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Abstract
To improve capacity and efficiency of the air transportation system, a number of new systems-
level changes have been proposed. Key aspects of the proposed changes are combined
functionality across technology and procedures and large physical scale of deployment. The
objective of this work is to examine the current safety assessment processes for systems-level
changes and to develop an understanding of key challenges and implications for the assessment
and approval of future systems-level changes.
From an investigation of current U.S. and international safety regulatory policies and processes,
a general model was created describing key processes supporting operational approval. Within
this model, a framework defined as an influence matrix was developed to analyze key decisions
regarding the required scope of analysis in safety assessment. The influence matrix represents
the expected change in levels of risk due to changes in behavior of elements of a system. It is
used to evaluate the appropriate scope of analysis in safety assessment. Three approaches to
performing safety assessment of systems-level changes were analyzed using the framework: the
risk matrix approach, target level of safety approach, and performance-based approach. Case
studies were performed using eight implemented and pending systems-level changes.
In this work, challenges expected in safety assessment of future systems-level changes were
identified. Challenges include the large scope of proposed changes, which drives a need for a
broad and deep scope of analysis, including the multiple hazards and conditions and complex
interactions between components of a change and the external system. In addition, it can be
expected that high safety expectations will increase the required accuracy of models and
underlying data used in safety assessment. Fundamentally new operational concepts are also
expected to expand the required scope of safety assessment, and a need to interface with legacy
systems will limit achievable operations. The large scope of analysis expected for future
changes will require new methods to manage scope of safety assessment, and insights into
potential approaches are discussed.
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and Engineering Systems
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1 Introduction: Air Transportation System Change and Safety
Assessment
The air transportation system in developed countries such as the U.S. and Europe is reaching its
capacity limits as evidenced by increasing delays. There is also a concern that the concepts of
operation based on 1950s-era radar-based surveillance and voice communication will limit
achievable future performance. To address these challenges, modernization initiatives propose
to replace aging infrastructure and incorporate new operational capabilities through changes in
technologies and procedures. Proposed changes to the United States air transportation system
are being developed through the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen)
modernization initiative [1]. Similar modernization efforts are underway in Europe as part of the
Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) program [2]. The proposed changes are of a
systems-level nature, combining multiple components over large physical scale with significant
procedural changes to achieve new operational capabilities.
A key requirement in implementing changes to the air transportation system is to assure that
safety is maintained. This is achieved, in part, through the processes of safety assessment and
operational approval. Motivated by the scale of proposed changes, this work seeks to develop an
understanding of key processes needed for their safety assessment.
1.1 Current Modernization Initiatives
In the United States, air transportation system modernization initiatives have been proposed as
part of the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). The goal of implementing
NextGen capabilities is to improve the performance and efficiency of the U.S. air transportation
system. The improvements envisioned in NextGen are large in physical scale; rely on distributed
capabilities across multiple system components; and represent fundamentally new operational
capabilities. This is illustrated by the operational view of the NextGen architecture in Figure
1-1. There are substantial stakeholders involved, significant changes to airspace operations, and
a broad impact on multiple air transportation system domains.
Figure 1-1: NextGen Enterprise Architecture Operational View [31
NextGen improvements incorporate new functional capabilities into the air transportation
system. An example is trajectory-based operations, which will add the dimension of time to
management of air traffic. Foundational technologies, such as Automatic Dependent
Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) and data communication are also proposed to increase air
traffic control performance and efficiency.
The air traffic management system in Europe faces similar challenges to the United States. The
corresponding modernization initiative, SESAR, is similar in philosophy to the NextGen vision,
and contains generally similar initiatives [4].
1.2 Increasing Air Transportation System Safety
There is a general trend of increasing safety in air transportation. This trend can be seen for
United States general aviation and commercial airlines in Figure 1-2. The total accident rate per
hour of operation has been reduced by a factor of 10 since 1940 for general aviation, and factor
of nearly 1,000 for commercial airline operations. The 5-year average accident rate for
scheduled air carrier operations from 2004-2008 was 7.7 fatal accidents per 10 million hours of
operation [5]. For general aviation, the rate of fatal accidents in the same time period was 1.3
per 100,000 hours of operation.
1000
* -GenralAmalon
Cornrercial Arlins
10-
0.1
1925 1935 1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
Year
Figure 1-2: Historical Trends in Accident Rates for Civil Aviation'
By another view, the rate of fatal accidents per million hours for the worldwide commercial jet
fleet has been steadily decreasing, as shown in Figure 1-3, reported by Boeing [6]. For U.S. &
Canadian operators, the rate has steadily declined from 1990-2004 as shown in the inset, but has
exhibited a small increasing trend from 2004-2008. However, fatal accident rates remain at low
levels, as can be seen for the broader range of data shown on the main chart.
The air transportation system in the United States and Europe is the safest form of transportation
in the world. The currently high safety of the system is the result of significant advances,
including implementation of specific technologies and changes to operational procedures and
training over a long time scale of operation.
Created from general and commercial aviation accidents statistics were from the National Transportation Safety
Board [17]. Historical general aviation accident statistics were obtained from the AOPA Air Safety Foundation and
commercial aviation from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics.
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Figure 1-3: World Wide Commercial Jet Fleet Fatal Accidents 161
It will be necessary to maintain or enhance safety in changes to the system. The currently low
accident rate can therefore be expected to result in continued high demands for safety
performance. Consistent with the need to enhance safety, FAA Aviation Safety Organization
recognizes goals for aircraft accident rate reductions [7] shown in Figure 1-4. The figure shows
baseline accident and fatality rates and planned reductions projected from the baseline year,
indicated by arrows. The goals set by the FAA include a 16% reduction in the accident rate for
General Aviation (GA) and non-scheduled Pt. 135 (charter) operations, and an 80% reduction in
airline fatal accident rates by 2010.
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Figure 1-4: FAA Aviation Safety Organization Goals for Accident Rate Reductions
1.3 Safety Assessment In Support of Operational Approval
Several types of regulatory approval are required before overall operational approval of a
proposed change. Airborne components, such as avionics, flight crews, and aircraft are certified
to Federal Aviation Regulations. Certification is a guarantee to the public that these components
meet minimum established performance criteria. In addition, organizations that operate aircraft,
such as commercial airlines, are certified for operations. Regulators approve airspace and Air
Traffic Control procedures and ground components based on internal policies, in contrast to
certification to regulations. Ground equipment has historically been from external venders and is
subject to formal acquisition milestones, which include safety approval of the systems.
Civil aviation authorities typically require a safety analysis process prior to granting operational
approval of proposed changes. The purpose of the analysis is to ensure that changes can be
implemented at an acceptable level of safety. Various approaches can be used to conduct safety
assessment, including assessment to levels of risk or derivation of performance in comparison to
reference systems with similar functionality [8].
1.4 Scoping in Safety Assessment
In safety assessment of a proposed change, complex safety behavior in a real system is simplified
to make analysis tractable. The scope of analysis is therefore limited, to ensure that the set of
safety behavior evaluated in safety assessment is representative of the key areas of concern in the
proposed change, while remaining sufficiently simple to analyze and understand.
.. .. . . ...... ................. ............ ......... . ....
Simplifications can be made in several areas of safety assessment. Evaluated operational
conditions can be limited, such that assessment considers only the worst possible system states.
Human behavior can be simplified, focusing on probabilistic estimation of the performance of
humans in committing errors, or in responding to dangerous conditions. Functional interactions
and system models may also be simplified depending upon the conditions that are evaluated.
Scoping decisions made in the safety assessment of a change influence the quality and validity of
the safety assessment. Inappropriate constraints in scope can lead to unexamined safety behavior
that can reduce the safety when the system is implemented. An inappropriately large scope can
also lead to overspecification. Mitigations applied can potentially be expensive to implement,
and should only be required when necessary to achieve safe operation. An inappropriately large
scope can result in mitigating already acceptable risks. With the increased complexity expected
in future changes, it is important to understand the implications of scoping decisions made
through different safety assessment processes. It is also important to understand the potential
limitations of current approaches to safety assessment and approval that may present challenges
for approval of future systems.
1.5 Research Objective
Because of the large scale of proposed changes and high safety expectations, it is likely that
safety assessment processes will be a significant challenge for future systems-level changes.
Therefore, the objective of this research is to understand current approaches to safety assessment,
with a key focus on corresponding methods for scoping analysis. Through this understanding, a
further objective is to identify key challenges and implications for safety assessment of future
changes.
1.6 Research Approach
The research objectives outlined above are achieved through a grounded theory approach [9].
This approach identifies key factors that define decisions made in the safety assessment of a
proposed systems-level change. The analysis of safety assessment decisions was initially
constructed from an investigation of current safety regulatory practices. It was then reinforced
through case studies of past and pending changes. From this analysis, it was then possible to
identify expected challenges in safety assessment and operational approval of future systems-
level changes.
The steps taken in the approach are listed below and briefly described in the following sections.
- Literature review
- Investigation of current safety regulatory policies and processes
- Review of regulatory policy and process documentation
- Interviews of personnel experienced in regulatory policy
- Monitoring of several active change efforts (e.g. Unmanned Aircraft Systems and
Automatic Dependent Surveillance, Broadcast)
- Synthesis of current regulatory practices into a general framework describing methods
and decisions in safety assessment processes supporting operational approval
- Use of framework to conduct detailed case studies of specific air transportation system
changes that required safety assessment and operational approval
- Application of the framework to identify challenges and implications for future air
transportation system changes
1.6.1 Investigation of Current Safety Regulatory Policies and Processes
National civil aviation authorities (e.g. the U.S. FAA, Australia's CASA, etc.) have implemented
different policies and processes for operational approval. To enable a detailed review, the
investigation of current policies and processes was specifically focused on the safety regulatory
practices of the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
Where appropriate, the review was extended to International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) policies and practices, as these serve as guidance for national regulatory policies. In
some cases, safety assessment or standard development is performed by external consensus
groups (e.g. RTCA, Inc) or international bodies (e.g. ICAO) with the involvement of FAA and
industry personnel. These practices were also within the scope of the review. In addition,
European safety regulatory policies and processes in for assessing Air Traffic Management
(ATM) systems were reviewed from Eurocontrol, the European Air Navigation Service Provider
(ANSP).
As shown in Table 1-1, there were seven types of documentation reviewed. FAA regulations for
aircraft airworthiness and certification processes define required performance of systems, and
required process steps. Advisory materials provide acceptable means of compliance with
regulations. Orders and notices described policies and practices for safety regulation. In
addition to FAA regulations, international standards and processes also govern certification
practices for some components of the air transportation system. Handbooks and manuals offer
explanatory guidance on conducting safety assessment or systems engineering processes.
Finally, consensus standards are established by advisory bodies and were used to examine safety
performance required for specific systems. Consensus standards also contain methods for
conducting safety assessment processes.
Table 1-1: Categories
Regulations (FAA) - defined legal standards for
elements of air transportation system
-Aircraft Airworthiness
-Certification Processes
Advisory Circulars (FAA) - acceptable means of
compliance with regulation
Orders (FAA) - internal policy established by FAA
lines of business
-Organizational: define roles and responsibilities of
organizations
-Process: describe processes and requirements
Notices (FAA) - temporary policy established by FAA
lines of business
of Documentation Reviewed
International Standards and Processes-guidance
material and requirements for signatory nations (ICAO)
or EU
-Safety Management Systems
-Requirements for ATC Changes
Handbooks & Manuals (FAA) -explanatory guidance
on performing safety management functions
-System Safety
-Safety Management System
-Systems Engineering
Consensus Standards (RTCA, SAE) - standards
established by advisory bodies for processes and
products
-Safety assurance of software and hardware
-System specifications
Interviews with regulatory personnel were also conducted. The interviews served several
purposes. They augmented the regulatory practice review by clarifying areas of conflicting
policy. Additionally, they provided insight into practices that were not documented. The
interview subjects also provided information that supported regarding studies of changes that
were currently in process and initially identified challenges expected in approval of future
systems. The list of the titles and organization of interview subjects is shown in Table 1-2. The
names of individuals are included in Appendix C. Where appropriate, supporting evidence
obtained from the interviews were used and referenced in the body of the work.
During the course of this research, insight was also gained into current FAA regulatory practices
and operational approval decision-making through participation in change initiatives that are
currently in progress. This included participation in several Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS)
change efforts in collaboration with NASA, FAA, MITRE, and the Department of Defense
(DoD). In addition, insight was gained into Automatic Dependent Surveillance, Broadcast
(ADS-B) decision-making through monitoring of efforts to identify costs and benefits, and
provide feedback to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) through an Aviation
Rulemaking Committee.
Table 1-2: Positions of Individuals Interviewed
Title & Organization Date (s)Interviewed
Aerospace Engineer, FAA Small Airplane 4/17/2007
Directorate, Standards Office
ADS-B Separation Standards Analysis Group, 4/25/2007Johns Hopkins University
Aerospace Engineer, Avionics Systems, FAA 5/10/2007
Aircraft Certification Service
Manager, DoD Joint Integrated Product Team for 7/20/2007UAS Airspace Access
Flight Test Engineer, FAA Small Airplane 4/20/2007
Directorate
Manager, Air Traffic Management, International 5/14/2007Civil Aviation Organization
5/11/2007
Staff Member, MIT Lincoln Laboratory 7/16/2007
Manager, Avionics Systems, FAA Aircraft 5/10/2007
Certification Service
Senior Manager, Air Traffic Operations, Fedex 4/17/2007
Aviation
As a result of these activities, a detailed review of current US safety regulatory policies and
processes is provided in Chapter 3. This review provides a description of the assessment and
approval processes for air transportation systems, and provides background for the activities
performed to assess and approve of systems-level changes that are the focus of this work.
1.6.2 Synthesis of Safety Assessment Decision-Making Methods
Based on the investigation into current regulatory approval processes, a general process model
was developed that described decision processes used in safety assessment as a prerequisite for
operational approval. An influence matrix framework was also developed to represent decision-
making regarding the influence of changes in proposed system behavior on risk. The framework
is introduced in Chapter 4.
Three distinct approaches to performing safety assessment for operational approval are described
using the framework in Chapter 5. These approaches include assessment to risk-based criteria
through target levels of safety and risk matrices. The analysis is also conducted for assessment
in comparison to a reference system.
1.6.3 Case Studies
Cases studies of past and pending air transportation system changes were performed to provide
insight into the application of safety assessment processes to specific systems. Cases were
selected which combined technical and procedural elements and introduced a change in the way
operations were performed in the air transportation system.
The case studies were limited to those with sufficient available documentation of the safety
assessment and safety case presented to regulators for approval. In some cases, direct
documentation of safety analysis was available, while others had sufficient documentation in
secondary literature. The cases studied are shown in Table 1-3. Six of the changes reviewed
have been implemented and are operational. Two cases are pending approval.
Table 1-3: Case Studies Analyzed
No Case Implemented
1 Instrument Landing Systems (ILS) 1961
2 North Atlantic Organized Track System 1966-1981(NAT OTS)
3 Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance 1993System (TCAS)
4 Precision Runway Monitor (PRM) 1997
5 Automatic Dependent Surveillance, 1999Broadcast (ADS-B) Alaska Capstone
6 EUR Reduced Vertical Separation 2002Minima (RVSM)
7 Automatic Dependent Surveillance, (pending)
7_____ Broadcast (ADS-B) Segments I and II (pending)
8 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) (pending)
The documentation available for Reduced Vertical Separation Minima (RVSM) in Europe
provided sufficient detail to apply the influence framework developed in the previous approach
step. This allowed scoping decisions to be discussed in detail in the EUR RVSM case, using the
influence framework in Chapter 7. The safety assessment process was examined for other cases,
and the analysis was used to identify key trends and challenges in safety assessment of each
specific change. The analysis and discussion of the remaining 7 cases and additional aspects of
RVSM is included in Appendix D.
1.6.4 Identification of Challenges and Implications for Future Air Transportation System
Changes
Evidence from the previous analyses conducted was used to identify challenges in safety
assessment and operational approval of future systems-level changes. These challenges are
described and analyzed in Chapter 7.

2 Key Concepts and Literature Review
This chapter presents an overview and definition of key safety concepts used in this work.
Alternate definitions will also be acknowledged and discussed when they differ significantly
from those used in this work. First, key concepts related to safety as a property of events are
defined. Next, key concepts related to the process of assessing safety are defined.
A review of the literature was conducted in the areas of safety in complex systems and system
change processes, specifically focusing on air transportation systems. The literature review is
presented following the definition of key concepts. This review of the general literature is
separate from the safety regulatory policy and process documentation that was reviewed as a
basis for description of current safety regulatory processes in the following chapter.
2.1 Operational Events and Safety
The goal of safety is to eliminate harm to things that society values. A system is said to be safe
if it does not exhibit harm. For this work, safety is defined as freedom from harm to people and
property. Prevention of harm to people and property is the basis of safety standards in air
transportation. Therefore, safety is defined in this work as:
Safety: freedom from harm to people and property
It is common to define safety conceptually. There are alternate definitions of safety as an
acceptable level of safety, which implies a threshold for which unsafe occurrences are tolerated
(see e.g. [10, 11]). This alternate definition recognizes that it is impractical to expect perfect
safety in an operational, safety-critical system.
Safety is often measured through its absence. An accident is an occurrence in the operation of a
system that causes harm to people or property. Accidents are therefore unsafe occurrences.
Accident: an occurrence of harm to people or property in the operation of a system.
There can be different magnitudes of harm associated with occurrences. Differing magnitudes
are defined by the measure of severity. Severity is typically defined through discrete categories
of severity (e.g. minor, hazardous, catastrophic). Defining categories and criteria for severity is a
policy decision that incorporates societal values regarding magnitude of harm. In air
transportation safety assessment, adverse effects on people and property are typically used to
define categories of harm in air transportation.
Severity: a measure of magnitude of harm.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the U.S. federal agency responsible for
investigating transportation accidents defines an accident as having a different level of severity
than defined above: as death or serious injury or hull loss 2.
The concept of risk is frequently used in judging the safety of a system. Two definitions are
presented here related to risk: risk as an event and risk as a measure. A risk event, which will be
defined as a risk, is an adverse occurrence with associated harm. For example, when it is stated
that operating an aircraft carries elements of risk, it is meant that there is the potential for
something undesirable to occur, such as an accident. A risk event is a hypothesized occurrence
used in evaluating the safety of the system. It can be an occurrence directly associated with harm
to people or property. A risk event can also be an occurrence with an indicator of potential for
harm, such as an increase in workload.
Risk: An occurrence with associated harm to people or property or with indicators of the
potential harm to people or property
2 In 49 CFR 830.2 [governing the NTSB] - Definitions, an accident is defined as any occurrence of death or serious
injury of any person, or substantial damage to an aircraft that occurs in operation of the aircraft.
Additionally, Boeing commonly reports accident statistics in the form of hull losses. This term originates in the
insurance injury, indicating that the aircraft hull is damaged beyond repair and the accident is a total financial loss.
Risk events can be aggregated into a group by common factors. Risks can be grouped by
severity of harm (e.g. fatal accidents, catastrophic accidents, etc). Risks can also be grouped by
a common category of causality (e.g. controlled flight into terrain, runway overrun, etc [12]).
Examining risks as groups can indicate common approaches to reduce their likelihood of
occurrence, or can be used to judge the safety of a given class of events.
For any individual risk or grouping of risks, it is useful to define the level of risk. The level of
risk, or risk level, measures the likelihood of occurrence of the risk event.
Level of Risk: a measure of the likelihood of a risk event
A hazard is defined in system safety to occupy an intermediate state between a set of potential
initiating events and their harmful outcomes. In this work, a hazard will be defined as a set of
conditions that could result in harm. This is consistent with common practice in civil aviation
[11, 13] and military risk assessment processes [14]. Because it represents an intermediate state,
for every hazard present in the operation of a system there can be several potential risks that can
follow.
Hazard: A set of conditions of a system that could result in harm
2.2 Safety Assessment
Safety assessment is a structured process to evaluate the expected safety of a system. The
process can be performed for a system which is either hypothetical or currently in operation, and
techniques and methods used to characterize safety performance can vary.
Safety Assessment: a process for determining the expected safety of a system
There is often a need to define criteria for acceptable safety performance. These standard will be
defined as acceptability criteria. Acceptability criteria have several forms. As examples, they
can be in the form of a required process, an acceptable level of risk, or a measure of system
performance.
Acceptability criteria/criterion: a criterion or set of criteria that define acceptable safety
In a strict sense, safety assessment is an analysis process for determining expected safety, and
does not imply any action taken to address performance beyond those defined in acceptability
criteria. In the assessment of a system, it is likely risk levels may exceed acceptability criteria.
The process of addressing unacceptable levels of risk assessed - by deriving requirements for a
system or changes to the system - will be defined as mitigation.
Mitigation: the process of addressing unacceptable safety performance of a system.
The associated requirements derived through safety assessment and mitigation to meet safety
objectives will be defined here as safety-derived requirements.
Safety Derived Requirements: requirements derived through safety assessment to meet a
safety objective.
2.3 Literature Review
The discussion of literature is organized by topic area. The first section describes relevant
literature on the perception and communication of risk. The next section discusses literature
related to accidents and safety. The following section focuses on new approaches to assessment
of safety-critical systems. The next section describes literature relevant to change processes in
air transportation system. The section concludes with current literature discussing safety
assessment in air transportation, with some literature directly addressing expected challenges in
future changes.
2.3.1 The Concept of Risk, Risk Perception, and Risk Communication
The concept of risk is the subject of a significant amount of scholarly work across multiple
disciplines. Among other characteristics, studies have focused on the definition of key attributes
of risk, how risk is communicated and perceived, and how risk is measured.
There is general consensus that the applicable concept of risk to technological systems is a
relationship to danger or harm [15]. A further review of varying definitions of the concept of
risk is provided by Thompson and Dean [16]. The authors classified risk definitions on a
spectrum of contextualist and probabilist interpretations. As a probabilistic concept, risk is
defined as a combination of probability and associated severity of an event. This approach was
common in early technological studies of risk, most notably those by Starr and Whipple [17]. In
contrast, the contextualist interpretation holds that risk is determined by multiple factors, of
which likelihood is only one among several. This view is common in psychological literature
[18] [19].
In commercial air transportation, the probabilistic approach is common in characterizing risk.
The NTSB reports annual accident rates by type of aircraft operation (e.g. general aviation,
commercial airlines, etc [5].) Boeing reports hull loss occurrences categorized by an
internationally-defined taxonomy [12].
Accidents invoke a phenomenon known as the social amplification of risk, as explained by
Kasperson [20]. This amplification of risk occurs primarily due to the response of the media,
which amplifies the effects of one event in "ripples" to other areas of industry and society [20].
The amplification of risk perception through media coverage has been studied [21]. Commercial
aviation accidents are generally perceived as more strongly related to risk as they typically result
in multiple fatalities, typically occur near metropolitan areas, and are heavily covered by the
media [22]. Risk perception is also related to the policy question of acceptable risk, studied
extensively by Fischhoff, et al. [23].
2.3.2 Accident Causality and Safety
Early examination of safety in complex sociotechnical systems was performed by Rasmussen
[24], laying the foundation for several related areas of investigation into the many factors that
contribute to accidents in complex systems. Normal Accident theory was proposed by Perrow
[25] to describe system accidents as the result of complexity and tight coupling in systems. In
addition, Reason [26] has examined organizational factors and structures that contribute to
accidents. High reliability organizations [27] are a formalism that also describe organizational
management of complex systems.
Increasing focus has been applied to addressing the role that organizational factors and
conditions contribute to the safety of systems. Hollnagel, et al. [28] have defined the concept of
resilience to formalize the analysis of organizational structures and conditions and how they
respond to emergent safety issues.
Many best practices related to organizational response to accidents have been incorporated into
guidance on Safety Management Systems in industry and by Regulators [11, 29]. Safety
Management Systems promote a safety culture and best practices to dynamically manage safety
in organizations.
2.3.3 New Approaches to Safety Assessment in Complex, Safety-Critical Systems
Traditional approaches to safety-assessment are widely established and utilized. Fault tree
analysis/ event tree analysis (FTA/ETA), failure hazard analysis (FHA), and failure modes and
effects analysis (FMEA) were initially used to describe failure modes of mechanical systems.
The basic cause-hazard-consequence method of safety assessment has been extended to describe
human, software, and organizational failures. The use of hazard assessment is well established
in air transportation system standards on safety assessment by the FAA [11] and others [30, 31].
A review of current methods and models of civil air transportation safety can be found in [32].
There is a recognition that extending the failure probability approach to complex systems
involving human and organizational failures becomes increasingly difficult as the complexity
grows and failures shift from mechanical failures to human and organizational failures. One new
approach has been to assess the influence of organizational factors on safety through system
dynamic modeling by Leveson [33]. This approach focuses on the general influence of
organizational structure and authority on risk. This approach does not, however, seek to quantify
risk or provide decision guidance on system configurations to reduce risk. Marais has extended
this approach [34] by identifying and understanding archetypes of organizational influences on
risk.
A separate approach to safety assessment involves quantifying expert judgment of event
probabilities. These subjective probabilities can be structured as transition likelihoods for
physical events, and arranged in Petri nets. This allows complex behavior to emerge from
simple descriptions of the actions of many agents as so-called agent-based modeling. This
approach originated at NLR with Blom and integrated into the TOPAZ tool [35]. Another
approach to elicit expert probabilities to on risk influences of different interventions. This
approach is known as a Bayesian Belief Network (see e.g. [36]).
As systems have become more complex, the underlying assumptions and justifications in
assessing change have also become more numerous. To address the often complex nature of a
safety case, Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) provides a method to organize the arguments in
support of a safety case [37]. The purpose of GSN is to determine if logically consistent
justifications are made in the safety analysis of a system, or to determine the required
reassessment if an aspect of a safety case comes under question.
Software poses a separate set of challenges in safety assurance. The National Academy of
Science recently examined software challenges and conclude that additional evidence-based
approaches are need to assure software integrity [38]. To this point, software standards have
been focused on integrity assurance through assurance on the development process [39]. Some
approaches, such as formal methods use structured mathematical theory to assure implemented
software performs as specified, but are currently limited to simple functions performed by
software [38].
2.3.4 Air Transportation Change Processes
In general, it is difficult to achieve system transition in air transportation. Due to the complexity
of the system, and its multi-stakeholder nature, change is typically a long and complicated
process, as shown by Mozdzanowska [40]. Safety catalytic events tend to drive safety-related
changes for the system, but it is not clear what will be a parallel driver for capacity-driven
system modernization. The delivery of cost and benefit to stakeholders has also been
investigated [41].
Several studies have highlighted issues in FAA safety approval processes generally, and for
specific systems. RTCA Task Force 4 was charged in 1999 with examining the FAA
certification processes for new systems [42]. The task force found several deficiencies related to
systems engineering, dealing with emerging technology, coordinating management processes,
and understanding human interactions with systems. GAO has also reviewed coordination
processes for new technology, and found insufficient coordination between processes for
certification of airborne equipment and approval of ground equipment [43]. Concerns have also
been highlighted with the organizational structure of the FAA as both regulator and operator in a
review by the Brookings Institution [44].
GAO has examined several cases of delayed approval, or of specific problems in specifying new
technologies. One example is the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) [45]. Other
studies have highlighted similar persistent issues in other programs, such as Controller-Pilot
Datalink communications (CPDLC) [43]. In addition, Hansen examined the air carrier oversight
process, noting increasing trends toward risk-based oversight [46]. The DOT inspector general's
office has audited FAA's Aviation Safety Action program and found deficiencies in the use of
risk-based data [47]. Downer [48] studied issues in assurance bases and test criteria from a
sociological standpoint, primarily through reviewing airworthiness criteria.
2.3.5 Challenges in Future Air Transportation Safety
A growing body of literature motivates the need to identify precursors to accidents. Future work
is likely to build fundamentally on the theory of parameter identification of distributions based
on a limited number of observations, described by [49]. Experienced safety assessors, such as
Fowler and Brooker have identified research challenges in safety of new air traffic control
systems [50] [51]. The authors highlight the need to identify precursors and utilize less
reliability-focused methods, extending analysis to organizational and other systems-level factors
[52].
3 Current Safety Regulatory Processes and Policies in US Air
Transportation
This chapter provides a summary of current safety regulatory processes and policies in air
transportation. This includes both approval processes and standards for various components of
the air transportation system as well as supporting safety assessment processes. The
investigation is focused on U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) policies, processes, and
procedures. FAA policies are similar to those used in other developed nations. Where it is
relevant to current FAA policy, international policies on approval are also highlighted and
explained.
The chapter begins with an overview of the components of the air transportation system and a
discussion of relevant policies regarding their approval. Additionally, the distribution of
functionality across air transportation system components in systems-level changes is further
emphasized. After this introduction, a model of the assessment and approval processes for
changes with distributed functionality is introduced, which has been created based on the
investigation of current safety regulatory policies and practices. This model describes the
structure and sequence of specific approval processes and standards for individual components of
a distributed change.
Following the model, background is provided on the general safety assessment processes used to
determine required performance at a systems-level. This discussion focuses on the general FAA
process of Safety Risk Management, and its similarity to safety assessment approaches used in
industry and advisory committees to derive requirements for a systems-level change. After the
discussion of safety risk management, approval processes for specific components of the air
transportation system will be described. This discussion provides background on the varied
approaches used to assure the safety of air transportation components, and highlights key
differences between processes.
The chapter concludes with a brief overview of other processes present in the air transportation
system that affect safety. These include oversight and monitoring processes that are beyond the
scope of this work.
3.1 Air Transportation System Components
The air transportation system consists of multiple interacting components that serve to safely
transport passengers and cargo. These components are both physical and virtual: including
aircraft and ground-based infrastructure as well as procedures. Each of these components can be
considered a system in itself, with further decomposition to components. As an example, an
aircraft can be described as one component of the overall air transportation system. An aircraft
can also be described as a system, with the components of wings, passengers, avionics, etc. A
systems-level change is composed of distributed functionality across air transportation system
components of aircraft, air traffic control, etc. that will be described in more detail here. This is
consistent with describing these objects as components of the overall air transportation system.
Components of the air transportation system outside of the boundary of the proposed change will
be referred to as being part of the external system.
A summary of the components of the air transportation system and relevant policies is shown in
Figure 3-1, which has been updated and adapted from [42]. On the airborne side, aircraft are
defined as "contrivances designed to fly in the air" [53]. Aircraft include a wide range of types -
hang gliders, ultralights, unmanned aircraft systems, propeller, jet transports, helicopters, etc.
Unless otherwise noted, when aircraft are referenced in this work, it is generally assumed that
these are conventional airplanes such as commercial airliners, business jets, and recreational
aircraft. Major subcomponents of aircraft are also certified separately, known as subcomponents
or parts. These include engines and propellers. Avionics also fall under this category, which are
electronic equipment installed in aircraft.
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Figure 3-1: Air Transportation System Components Requiring Safety Approval
(Adapted from [42])
Also in the airborne category, aircraft are operated and maintained by airmen. Pilots are the
most common category of airmen. However, the category also describes flight engineers,
navigators, dispatchers, mechanics, and repairmen. In this work, the flight crew will generally
refer to the pilots of aircraft. For certain types of operations, there are organizations created to
operate single or multiple aircraft. In these cases, the organizations are referred to as aircraft
operators. Commonly, these organizations are referred to as airlines, and there are several
different categories depending upon the type of operation that will not be described in detail
here.
There are also components of the air transportation system that function as supporting
infrastructure, which facilitate the operation of the system. For example, Air Traffic Control
(ATC) relies on ground and satellite-based surveillance, navigation and communication to
support separation of aircraft and access to resources. Air traffic control is performed by air
traffic controllers. Controller tasks are supported by hardware and software-based decision
support systems, displays, and automation. There are other physical components of ground
infrastructure. These include airports - locations for aircraft to takeoff and land. Space-based
infrastructure, such as the Global Positioning System (GPS), and communication satellites also
support the operation of the system.
The functioning of the air transportation system is based on a common set of procedures. These
procedures, generally referred to as "rules of the air" define protocols for operation under
different conditions. Specific operational procedures certified for use by airlines and pilots, and
controllers are trained and conduct defined procedures. Specific navigation procedures, such as
routes for arrival and departure to airports are also used.
3.2 Safety Assessment and Operational Approval of Distributed Capabilities
The Investigation of current safety regulatory practices was used to construct a representation of
the general process of assessment and approval of systems-level capabilities. This is shown in
Figure 3-2 and discussed in this section. In the figure, an overall system or proposed change is
highlighted in grey. Elements of a change are divided into the categories of aircraft-based,
procedural, and infrastructure components. Other objects and processes are defined in the
legend.
The steps preceding operational approval generally fall into the categories shown at the top of
the figure. A system description process takes a desired capability in the system and defines the
artifacts that are required to achieve that capability. These artifacts constitute the proposed
change, and can include flight crew procedures, aircraft avionics, operational procedures, and
infrastructure (air traffic control, surveillance, and communication infrastructure). In addition,
the applications performed by the proposed change are also part of the system description.
Examples of applications are airborne self-separation or midair collision conflict avoidance. At
this stage, the description of the proposed change is usually captured in a concept of operations,
which describes both the components of the change, and how it will be operated in the air
transportation system.
The proposed change is assessed to safety standards at a system level through modeling and
analysis. This process is safety assessment. Safety assessment is one basis for the general
process of specification development shown in the figure. Specification development leads to
detailed specifications from the description of artifacts of the proposed change. Specifications
can be decomposed to individual components of the change, as shown. There can also be
specified required performance at a systems level.
This work is focused on the processes of safety assessment at a systems level. It is at this stage
of the system's life cycle where significant flexibility exists to incorporate changes to the system.
Standards derived at this stage are also used in downstream approval processes.
The process of incorporation of safety-derived requirements occurs after detailed specification
development. In this process, detailed specifications derived through safety assessment are
incorporated into existing approval processes. This step is necessary due to existing divisions of
responsibility and separate processes for approval by component. In the figure, orange ovals
represent the policies governing each individual component, through which specific
requirements will be enforced. Based on these standards, the resulting types of requirements are
shown in boxes following each process.
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There are subtle but important differences between airborne and ground capabilities in how new
requirements are integrated into existing policies and processes. In general, for aircraft-based
capabilities, performance is certified to minimum standards specified by regulation. Regulations
also govern how the certification process is performed. For certain system elements (e.g.
avionics), regulations or regulatory guidance (e.g. advisory circulars) establish minimum
performance standards for the specific element. Safety-derived requirements are incorporated as
standards for equipment. As an example, if a specific flight crew or airline will utilize
procedures, they are approved as part of the carrier's operating certificate. Changes made to
operating rules require a notice of proposed rulemaking.
For ground-based systems, safety-derived requirements are incorporated through systems
engineering processes of validation and verification to internal regulatory or procurement
standards. This is due to the historical practice of acquiring ground-based systems, where a
system as a whole is built to specifications and acquired and implemented by the operator. By
this process, acquisition policies establish methods for including safety-derived requirements
along with other general requirements, which are approved in program milestones.
Specifics of procedures may differ depending upon whether they support an airborne capability
or infrastructure capability, but the general function performed is common to the two
capabilities, shown by the dashed line connecting airborne and ATC/ground operating
procedures. Procedures are decomposed and approved separately for airborne and infrastructure
domains.
As a final step, safety approval processes are conducted for the specific artifacts or procedures
that compose the proposed change. The specific process used to achieve this is labeled on the
arrows from requirements to approval processes. The completion of component safety approval
processes result in an approved artifact or procedure. Once all elements in a capability are
approved, the capability is operational. This is shown as the airborne operational capability,
procedural operational capability, and infrastructure operational capability. For some changes,
one of these capabilities in isolation may be sufficient for an application. However, when the
change is distributed across air, ground and procedural capabilities, all are necessary to achieve
an operational capability in the system.
This section has provided an overview of the general flow of assessment and approval processes
to achieve an operational capability. In the following sections, the detailed policies and
processes for approval of individual components will be described.
3.3 Safety Assessment
Safety assessment is the process of examining safety-related behavior of a system by: defining
potential hazardous states, determining if hazards meet defined safety objectives, and correcting
any deficiencies that do not satisfy safety objectives. Safety assessment is a key process
supporting safety approval decisions across a range of air transportation system components. Its
extensive use in setting systems-level safety performance requirements merits a detailed
discussion in this section. Within FAA operational approval documentation [11], safety
assessment is referred to as Safety Risk Management (SRM).
There are several forms of analysis within the category of safety assessment. When examining
failures of components of a system, the process is referred to as Fault Hazard Analysis (FHA).
When performed early in a system's life cycle, the safety risk management process is a
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA). There are many other individual techniques used to
perform safety assessments that are risk management processes, but will not be discussed in
detail here.
The FAA requires safety assessment to be performed for any change to the air transportation
system that could significantly impact safety. ATO SMS policy requires safety assessment for
significant changes to airspace, procedures, or Air Traffic Control systems [11]. In addition,
several aerospace design standards incorporate guidance on determining system performance
requirements to meet acceptable risk levels. RTCA publishes guidance on system design
processes for air traffic services supported by data communications [30]. Other safety
assessment guidance includes SAE ARP 4761 [31], the FAA System Safety Handbook (which
was primary guidance prior to SMS implementation) [13], Mil-STD-882 [14], and FAA
acquisition guidance [54]. Risk matrices are also used in European safety standards (e.g.
ESARR4 [55]) and other safety-critical industries [56].
In more detail, the four steps in the risk management process described in the ATO SMS [11]
are:
1) Describe the system: Functional relationships within the system are described, as well as the boundary
of the system and its relationship within an external system in which it operates.
2) Identify hazards: through two different processes, potential hazards are identified, and a set of hazards
expected in operation of the system is obtained. Backward identification considers causes of unsafe
states in the system, and then infers which general hazardous states the system could arrive at.
Forward identification considers potential outcomes (such as a midair collision), and then deducts what
hazardous states could precede these outcomes.
3) Analyze and Assess Risk: Using a model of the system, existing risk controls are identified, and then
the potential risk of each hazard is assessed through a system model. The system model can be a
quantitative model, or can be implicitly held by assessors to arrive at qualitative judgments. Based on
the combination of severity and likelihood, risks are ranked in a risk space, and prioritized for potential
interventions.
4) Treat Risk: Once risks have been ranked and categorized, they are treated by applying mitigations or
requirements to reduce risk to an acceptable level. It is usually assumed that these treatments are
independent of the previous behavior of the system. The new "mitigated" system does not need to be
re-analyzed through the risk assessment process. In the case of design requirements, models of the
system may be redone with new design requirements [11].
Acceptability Standards. The FAA ATO SMS also defines acceptability criteria in risk
management. The criteria used for acceptability are defined in a risk matrix, shown in
Figure 3-3. The matrix is organized with levels of risk severity along one dimension, and
categories of likelihood (risk level) along the other dimension. A given risk is assigned a
ranking based on its location in the matrix, which is function of its risk level and severity. For
the ATO SMS risk matrix, there are three risk rankings: high, medium, and low. Mitigation and
approval requirements differ depending upon the risk ranking. As an example, risks with a risk
ranking of "high risk" are unacceptable without mitigation [11], and mitigation measures are
required to be approved by the air traffic oversight (AOV) branch for risks initially ranked as
high. In the ATO SMS process, risks are identified for each hazard analyzed, and it is typically
the worst credible risk that is ranked in the risk matrix.
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Figure 3-3: Risk Matrix Classification of Risk [11]
Five categories of severity range from no safety effect to catastrophic. As the severity level
increases, the magnitude of harm associated with the risk increases. As an example, hazardous
severity events on aircraft are characterized by a small number of severe or fatal injuries.
Catastrophic level events result in multiple fatalities or hull losses (the destruction of an aircraft
fuselage). Severity of harm is classified depending on general effects, and specific effects on the
function of air traffic control and the flying public (flight crews and passengers). The categories
of severity and associated descriptions from the FAA ATO SMS [11] are shown in Table 3-1.
Some categories do not directly have fatality or injury harms associated with them. As an
example, major severity ATC events are characterized by a reduction in separation due to a low
or moderate severity operational error, or significant reduction in ATC capability. Neither of
these criteria directly describes harm to passengers. Instead, they indicate an increased potential
for harm.
.............. ............. .......................... ....
Table 3-1: ATO SMS Severity Definitions [111
Effect Hazard Severity Classification
on: No Safety Effect Minor Major Hazardous Catastrophic
Does not significantly Reduces the capability Reduces the capability Total loss of systems
reduce system safety. of the system or of the system or the control such that (see
Required actions are operators to cope with operators ability to below):
within operator's adverse operating cope with adverse
capabilities. Includes conditions to the extent conditions to the extent
(see below): that there would be a that there would be a
U__________ 
_ (see below): (see below):
Slight increase in ATC Slight reduction in ATC Reduction in separation Reduction in separation Collision with other
workload capability, or significant as defined by a as defined by a high aircraft, obstacles,
increase in ATC low/moderate severity severity operational
workload operational error (as error (as defined in
defined in FAA Order FAA Order 7210.56), or
7210.56), or significant a total loss of ATC
reduction in ATC (ATC Zero)
capability
No effect on flight crew Slight increase in Significant increase in Large reduction in safety Outcome would result
Has no effect on safety workload flight crew workload margin or functional in:
- Inconvenience Slight reduction in safety Significant reduction in capability Hull loss
margin or functional safety margin or Serious or fatal injury to Multiple fatalities
capabilities functional capability small number
Minor illness or damage Major illness, injury, or Physical distress!
Some physical damage excessive workload
7210.6ndiscomfort tPhysicaldistress I
Definitions of risk levels in the ATO SMS are defined as shown in Table 3-2 [11]. Both
quantitative and qualitative definitions of likelihood are defined. Five categories of risk levels
range from frequent to exRremely improbable. Each category increases the quantitative
description of likelihood by two orders of magnitude, from 10-a events/hr to 1d0e events/hr.
Risk level criteria are commonly referenced for hazardous and catastrophic events. By referring
to Figure 3-3, it may be noted that the minimum acceptable level of risk for a catastrophic event
is extremely improbable. This translates to a quantitative probability of 10-9 events/hr.
Similarly, for hazardous severity events, the probability is 1 (0 a events/hr.
FAA advisory circulars for aircraft systems, AC 23.1309 [57] and 25.1309 [58] also present risk-
matrix criteria as methods for assessment of failure conditions of installed systems. These
methods are not addressed in this work as they are a means of assessing required reliability of
aircraft subsystems.
3 For more information regarding these definitions, refer to FAA Advisory Circular 25.1309-1A, System Design
Analysis, 06-21-88. [footnote in original]
Table 3-2: ATO SMS Likelihood Definitions [111
NAS Systems Flight Procedures ATC Operational
Quantitative Qualitative Per Facility NAS-wide
Individual Item/ ATC Service/
System NAS Level
System
Probability of occurrence Expected to occur Continuously Probability of occurrence Expected to Expected to
per operation/ operational about once every experienced in the per operation/ operational occur more occur more
hour is equal to or greater 3 months for an system hour is equal to or greater than once per than every 1-2
than 1x10 3  item than 1x103  week days
Probability of occurrence Expected to occur Expected to occur Expected to Expected to
per operation/ operational about once per frequently in the occur about occur about
hour is less thanIx10I , but year for an item system once every several times
0 equal to or greater than month per month
1x10 5
Probability of occurrence Expected to occur Expected to occur Probability of occurrence Expected to Expected to
per operation/ operational several times in numerous times per operation/ operational occur about occur about
hour is less than or equal to life cycle of an in system life hour is less than or equal to once every once every
1x10 5but equal to or item cycle lx104but equal to or year few months
greater than 1x10-7  greater than 1x10
> Probability of occurrence Unlikely to occur, Expected to occur Probability of occurrence Expected to Expected to
E per operation/ operational but possible in an several times in per operation/ operational occur about occur about
,UE hour is less than or equal to item's life cycle the system life hour is less than or equal to once every once every 3
g Ix10but equal to or cycle 1x104but equal to or 10-100 years years
greater than 1x10-9  greater than lx 10~
- Probability of occurrence So unlikely that it Unlikely to occur, Probability of occurrence Expected to Expected to
per operation/ operational can be assumed but possible in per operation/ operational occur less occur less
hour is less than Ix10-9 that it will not system life cycle hour is less than 1x10-9  than once than once
x 2 occur in an item's every 100 every 30 years
W___ life cycle years
3.4 Safety Approval Processes by Air Transportation System Component
The previous section described the safety risk management process used by the FAA in
evaluating systems-level changes. Previously, this process was placed in the context of the more
specific safety approval processes for each component of the air transportation system. This
section presents a more detailed discussion of safety approval processes by component of the air
transportation system.
Approval processes will be described in the following order: aircraft and airborne equipment
certification; airmen and air traffic controller certification; operator certification and operational
approval; and airspace procedure design and approval. Following this, approval processes are
for specific procedures, programs, or aspects of a systems-level capability are discussed. These
include: separation standards and surveillance systems; ground-based programs; and software
and complex electronic hardware.
3.4.1 Aircraft and Airborne Equipment Certification
The FAA certifies aircraft and associated components through several certification processes.
Aircraft airworthiness is certified through an airworthiness certificate. A type certificate is
"issued by the FAA when the applicant demonstrates that a product complies with the applicable
regulations [59]." This certificate is issued for the general design of one type of aircraft
following an extensive set of review procedures between the FAA and the applicant [59]. Each
individual aircraft is issued an airworthiness certificate for a given type design. Airworthiness
of individual aircraft of a type is guaranteed through a quality control process called
conformance. Type certification of an aircraft encompasses all subcomponents within the type
design, including the structure of the aircraft, avionics, and any parts used in the aircraft. It also
dictates other products that are approved for use on the aircraft, such as engines and propellers.
A type certificate is issued to an established regulatory basis, which includes applicable
airworthiness standards, any agreed-upon deviations from standards and appropriate measures,
and process documentation. Airworthiness standards are published in FAR Parts 23, 25, 27, 29,
31, 33, and 35. There are exceptional categories of airworthiness certificates that can be issued
without type designs, such as experimental airworthiness certificates for research and
development [60] and amateur-built aircraft. There are also classes of aircraft, such as ultralights
[61], that do not require airworthiness certification prior to operation. Minor changes to type
certificates can also be obtained through a supplemental type certificate. Supplemental Type
Certificates (STCs) are used for changes to the aircraft not included in the original type
certificate, such as repairs to structure. They are also used to certify changes to major
components that are updated from the original type certificate, ranging from cockpits to wheel
assemblies. The process for application and issuance of certificates for aircraft and parts is also
established by specific regulation.
The FAA also issues production certificates [62] to applicants. A production certificate is a form
of approval to manufacture a given type design or part. Holding a production certificate
expedites the issuance of airworthiness certificates for individual aircraft.
4 FAR Part 21, Certification Procedures for Products and Parts
Major subsystems of such as propellers are subject to separate sets of regulations that prescribe
their required minimum performance. Separate companies from airframe manufacturers
typically manufacture propellers and engines.
For subcomponents of aircraft, there are processes for approval of parts of aircraft that can be
installed or replaced when not covered by the type certification of the aircraft. These include
Supplemental Type Certificates (STC), Technical Standard Orders (TSO), and Parts
Manufacturing Approval (PMA). STC approval was discussed above, and is generally granted
to an applicant for a major change to a type certificate [63]. PMA is granted to an applicant from
the FAA as design and manufacturing approval for a replacement part for type certified aircraft
[63].
A TSO is different from a PMA, although it serves a similar function, to certify the design and
artifact for a replacement part. The basis for a TSO is a "minimum performance standard for
specified articles [64]" Thus, a technical standard order approval is to an FAA-published
specification of performance. TSOs contain functional requirements, certification process
requirements, and testing requirements to certify given articles. It does not allow for approval of
installation or use of the avionics [65].
Processes for approval of aircraft parts require the FAA to publish associated orders or advisory
circulars, which dictate their minimum performance. Creation of these standards is abbreviated
compared to the process for creating new regulations, but it also provides a level of
standardization apart from detailed review of an entire aircraft design. However, it has been
found that TSOs are increasingly being used for more complex avionics [42]. Therefore defining
requirements for TSOs requires more effort than in the past.
3.4.2 Certification of Airmen and Credentialing of Air Traffic Controllers
The FAA is certifies airmen and other flight crewmembers that operate aircraft, instruct others in
operation, or perform maintenance. In general, certification requires completion of a specified
training program and milestones, passage of knowledge tests, medical examination and
sFAR Part 33 - Airworthiness Standards for Engines, and FAR Part 35 - Airworthiness Standards for Propellers
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certification, and practical examination, among others . To maintain privileges of some airmen
licenses, there are also recurring requirements for continued experience (called currency
requirements).
Specifically for pilots, certification privileges are categorized along several divisions. A pilot
certificate allows a pilot to operate under Visual Flight Rules (VFR), a set of defined weather
conditions that allow for visual navigation, detection of other air traffic, and landing. A separate
rating, known as an instrument rating, is required to operating an aircraft under Instrument Flight
Rules (IFR).
Pilot licenses can give the privilege to operate aircraft by category, which give a pilot an ability
to operate broad classes of aircraft. Categories are typically defined by number of engines and
type of airplane (land, seaplane, glider, balloon). As aircraft become more complex, it may be is
necessary to be "checked out" and hold a rating in a specific airplane type. This is required for
aircraft above 12,500 lb. or turbine powered. A type rating gives the privilege to operate a
specific aircraft by type.
Licenses are also granted at several levels, ranging from student pilot to air transport pilot.
Levels provide different classes of privileges or, conversely, limitations. As an example, a
commercial pilot can carry passengers for compensation or hire, while a private pilot is limited
only to sharing the cost of operation with passengers. Pilots can also earn ratings allowing them
to instruct other pilots.
Some types of aircraft do not require a private pilot certificate to operate. Ultralights require
only a driver's license (except for additional requirements in some states), while sport pilot
certificates are granted with an abbreviated training process and less stringent medical
requirements. These classes of aircraft are also typically no certified to the same level of
airworthiness (as discussed above) as other classes of aircraft.
Air Traffic Controllers are required to pass an FAA-approved training program, most commonly
the FAA Academy in Oklahoma City (there are also processes for abbreviated training for
6 FAR Part 61, Certification: Pilots, Flight Instructors, and Ground Instructors; FAR Part 63: Certification: Flight
Crewmembers Other Than Pilots; FAR Part 64: Certification: Airmen Other Than Flight Crewmembers.
military air traffic controllers, and other authorized training centers). Initial training is combined
with an apprenticeship process at operational centers. Initial controller coursework focuses on
general knowledge of airspace, weather, and aircraft performance. Next, controllers learn
procedures for their functional position through a combination of classroom instruction and
simulator training [66]. Following academic work, controllers are then trained on the job at their
assigned air traffic control center. The entire process takes approximately five years [66].
With the creation of the Air Traffic Oversight Branch (AOV), Air Traffic controllers are
"credentialed" based on a completion of a set training process, and proficiency at a specific
facility [67]. This was made as an effort to provide more structured regulation of Air Traffic
Operations.
Other personnel engaged in safety-critical support activities are also certified, such as airway
facility maintenance technicians to internal FAA standards [68] after completing required
training.
3.4.3 Operator Certificates and Operational Approval
Aircraft that are certified or meet other approval requirements and flown by licensed pilots, have
implicit approval to operate under General Flight Rules, FAR Part 91 [42]. The FAA
additionally regulates operators who perform routine carriage of commercial passengers, or
scheduled operation. These organizations are required to be certified, through operator
certification. Specific procedures conducted by the operators are authorized through operational
approval.
There are different classes of operating certificates depending upon the type of operations
conducted by the airline 7. Generally, certification requirements become more stringent the more
7 FAR Part 121 - Operating Requirements: Domestic, Flag, and Supplemental Operation
FAR Part 125 - Certification and Operations: Airplanes Having a Seating Capacity of 20 or More Passengers or a
Maximum Payload Capacity of 6,000 Pounds or More; And Rules Governing Persons on Board Such Aircraft;
FAR Part 129 - Operations: Foreign Air Carriers and Foreign Operators of U.S.-Registered Aircraft Engaged in
Common Carriage
FAR Part 133 - Rotorcraft External-load Operations
FAR Part 135 - Operating Requirements: Commuter and On Demand Operations and Rules Governing Persons on
Board Such Aircraft
FAR Part 136 - Commercial Air Tours and National Parks Air Tour Management
FAR Part 137 - Agricultural Aircraft Operations
similar an airline is to common carriage of commercial passengers. There are several
requirements to receive and maintain operating certificates: including maintenance, operating
procedures, pilot training, and safety-based quality control requirements. Oversight of operating
certificates are conducted to ensure continued compliance with FAA regulations by certificate-
holders [46]. The process primarily involves structured audits by FAA Aviation Safety
Inspectors [69].
Even if certified avionics are installed, to use the functions of the avionics, an air carrier requires
operational approval from the FAA to utilize the set of avionics for a given function. This
operational approval is granted to certificate-holders through appropriate sections of an
Operations Specifications, or OpsSpec [69]. The relevant operational capability is approved as
long as the carrier can satisfy provisions on pilot training, aircraft and avionics types used, and
internal safety oversight functions. The FAA maintains standard OpsSpecs to expedite approval
of different capabilities [69], but operational approval of new capabilities can be a lengthy
process while capabilities are defined.
3.4.4 Airspace Procedure Design & Approval
The FAA division responsible for establishing instrument and visual flight rules, as well as
oversight of air carrier operations is the Flight Standards Service (with the internal FAA
designation of AFS). Part of AFS responsibility is to design and certify terminal and en-route
flight procedures.
Instrument flight procedures are used to link ground-based navigational aids with aircraft
capabilities to safely direct aircraft to landing and upon departure. As such, their design and
certification heavily influences safety of aircraft. AFS sets the standards for design, review,
approval, and publication of instrument approach and departure procedures in the terminal area,
published in the United States Standard for Terminal Instrument Procedures (TERPS) [70], an
internal FAA policy, and in Federal Regulation8 . TERPS contains guidelines for approaches
using different capabilities, as examples: Lateral Precision, Vertical Guidance (LPV) approaches
via the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS), and Required Navigation Performance
(RNP). As new approach capabilities are implemented in the system, Flight Standards
8 FAR Part 97 - Standard Instrument Procedures
determines appropriate criteria for approach procedure design to accommodate additional
performance capabilities. AFS is also responsible for certifying automated procedure
development software [71]. Once a procedure has been designed and published, it must be
verified in flight tests by Flight Inspections, Central Operations (FICO) before receiving
operational approval [69].
In addition to terminal instrument flight procedures, other procedures in air transportation are
subject to approval by AFS. These include: minimum enroute altitudes [72], Category I, II, and
III ILS approach and landing procedures, evaluation of proposed obstructions for impact on
procedures, [71] and approval of letters of agreement that impact flight procedures [73].
3.4.5 Separation Standards & Surveillance System Performance
ICAO publishes guidance methods for determination of airspace separation minima [8]. The
guidance emphasizes methods for evaluating safety of proposed changes to airspace or
separation minima, enabled by Air Traffic Management Technologies. This guidance has been
applied for changes in oceanic separation standards and by the FAA in evaluating ADS-B
separation standards and implementation of RVSM.
There are two methods that ICAO recognizes for safety assessment of a proposed change in
separation - comparison with a reference system9 and evaluation of system risk against a
threshold. In the comparison to a reference system approach, the proposed system is analyzed
relative to the performance of a similar system that has already been judged to be acceptably
safe. The proposed system must perform equally or better to the reference system in identified
measures of performance. In evaluating against a threshold, the modeled risk of a system must
be equal to or below an established target level of safety (TLS).
9 The ICAO-defined comparison with a reference system approach is a subset of more general equivalence-based
approaches that set requirements based on performance measures of a comparable system.
The minimum stated requirements for application of the reference system approach are:.
a) separation minima must not be less in the proposed system than in the reference system;
b) proposed means of communication and surveillance must be no worse in terms of accuracy, reliability,
integrity, and availability than those of the reference system;
c) frequency and duration of the application of minimum separation between aircraft must not be greater in
the proposed system than the reference system
d) navigation performance (typical and non-typical) of the population of aircraft should be no worse in its
effect on collision risk, in any dimension, than that of the aircraft in the reference system.
It may be noted that separation minima must not be less in the proposed system than the
reference system. Therefore the reference system approach cannot be used to reduce separation
beyond that established in current operation.
The process for comparing performance to a reference system considers several properties of the
airspace dictated by ICAO. These include "the effect of changes along each factor must be
shown to be equal or safer, or tradeoffs between factors must be evaluated" and "the
effectiveness of TCAS may not be considered as a mitigation in the safety case [8]."
Evaluation of risk against a threshold involves identification of hazards and modeling of their
severity and likelihood. Qualitative modeling is possible, but quantitative modeling trough a
collision risk model is usually performed. ICAO recommends several possibilities for a target
level of safety that have been used in past changes [8].
3.4.6 Ground-Based Equipment and Programs
Ground-based systems fall under the technical category of "air navigation facilities" [42]. The
FAA is empowered to define performance characteristics for air navigation facilities, and to
deploy to meet air transportation needs 0 . In interpreting this mandate, the FAA has created a
broad range of internal policies to define, build, acquire, and maintain FAA and contractor
operated facilities. In contrast to airborne equipment certification processes, these internal
policies are not regulations. They also vary depending upon the type of system capability
implemented. This discussion will focus on the process for creating new large-scale capabilities
or equipment, or instituting significant changes to the configuration of the NAS.
1 49 U.S.C. 40102 Definitions
The FAA uses a set of systems engineering practices and policies to manage the configuration of
the NAS. As part of this, the enterprise architecture is a detailed description of operating
systems in the NAS, a set of tools for managing the NAS configuration, and as basis for
coordinating decision-making for future improvements [74]. When planning new system
acquisitions, or changes to existing systems, the FAA employs a set of configuration
management processes to track and coordinate changes [73]. Configuration management is
required for any system that is contained in the NAS enterprise architecture [73], which includes
most air traffic control communication, navigation, and surveillance systems.
Safety assessment is a defined process within configuration management used to manage the
potential risks introduced by changes. Because of its broad uses and impact, the safety
assessment process merited a more in depth discussion as a supporting process in Section 3.3.
The configuration management process requires a safety review of proposed changes [75]. The
depth of analysis of safety differs depending upon the nature of the change.
Results of the safety assessment are documented in a Safety Risk Management Document
(SRMD). The SRMD is performed as part of a more general systems-engineering process
known as a NAS Change Proposal (NCP). NAS change proposals [73] originate from FAA lines
of business and external contractors, and document proposed changes to NAS architecture.
Safety decisions are audited by the safety arm of the air traffic organization, ATO-S, and can
also be audited by an independent line of business, the office of Air Traffic Oversight (AOV)
[11].
When all analysis of a change is complete, the formal review by the appropriate Configuration
Control Board is performed to formally approve the proposed change in a NAS Configuration
Control Decision (CCD). At this point, safety requirements generated from the safety review
have become part of the overall program requirements, which are then approved and
implemented through a broader Acquisition Management System (AMS) Process.
The AMS is FAA policy governing the procurement, deployment, and management of FAA
products and services [76]. Acquisition processes are structured around a set of decision points
by the FAA Joint Resources Council (JRC), the senior investment review board of the FAA.
Decisions from the JRC precede review by the White House Office of Management of the
Budget (OMB). Lines of business (such as the Air Traffic Organization) propose and structure
programs for review by the JRC and eventual implementation into the NAS [76].
Each milestone in the AMS has a requirement for performance of safety assessment activities to
varying levels of fidelity [11]. Safety assessment is one specialty process performed to support
the AMS [54]. These safety assessment activities vary depending upon which organization
initiates the activity and what the nature of the change is. There are also associated
programmatic and budgetary review milestones associated with the lifecycle of the change.
3.4.7 Software and Complex Electronic Hardware
The use of software has increased in modern systems, both in airborne avionics and in ground-
based systems. This use of software and advanced electronics created a shift from using
mechanical methods for providing functionality, to a "virtual" capability to perform similar
functions, supported by computer displays and processors. Now, fly-by-wire and glass cockpits
are common in aircraft, replacing functionality that was previously performed by mechanical
linkages and instrumentation.
This shift from mechanical to electronic functions required new methods for safety assurance.
The trend initially spurred the development of DO-178 by RTCA in 1980. DO-178 provides
considerations for safety assurance of software in airborne systems. The current revision is DO-
178B, which has become a de facto standard for software development in safety critical systems
[77].
Software or complex electronic hardware itself is not a component of a vehicle, but is embedded
within existing vehicle components, especially avionics. Software also supports functionality in
air traffic control systems and displays. Additionally, software-like functionality can be
embedded in electronic assemblies, termed "complex electronic hardware. [77]. Because of this
distribution in domain, software standards vary for airborne and ground-based software, and for
complex electronic hardware. RTCA DO-178B [39] is a consensus standard that was developed
as a means of compliance for airborne software certification, and has been applied generally
beyond airborne software certification [77]. DO-254 [78] is the airborne counterpart for
complex electronic hardware, and is similar in most aspects [77]. Therefore the following
discussion will focus on the general process for software. Both documents are recognized by the
FAA through advisory circulars [79, 80] as acceptable means of compliance for assurance of
intended function as part of an associated equipment certification.
Design Assurance Levels (DALs) are categories that define the integrity of the software
assurance process. The required DAL is determined from the criticality of the function executed
by software. This criticality is based on a safety assessment of the potential failure modes of the
software, and their associated levels of severity. Guidance on corresponding severity and design
assurance level is included in DO-178B [39], FAA systems-level policies, [11], and advisory
circulars for aircraft certification [57, 58]. The determination of DAL is based on a safety
assessment of the intended function, according to other standards for safety assessment, such as
ARP 4761 [31]. Each DAL has an associated set of objectives to be satisfied. Meeting these
objectives is required for approval of the software, although alternative means of compliance can
be proposed.
Software approval is typically coordinated through an FAA Designated Engineering
Representative (DER). The DER is responsible for approving documentation to DO-178B and
assisting the applicant in interpreting requirements. Coordination occurs at multiple points in the
developmental lifecycle, from initial planning to final implementation and testing. There are
multiple formal documents described to coordinate these activities. For more information, see
[77].
To interpret the requirements of software approval in ground-based systems, RTCA created DO-
278. The document specifies software considerations for approval in use in CNS/ATM systems.
It is a companion document to DO-178B, offering corresponding assurance levels and processes
to airborne software.
3.5 Other Safety Control Processes
Several additional processes are in place in the air transportation system used to control safety.
These processes reside both within the FAA and in other organizations. These processes are not
explored in detail, as they are outside of the scope of this work.
3.5.1 Monitoring of Current Operations
Internally, the FAA monitors accident rates and performance of the air traffic control system.
Key safety performance metrics serve as management targets for the Air Traffic Organization
[81]. Safety trends are also highlighted internally through data analysis efforts such as the
Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing Program (ASIAS) [82]. Several other
monitoring systems are in place to identify safety issues, typically through voluntary reporting of
operators. Examples include the NASA-maintained Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS)
and the Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program (VDRP) administered by the FAA.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is responsible for investigating major
accidents and recommending actions to prevent the future occurrence of accidents. It is separate
agency with independent funding from the department of transportation. The role of the NTSB
is to issue recommendations based on identified causes of accidents, incidents, or trends
identified in the system. The board does not have direct power to implement recommended
changes, but has high visibility by the public and Congress.
Several organizations conduct directed studies to identify areas of high risk in the system.
Examples include: the NTSB (e.g. Emergency Medical Service Operations [83]), and the AOPA
Air Safety Foundation (e.g. the Nall Report [84]), and Congress, through focused hearings. The
goal directed studies are to identify accident trends that indicate risk areas in the system that need
to be addressed.
3.5.2 Rulemaking
Rulemaking is a general process for agencies of the executive branch to enact new or modified
federal regulations. Rulemaking is a general process to perform a set of analysis, modeling, and
public comment steps to ensure that there is adequate public visibility of regulations, and that
there is adequate need for governmental intervention. Being an executive agency, the FAA is
required to follow the rulemaking process for any changes or new additions to the Federal
Aviation Regulations [85].
Specific to the FAA, most rules are initially drafted by the agency based on an identified
operational need that requires changed to Federal Aviation Regulations. When a major change
to regulations is required, the rulemaking process is lengthy. A GAO study of 76 FAA rule
changes found a median time of 2.5 years [86]. The FAA can use Advanced Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking to seek input regarding a potential rule, or proceed with a final rule. Industry and
stakeholder input is typically obtained through Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committees
formed for each rule. Several analysis tasks before initial implementation of rules assess their
environmental impact, cost/benefit distributions, and economic impacts. Analysis prepared by
the FAA is coordinated with the White House Office of Management & Budget and Department
of Transportation.
3.6 Summary of Safety Assessment for Systems-Level Changes
Proposed changes are approved to two classes of acceptability criteria. The first class is risk-
based criteria. In the FAA Safety Risk Management process, these criteria are arranged in a risk
matrix. Proposed changes can also be approved to a target level of safety (TLS), which is a
threshold risk level for acceptability of a defined event and conditions. The underlying process
supporting approval to risk-based criteria requires safety assessment of a proposed change and
mitigation of all risks such that all risk levels meet acceptability criteria.
The second class for approval of a proposed systems-level change is performance-based criteria
defined in comparison to a reference system. The corresponding approach to designing
mitigations will be discussed as the performance-based approach, which can be applied when an
acceptably safe example system exists to which the proposed change can be compared.
4 Scoping in Safety Assessment and the Influence Framework
This chapter defines a framework to represent decisions about the appropriate scope of analysis
in safety assessment. The scope of analysis is the scope of safety behavior that is examined in
detail in evaluation of expected safety performance and is used to reduce complexity of analysis
to a tractable level while assessing the most important safety behavior. The framework is
applied to three specific approaches to safety assessment analyzed in Chapter 5, detailed analysis
of decisions made in assessment of European Reduced Vertical Separation Minima in Chapter 6,
analysis of other past changes in Appendix D, and identification of challenges for future changes
in Chapter 7.
Based on the investigation of current safety regulatory practices, a general model is presented in
the first section that divides safety assessment into sub-processes where common decisions and
analysis methods are present. Following this, a framework is developed to describe how scoping
decisions should be made, based on the expected influence of components of a proposed change
on risk levels.
4.1 Systems-Level Operational Approval Model
A general model of sub-processes within safety assessment was created and is presented in
Figure 4-1. The general model is consistent with the FAA's Safety Risk Management (SRM)
process as defined in the FAA Air Traffic Organization Safety Management System [11]
described in Section 3.3.
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Figure 4-1: Safety Assessment Processes Supporting Operational Approval of a Proposed C ange
This general model illustrates the context for the safety assessment process based on a
description of a proposed change and the external system to support operational approval. The
safety assessment process is shown by the grey-shaded box at the center of the figure. The
model also illustrates key sub-processes in safety assessment where decisions are made that
influence the safety behavior of a proposed change. These processes include: hazard/risk
identification, scoping detailed assessment & modeling, and mitigation. Each sub-process will
be described in more detail below.
As shown in Figure 4-1, the input to safety assessment is a description of the proposed change,
which consists of change elements and a decomposition of elements in the external system to
interacting and non-interacting elements (discussed in more detail in Section 4.2). This system
description serves as a basis for hazard/risk identification.
Hazard/Risk identification uses the description of the proposed change to determine potential
risks and/or hazards that are associated with the change. The result of this process will be
represented by an influence matrix, which is a framework developed in this work. The influence
matrix compactly represents the effects of changes in behavior of system elements on associated
hazards/risks. The influence matrix is discussed in Section 4.4.2 supported by a conceptual
state-based description of safety behavior.
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The safety behavior of a real system can be very complex. To better allocate resources to
specific areas of concern, safety assessment is typically scoped. The scoping process results in
an identification of the scope of detailed analysis, which defines the elements, risks, and
conditions that must be included in detailed modeling and assessment. The application of
influence matrix to scope is discussed in Section 4.4.
In the process of detailed assessment and modeling, the expected safety performance of the
system is evaluated. Data obtained from a variety of sources, such as through operational
experience can be used to support the assessment, and assumptions are made in the creation and
evaluation of the detailed model. Unacceptable safety performance that does not meet
assessment criteria is mitigated through the derivation of safety requirements, and design of
additional aspects of the proposed change. The processes of detailed assessment and mitigation
are discussed in Section 4.5.
Safety assessment supports an operational approval decision. The output of safety assessment,
assumptions and data used, and modeling approaches are also inputs to the operational approval
decision. Acceptability criteria are the basis for judging the acceptability of modeled safety
performance. They are typically the same as assessment criteria.
4.2 Elements of a Proposed Change
For the systems-level changes, it is useful to divide a proposed change into components, and to
describe interactions between the components of the change and components in the external
system. These components will be referred to as system elements. System elements can be
physical (such as avionics, navigation aids, humans, etc.) or virtual (such as procedures or
software logic). Properties of system elements may be altered to mitigate unacceptable safety
performance.
Types of system elements are further illustrated in Figure 4-2. For a given change, there are
elements that are defined by the system boundary of the change. These are typically under
design control in the safety assessment process, and are referred to as change elements. There
are also elements outside of the boundary of the proposed change and part of the external system.
Within this category, there are elements with which the change will interact (interacting
elements). These elements can share physical proximity with the proposed change (e.g. other
aircraft operating in the airspace) or have linked and dependent functionality (e.g. GPS satellite
signals that are used as a position source). There are also external elements with which the
proposed change is reasonably expected to not interact, termed non-interacting elements.
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Figure 4-2: System Elements
One way that a proposed change can be described is by a concept of operations, which includes
change elements that will be implemented and how the proposed change will operate in the
external air transportation system. Another common way is to refer to the description of a
proposed change in an Operational Service and Environment Definition (OSED) document.
A proposed change can add new elements to the existing system. This is the case when new
physical elements are defined or new procedures are performed in the proposed change.
Elements can also replace those currently performing the same or a similar function, in which
case the change element is a replacement or modification to an existing element.
Elements of a proposed change enable a set of operational capabilities. Capabilities are divided
into three areas: airborne capabilities, which include functions performed by aircraft and flight
crews; infrastructure-based capabilities, which are include ground-based infrastructure, satellite-
based infrastructure, or ATC automation and surveillance systems; and procedural capabilities,
which include airspace procedures used by air traffic control, operational procedures
implemented on aircraft, and airspace design. With the increased use of the Global Positioning
System (GPS) as a position source, satellite-based system have also become part of the NAS
navigational infrastructure, and can be considered as similar to ground-based infrastructure and
grouped as that capability. These divisions are illustrated in Figure 4-3 with examples of
elements within each capability.
Historically, airborne, airspace, and infrastructure capabilities have followed separate and
independent assessment and operational approval processes. The current operational approval
process reflects this division in approval authority of ground-based, airborne, and procedural
changes, as discussed in Chapter 3. However, as proposed changes have become more
distributed, there is increased coordination across approval processes in identifying common
safety requirements early in the development of new systems capabilities [36].
Example Elements of a Proposed Change
Airborne Capability
-Avionics: technical capabilities in avionics (navigation, communication, etc), displays and controls,
and airborne-based interfaces with ground and satellite systems
-Flight crew: personnel who operate aircraft: pilots, flight engineers, etc.
Airspace and Procedural Capability Application
-Airspace design: procedures common to a set of airspace, such as approach, navigation, and 
-Operational
communication procedures within a given area of operation. capability
-Procedures: common procedures coordinated between aircraft and air traffic control enabled by
oController tasks: functions performed by an air traffic controller the proposed
oPilot tasks: functions performed by pilots, assured through training and airline operating change
procedures
Infrastructure-Based Capability
-Ground-based infrastructure: facilities constructed to facilitate navigation, communication, and
surveillance
-Satellite navigation services: space-based position sources
-Air Traffic Control equipment: automation tools, decision aids, and displays that interface with an
air traffic controller
-Air Traffic Controllers: personnel who operate the ATC system
Figure 4-3: Elements of a Proposed System and Enabled Applications
Individual capabilities combine to enable an application, as illustrated in Figure 4-3. The
application describes the function enabled by the proposed change. Elements of a change are can
vary depending upon the application performed by that change.
4.3 The Influence of System Elements on Safety
4.3.1 Abstractions Used in Safety Assessment
Safety assessment supporting current operational approval processes relies on estimating the
level of risk associated with a proposed change. To support the analysis of safety assessment
decisions, it is therefore useful to provide further definition of how system elements affect risk
levels. One approach to representing the relation of safety behavior to risks is based on a state -
representation, illustrated conceptually in Figure 4-4. In this representation, a circle represents
each state of a system, which is a defined set of conditions under which the system is operating.
Transitions between states are depicted as directed arcs. Transitions are the result of occurrence
of events. When multiple arcs reach a state, the state has multiple predecessors, any one of which
could lead to that state. These events could be failures, changes in the environment, or the effect
of other components of the system. Transitions can be assigned a probability or rate, allowing
state chains to be evaluated stochastically.
Initiating states are defined as causes, often called root causes. Intermediate states can be
contributing causes. The set of final states are risk events. The conditions in a given state a result
of the events predicted to lead to the state. These conditions can describe several aspects of the
state. They can indicate that the system is operating in a failed mode, such that a failure
preceded entry into the state. They can also indicate the associated state of the operational
environment, such as being on final approach, or operating in a thunderstorm.
The relationship of causes to risks is the safety behavior of the system. In Figure 4-4, safety
behavior is illustrated for an individual risk. The behavior leading to risks is often a complex
combination of multiple causes and states of the environment. In the course of assessment, risks
also may not be the only outcomes evaluated. Causal chains can terminate in outcomes without
associated harm. For simplicity, the behavior shown in Figure 4-4 does not reflect this full
complexity. Risks are assigned levels of severity based on the harm associated with them.
Examples of levels of severity assigned to risks were discussed in Section 3.3.
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Figure 4-4: State Transition Representation of Safety Behavior
Safety behavior can also be understood through the intermediate abstraction of a hazard, defined
previously in Chapter 2 as a set of conditions in the system that could result in harm. In the
state-based representation, the state defined by this set of conditions is referred to as the hazard.
The intermediate nature of a hazard is illustrated by an abstract example in Figure 4-5, which can
be contrasted with Figure 4-4. In this example, the states between causes and risks have been
grouped into three hazards, indicated by the dashed boxes. Hazards have an associated
likelihood, but do not directly have an associated severity measure, as they are not occurrences.
An intermediate state can only be classified as a hazard if it leads to a risk event.
A hazard is used in safety assessment for several reasons. As an intermediate state, it allows
both forward and backward search to be used to define states of concern. Forward search is the
process of identifying initial states, and then considering potential hazardous states that result
from the initial states. Backward search is the process of considering risks of concern, and
identifying conditions under which the risks can occur. Each strategy is likely to identify a
broader set of safety concerns than an identification of hazards alone [87].
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Figure 4-5: A Hazard as an Intermediate State
Because of its nature as an intermediate state in a chain of events leading to risks, the definition
of a hazard can vary in its level of abstraction. A hazard can be abstracted closer to preceding
events, which is common in failure-based definitions of hazards. It can also be defined closer to
risks, where it can be a general category of harm, such as a midair collision. This level of
abstraction would depend on where the hazard box placed in Figure 4-5, either to the left (toward
causes) or to the right (toward risks).
A common view of causal states, hazards, and potential outcomes is the bow tie model, shown in
Figure 4-6 for the behavior surrounding a single hazard. This model views hazards and
outcomes differently from the direct causal chain of Figure 4-4. It is a combination of state and
event-based abstractions. Root causes are shown on the left side of the model as initiating states.
Safety behavior is evaluated through contributory causes to a hazard. The behavior evaluated
can be complex, through several intermediate states and conditions.
From a hazard, the representation of behavior shifts to an event tree. Succeeding events are
modeled as branches of the tree, where the potential states of a system have multiple, discrete
paths to risk events. The event tree notation is valuable, as it illustrates event transitions that are
commonly related to all occurrences of a hazard as branch points.
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Figure 4-6: Hybrid Bow-Tie Framework of Hazard Analysis
The addition of the event tree representation makes succeeding events more distinct. States
preceding the hazard can often have complex relationships. These are commonly represented in
the bow tie model by a fault tree [11]. Fault Tree Analysis allows the complex causal
relationships to be captured using logic-based combinations of events and associated
probabilities [88]. To make the severity associated with final event tree states clearer, a
distinction between final risk events and non-adverse outcomes is made in Figure 4-6.
Other processes can be used to evaluate risk, including Operational Safety Assessment (OSA)
and Operational Performance Analysis (OPA) that consider safety behavior based on operational
scenarios. Safety behavior can also be evaluated through risk models, as is the case in Collision
Risk Modeling (CRM).
The complex relationship of events and conditions leading up to the hazard result in a measure of
likelihood associated with the hazard. Based on the behavior of the system following the hazard,
there is also a likelihood associated with each outcome. For risks, this likelihood is the risk
level.
Because real systems exhibit complex dynamics, multiple hazards may lead to multiple risks.
This is shown notionally in Figure 4-7. For example, it can be noted that both Hazard 1 and
Hazard 2 influence Risk 3. When there are multiple hazards that influence the level of given
risk, the total level of risk is the result safety behavior through all associated hazards.
Causes Hazards
Figure 4-7: System Behavior with Multiple Hazards and Risk Events
4.3.2 Scoping in Safety Assessment
The large scope of potential safety behavior in real systems can be intractable to completely
analyze. There can be a near-infinite combination of conditions in the system, potential behavior
of system elements, and associated risks. There is therefore, a practical need to limit the safety
behavior evaluated, to make analysis tractable and more efficient. Limiting the safety behavior
evaluated in a proposed change is defined as setting the scope of the safety assessment.
The scoping process represents a decision made by safety assessors that defines the required
characteristics of a model of a proposed change. Scoping decisions can have strong implications
on the safety of the system when implemented. Inappropriately defining scope can lead to
unexamined behavior that increases the level of risk in operation. Defining scope as too large
can lead to overspecification, where mitigations are applied that were not necessary.
Overspecification can have the effect of increasing the expenditure of resources in the system
that could be more efficiently applied to other safety concerns.
There are three factors that define the scope of analysis. The first factor is the breadth of
elements of a system that are evaluated. The second factor is the depth of risks that are
examined. This is the number of adverse events that are analyzed and/or quantified. Behavior of
elements and risks can also be evaluated for several conditions, the third factor of scope.
Conditions are scenarios or assumptions describing the operational state of the system, such as
states of the environment, flight phases, etc. Conditions are not system elements, as they do not
have behavior that can be modified to influence the level of risk. Safety can also be assessed for
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Risks
an average condition, which might represent several different potential scenarios or operations
aggregated into an average level of risk.
Hazards define the set of conditions that can potentially lead to risks, while risks are events
associated with harm to people and property. Individual risks can occur following multiple
hazards or, conversely, individual hazards may lead to multiple risks, as illustrated above in
Figure 4-7. Because hazards and risks are linked in sequence, they can be defined as related
dimensions of scope. This is illustrated in Figure 4-8. When viewed in terms of risk, the scope
implicitly includes all hazards that contribute to the risk. When defined by hazards, all risks
associated with the hazard are within scope.
Breadth of elements
Scope of Analysis
O4
a 0.
Figure 4-8: Dimensions of Scope: Elements, Hazards, and Risks
4.3.3 Changes in Safety Behavior due to Changes of Elements and Influence
Implementing a proposed change will change safety behavior and associated levels of risk in the
air transportation system. This change in behavior can be decomposed by the effect of system
elements. By this view, a change in an element's behavior can influence hazards and risks
through several mechanisms, illustrated through the hybrid bow tie model of Figure 4-6. This is
shown below in Figure 4-9, where the influence of changes in elements on safety behavior has
been highlighted. Figure 4-9 shows a bow tie model for one hazard for clarity. However, the
influence of system elements on multiple hazards and risks in a real system would be illustrated
through multiple bow tie models.
There are two sets of events shown in the bow tie model. On the left-hand side, preceding events
occur before a hazard and influence the likelihood of the hazard. Changes in behavior of system
elements can influence the likelihood of hazards, by affecting the probability of occurrence of
the contributory causes shown on the left-hand side. This is shown by shaded states on the left-
hand side of the figure, and a shaded transition path.
Preceding Events (Causes) Hazard Succeeding Events
Root Non-Adverse Risk
Causes Contributory Causes Branches Outcomes Events
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Figure 4-9: Influence on Safety Behavior of a Proposed Change in the Bow Tie Model
The second part of the bow tie model is an event tree of events succeeding a hazard. Changes in
behavior of system elements can also influence the likelihood and structure of these succeeding
events. In some cases, system elements can add a mitigation that results in the elimination of
risks. This creates a branch in the event tree with a high likelihood of a non-adverse outcome, as
shown by the eliminated risk as the bottom event in Figure 4-9.
To understand scoping decisions, it is useful to define a characteristic of the relationship between
system elements and risks on which scope decisions are based. For this reason, influence is
defined conceptually in Figure 4-10. Influence is a measure of the change in risk level of a given
risk (Ri) due to a change made to a system element (Ej). Influence of a given element and risk
level is evaluated through expected safety behavior of the system. The determination of
influence is normally based on the judgment of a safety assessor. It should also be noted that a
change in a system element could also change the severity associated with a risk. This dynamic
is not captured in the framework and would require further refinement in future applications of
influence.
Change in System
Element (E )
Change in Risk
Level (R;)
Figure 4-10: Influence Defined
The change in a system element is defined around a design point, which is usually the state of the
element from the initial system description. It is not a change in behavior from the existing
system. By this definition, influence represents the ability to affect a level of risk based on design
decisions to set specific properties of a system element.
System elements can be an aspect of the system for which an explicit parameter is related to
safety performance. An example would be navigation precision. By some collision risk models,
risk is defined mathematically as a function of aircraft navigation performance. System elements
can also be aspects of the system without explicit parameters relating it to risk. An example of
this type of system element is flight crew training. While training clearly influences some risks,
it may not be parameterized. To capture both of these types of elements within the influence
framework, the function is defined conceptually and represents the effect of a change in behavior
of an element on risk levels. These changes do not necessarily have to be continuous or
parametric.
Influence as defined here also does not have a positive or negative sense. Influence may
represent that changes to a system element can expected to only increase risk level, only reduce
risk level, or increase or reduce risk level depending upon the properties of the element.
Influence will be coded based on its absolute magnitude, as described in the following section.
In a proposed change, there are typically multiple system elements and risks affected by the
change. Multiple measures of influence will be arranged in this work in the form of an m x n
influence matrix, an illustration of which is shown in Figure 4-11. The columns of the matrix
denote system elements (Ej), and the rows of the matrix denote risk events (Rj). Each cell of the
matrix is the influence of the corresponding element and risk.
The influence matrix presents a method of analyzing how scoping decisions should be made.
The influence matrix framework will also be used to depict how decisions have been made in
past changes and to illustrate the implications of current safety assessment approaches.
The influence matrix representation assumes a linear decomposition between elements and risk.
Each influence value is constructed independently of other system elements. Although this is a
limitation of the framework, it does not imply that expected safety performance of a system is
the result of a linear combination of the safety performance of individual elements. As a system
is typically decomposed when scope decisions are made, the influence matrix representation is
appropriate for describing scope decisions. Interactions between elements will exist in a real
system. The complexity in interaction is captured in the detailed modeling and assessment
process, when expected safety performance is evaluated in detail.
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Figure 4-11: Influence Matrix
Because of the linear decomposition of the influence matrix, there are limitations in identifying
correlated or dependent risks. Dependent risks can result from the behavior of a combination of
elements acting together. When examining the influence of any given individual element, this
correlation may be captured if it is recognized by the assessor, as the behavior of that element
changes as a result of the correlation and has an influence on risk. However, the influence of
combinations of elements is more likely to be overlooked through this process, and this is a
limitation.
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4.4 Application of the Influence Matrix to Scope Decisions
Scoping decisions can and their implications can be represented through the influence framework
defined above. In this section, the method of creating an influence matrix for a proposed change
will be described with a notional example.
4.4.1 Creation of Influence Matrix for a Proposed Change
Before the scoping process, risks or hazards associated with a proposed change must be
identified. To construct an influence matrix, it is necessary to examine what behavior
contributes to each risk, and the strength of influence of that behavior. To illustrate this process,
a notional set of influences on a single risk is shown in Figure 4-12.
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Figure 4-12: Notional Influence of System Elements on a Single Risk
The construction of an influence matrix follows the process of defining influence for each risk.
It is a subjective process that can be applied by safety assessors to capture judgment regarding
key factors affecting the scope of assessment. Throughout this work, the magnitude of influence
will be coded by three categories. A filled circle indicates a strong influence. If a given
influence is strong, changes in behavior of the element can result in a large change in the
associated risk. An empty circle indicates weak influence. When influence is weak, changes to
behavior impact the associated risk, but at a lower level of magnitude. Weak influences can
often act indirectly or in combination with other elements in the system. Closed parentheses
indicate no influence. In this case, there is no relationship between the system element and
associated risk. Changes to the system element do not change the magnitude of the risk.
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In Figure 4-12, the notional influence of change elements and external elements for a given risk,
Ri, is shown. Four change elements (EI-E 4) constitute the proposed change. For a real change,
this set can be large or small depending upon how analysis is parsed. There are three external
elements (E5-E7) shown with assigned influence. The additional elements in the system (up to
E,) do not have evaluated influence, as indicated by the dashes. They are shown to illustrate that
the set of external elements can be expansive, encompassing all elements of the air transportation
system.
Elements have been assigned notional influence rankings in Figure 4-12. For the change
elements, it should be recognized that some elements of a change (e.g. E7) would not have an
influence on risk.
When external elements have an influence on risk, it is due to that interaction with change
elements. This interaction is often referred to as coupling [25]. Elements in the external system
are generally outside of the authority of the system designer. Therefore, their magnitude of
influence does not represent a level of risk control achievable through that system element.
Instead, influence is a measure of the strength of interaction due to the properties of a change
element. When considering the influence of external elements, the change elements are
evaluated and controlled to achieve acceptable risk levels in the presence of external interactions.
As an example, E5 has been assigned a strong influence on risk. This would indicate that the
behavior of that element could significantly alter the risk level depending upon how the proposed
change interacts with it. Its contribution to the level of risk varies based on the configuration and
detailed properties specified for the change.
In cases where justification is provided for assessment of risk levels, influence is discussed in
safety assessment documentation. It is asserted by the assessors that behavior of a given element
affects the level of risk under investigation. In other cases, the presence of influence is captured
implicitly by the inclusion of elements in structured models, such as fault trees or event trees.
This does not, however, explicitly capture the strength of influence.
4.4.2 Influence Matrix and Scope of Analysis
It is a challenge to determine the appropriate scope of analysis. The scope of analysis is required
to limit complexity of the assessment task; therefore it should not include risks or system
elements for which implemented behavior will meet acceptability criteria without modification.
However, it must capture all potentially significant influences on risk above some acceptability
level, which is difficult to achieve before the true risk levels are known. There can also be
multiple separate analyses conducted in safety assessment. If this is the case, there can also be
multiple scopes of analysis identified.
Several strategies can be used to determine the appropriate level of scope, and the influence
matrix will be used here to illustrate those strategies. To illustrate scoping decisions with the
influence matrix, a notional influence matrix for a proposed change is shown in Figure 4-13.
Similar to the example above, there are four change elements, but only two external elements
shown with influence. The additional external elements are assigned no influence. There are
eight risks shown with assigned influence. The risks have been grouped by two categories of
severity (catastrophic and hazardous). The scope of assessment is shaded in grey and bounded
by a rounded box.
System Elements
Change Elements External Elements
I I 1
E 2 E, IE, I Risk Level by Severity
Scope of
Analysis
Outside of
Scope of
Analysis
00 0 0 0 R,
0 0 0 0 0 0 R2
0 0 O 0 O 0 0 0 R3
) 0 0 0 0 0 R4
OoO 0 0 0 0 R,
O_ 0 00 Ro
o 0 0 0 o 0 () 0 R,
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 R
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 R.
Catastrophic
Hazardous
Key
Strong
influence
o Weak
influence
No0 influence
Figure 4-13: Notional Influence Matrix and Level of Risk for a Proposed Change
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Notional risk levels are shown in Figure 4-13 assigned to each risk. These represent a judgment
of the risk level made by the assessor when hazards and risks are identified. Risk level will be an
important factor in eliminating some risks from scope, as described in the following sections.
It should be noted that influence defines the effect of a change in an element on change in level
of risk. The amount that the risk level can be altered in the design of mitigations is related to, but
distinct from the aggregate influence of system elements on the risk. There can be risk events
with very low levels of risk and strong influence, as shown for Risk 7 and Element 3 (R7 and E3)
in Figure 4-13. Changes to E3 may strongly correlate with the level of R7, but the overall
magnitude of the change in level of risk can be insignificant compared to other risks.
Up to this point, the influence matrix has been arranged by risk. The processes of safety
assessment and scoping can also be performed using hazards, with acceptability criteria
expressed for risk levels by hazard. The inclusion of this process in the influence framework
bears more detailed discussion.
Because hazards are an intermediate state between initial causes and risks, a given risk can be
influenced through multiple hazards. An example of this is shown in Figure 4-14. There are
three hazards and five risk events that follow the hazards. Two levels of severity are also shown
in the example. Each hazard precedes two risks, which would be represented by an event tree
with one branching point. Risk 1 is influenced by two hazards: Hazard 1 and Hazard 3. Risk 2
is only influenced through Hazard 2, Risk 3 only through Hazard 1, and so on.
Hazards Risks
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Figure 4-14: Example of Hazard Mapping to Risks
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In the example above, if influence is decomposed by hazard, there are two sets of influences of
Risk 1 (RI). The first set is a representation of safety behavior that results in Hazard 1 (H1 ), and
then results in Risk 1. The second set is a representation of safety behavior that results in
Hazard 3 (H3), and then results in Risk 1. These influences can be very different than aggregated
safety behavior that results in Risk 1. As shown in Figure 4-15, separating by hazard, shown in
the right side, disaggregates the influence of elements through hazards. This is common in
hazard-based safety assessment approaches, and its implications on scope will be discussed in
the following chapter.
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Figure 4-15: Arrangement of Influence by Hazard vs. Risk
4.4.3 Elimination of Risks from Scope
There are several general scoping strategies that are applied across multiple safety assessment
approaches that will be discussed below.
Scoping by Dominant Risk. As described in Section 4.4.2, there can be an initial level of risk
judged by the assessor during hazard identification. Based on this level, other risks may be
scoped out by dominance. Scoping by dominance is appropriate when there is similar safety
behavior of elements within the scope of analysis. This results in a similar structure of the
influence matrix across risks. It is assumed that the similar structure of influence will lead to
similar mitigation effectiveness across all risks. If this is the case, then the dominant risk is that
with the highest level of risk and must have a higher or equal severity level than other risks. If
this risk is mitigated to an acceptable level, then all other risks will be at acceptable levels. The
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lower magnitude risks are therefore scoped out of detailed analysis, as they are dominated by the
higher risk.
Scoping by dominance is illustrated in Figure 4-16. The six elements shown have similar
strength of influence across the four risks shown. The risk level and severity of each risk are
also shown. Risk 1 has the highest level of risk and is the highest severity risk. Therefore it
dominates and other risks can be eliminated from the scope of analysis. Although the strength of
influence is similar across risks, this is not sufficient to assert that behavior is similar. The
identification of similar behavior is not shown in the influence matrix, as noted below the matrix.
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Figure 4-16: Scoping by Dominant Risk
The use of scoping by dominance is typically applied when organizing safety assessments by
hazard. As described previously, there are several risk events that can follow a hazard,
depending upon succeeding states. Instead of evaluating the acceptability of all risk events, risks
are pruned to consider the dominant risk associated with each hazard in the analysis.
An additional method for scoping by dominant risk is by analyzing risk levels under a worst-case
operating condition or state of the environment. Hazards are defined by a set of conditions.
These conditions can be an operating state of system, such as a flight condition, or assumed load
on the system (e.g. traffic density, communication rate, etc). It can also be an environmental
condition, such as visibility (e.g. IMC or VMC), weather, or turbulence. Scoping by this method
functions similarly to the example shown above in Figure 4-16, but may not necessitate the
judgment of associated risk levels. Instead, it is assumed that the worst expected operation
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conditions will have the highest level of risk, and the risk level of other conditions will be
adequately mitigated. It should be noted that it might not always be possible to determine the
worst case operating condition expected in the operation of a system.
Scoping Negligible Risks. In some cases, risks are eliminated from the scope of analysis if they
can be considered to be negligible. Negligible risks are those for which the initially assessed risk
level is lower (and usually substantially lower) than acceptability criteria. Influence of elements
on negligible risks must also be weak. This reduces uncertainty that the risk level will be made
unacceptable by mitigations applied that change the behavior of system elements. The
combination of weak influence and low level of risk indicates that over any potential range of
behavior, risk is not expected to change substantially. If influence is strong, however, it may not
be appropriate to eliminate negligible risks from scope, as their risk level may increase
depending upon the specific behavior assessed in the detailed analysis and modeling.
Scoping Uncontrollable Risks. There are some risks that are fundamentally not controllable. For
uncontrollable risks, there is no influence across any system element. Thus, the risk level cannot
be changed regardless of any mitigation that may be applied to the risk. An example of an
uncontrollable risk is a meteor strike. A potential loss of life due to a meteor impact with the
earth exists for any proposed change. However, its causes are not within control of the air
transportation system. Because of this, resources are typically not devoted to assessing its level
of risk or modeling its effects.
Scoping by the Change Boundary. There are likely to be risks present in the system that exist,
but are not influenced by the behavior of the proposed change. These are appropriate to
eliminate, as it is not possible to mitigate them through requirements placed on the proposed
change.
Scoping Through Similarity. Risks can be scoped out of analysis through similarity. Similarity
is the degree to which the safety behavior related to a given risk or set of risks is expected to be
the same as that of the current system. If the current system is accepted as safe, then the
behavior in the proposed change can be accepted as safe without fully analyzing the level of risk
for a subset of risks associated with the change. This assumes that the behavior after
implementing the change is sufficiently similar to the existing behavior that it will be acceptable.
Figure 4-17 illustrates the use of similarity to scope risks. In the example, Risks 1-3 (R1 -R3) are
within the scope of analysis and influence is assessed. Risks 4-5 (R4-Rs) in the example are
scoped out by similarity. Influence is not directly evaluated, and the risks are eliminated from
scope as their risk level is expected to be similar to an existing, acceptable system.
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Figure 4-17: Use of Similarity to Scope Hazards Assessed
4.4.4 Unknown Risks and Scope
There are likely to be unknown risks present in the assessment of a proposed change. Unknown
risks can arise from safety behavior or conditions that were not conceived in the hazard/risk
identification process. They can also result from unknown and unpredictable interactions with
the external system. Emergent behavior is one class of unknown risks, which is behavior that
was not predicted at the level of abstraction at which the system was viewed. Unknown risks are
shown conceptually in the influence matrix framework as entries with unknown influence across
all system elements, illustrated in Figure 4-18.
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Figure 4-18: Out of Scope Unknown Risks
4.5 Detailed Assessment and Modeling/ Mitigation
From the scoping process, required characteristics for detailed assessment and
modeling/mitigation are derived. These characteristics serve as the set of behavior that should be
evaluated in more complex models. This is illustrated using a feedback representation in Figure
4-19. Model characteristics serve as an input to the detailed assessment & modeling process.
The result of the process is the expected safety performance of the proposed change. This
performance is compared against assessment criteria to determine unacceptable safety
performance that must be mitigated. Mitigations are then determined and implemented as safety-
derived requirements through properties of system elements, or additional system elements.
When all expected performance meets assessment criteria, the change is proposed for operational
approval.
A proposed change is normally assessed to the same criteria as used in judging acceptability for
operational approval. This ensures that the assessed behavior of the system will be sufficient to
ensure acceptability when implemented.
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Figure 4-19: Safety Assessment and Safety-Derived Requirements
The approach for performing detailed modeling and assessment varies depending upon the
assessment criteria. Different approaches are described in more detail, along with each
associated criterion, in Chapter 5.
4.6 Operational Approval
Operational approval by a regulatory authority is necessary before implementation of a systems-
level change. Operational approval can depend upon combinations of decomposed approval
decisions for separate components, as discussed in Section 3.2. In this work, operational
approval is focused on the approval of the expected safety performance of a proposed change.
As introduced in Figure 4-1, and reprinted here as Figure 4-20, there are multiple inputs to the
operational approval process. One input is expected safety performance. This performance
typically must meet safety acceptability criteria that serve as a basis for the operational approval
decision. In some exceptional cases, approval may be granted for changes that do not meet
acceptability criteria. In addition to expected safety performance, the system and safety-derived
requirements are also considered in the operational approval process.
It is important to note that human regulators conduct operational approval. Therefore, it is
typically not sufficient for the modeled safety to simply meet acceptability criteria. As part of
the operational approval process, several characteristics of the safety assessment are also
considered. The scope decisions, choice of model, and assumptions made in detailed modeling
must have the confidence of the regulator. If there are sufficient uncertainties or unsupported
assumptions, this may result in approval being denied.
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5 Analysis of Safety Assessment Approaches Using the Influence
Framework
Based on the investigation of current safety regulatory practices, there are two classes of
acceptability criteria used in safety assessment of proposed systems-level changes: risk-based
criteria and performance criteria. Within the class of risk-based criteria, there are two types: a
risk matrix and a Target Level of Safety (TLS). For each criterion, there is a distinct approach to
conducting safety assessment with different processes for hazard/risk identification, scoping, and
detailed modeling and assessment. This chapter will describe these key differences utilizing the
influence framework developed in the previous chapter.
The risk matrix approach is discussed first, following by the TLS approach. The performance-
based approach is discussed in the third section. Each subsection of the approach begins with a
description of the approach and criteria and is then organized by the general process divisions in
safety assessment: hazard/risk identification, scoping, detailed modeling and analysis, and
mitigation.
5.1 Risk Matrix Approach
A risk matrix is a risk-based criterion that defines a risk ranking of an event based on two
factors, each forming a dimension of the matrix. The first factor is the severity of the risk.
Severity is defined based on descriptions of harm associated with a risk or example events that fit
the category. The second factor in a risk ranking is the likelihood of a risk, referred to in this
work as the risk level. Each likelihood category has associated qualitative and quantitative
definitions. Definitions of severity include measures of the occurrence of harm to people and
property and indicators of harm. The implications of this will be discussed at the end of section
5.1.2 (For examples of severity definitions, the reader may refer to Section 3.3). The
combination of the factors of likelihood and severity defines the cell of the matrix in which a risk
lies, and each cell is assigned a rank. Risk rankings are used to define the acceptability and
associated requirements for each risk.
The purpose of a risk matrix is to provide a method to enforce varying levels of acceptable risk
based on the severity of an event and to allow a structured ranking of multiple risks associated
with a change. An example risk matrix from the FAA Air Traffic Organization Safety
Management System (ATO SMS) [11] is shown below in Figure 5-1. In this example, risk
rankings are high, medium, and low depending upon the cell in which each risk is located. For
catastrophic/ extremely improbable risks, there are two potential risk rankings: high if the
outcome is the result of a single point failure, and medium otherwise. Risk matrices include
severity criteria with associate events that indicate an increased likelihood of harm. These
indicators do not have directly associated harm to people or property, especially for lower levels
of severity.
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Figure 5-1: An Example Risk Matrix from the FAA ATO SMS 11]
Based on ranking of risk, there can be different requirements associated with the acceptance of
the risk. As an example, ATO SMS policy requires acceptance from multiple lines of business
for initially high risks, while medium or low risks can be accepted by individual service unit
managers [11]. It can also possible to require additional monitoring processes based on the
ranking of risk.
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The risk matrix approach is commonly used in many other aerospace standards. Examples are
Eurocontrol safety guidance [55], SAE [31], and RTCA [30] safety assessment processes. The
form of risk matrices, as well as severity and likelihood definitions vary between policies.
5.1.1 Hazard/Risk Identification
The risk matrix approach is typically structured around hazards. Organizing by hazard allows
common behavior around a set of conditions to be analyzed, and simplifications made regarding
the worst potential effects that follow from a hazard. Therefore, the initial step in the risk matrix
approach is to identify hazards associated with a proposed change. The goal of hazard
identification is to identify potentially dangerous states of operation to ensure that subsequent
safety assessment activities are conducted for a sufficient set of safety behavior to ensure the
safety of the change.
Hazard identification typically requires extensive understanding of many different types of
system behavior. For systems-level changes, this includes knowledge of airborne systems,
ground systems, procedures, and the expected operational environment. Committees of
operational experts are typically involved to utilize their experience in assessment of past
changes, and in conceiving of potential hazardous scenarios or failure modes.
Several methods facilitate hazard identification. Hazardous states based on failed components
can be considered (known as forward search), or potential hazards arising from risks can be
evaluated (known as backward search) [87]. Other techniques, such as scenario analysis [14]
identify potentially dangerous operational conditions. The goal of utilizing several techniques is
to develop a comprehensive list of hazards in the system, thereby ensuring completeness.
Risk events can also be identified at this stage. They are potential occurrences that result from
events occurring after the hazard. As there are many potential events, there can be multiple risks
associated with a hazard. This was illustrated using the hybrid bow tie representation in Section
4.3.1.
Hazard identification populates the rows of the influence matrix. This is illustrated in Figure 5-2
for identified hazards 1 to n. As illustrated, there can be unknown or uncontrollable hazards
associated with a change. This point is reinforced in Figure 5-2 by illustrating that the hazard
identification process implicitly eliminates unknown and uncontrollable risks from scope.
Because identification depends on the experience of assessors, hazards are more likely to be
identified if they have occurred in past system operations or similar systems. These two types of
hazards are discussed in detail below. The lack of inclusion of unknown and uncontrollable
hazards limits the scope of assessment even before formal scoping decisions are made.
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Figure 5-2: Hazard Identification
5.1.2 Scoping
The scoping process defines the depth and breadth of scope that must be included in the analysis
of a proposed change. In the risk matrix approach, this requires identification of elements with
significant influence on risks and hazards identified. In the initial stage, each hazard has
multiple risks associated with it, and the influence of several system elements can be considered.
This can result in a very large matrix describing the complete set of influence associated with the
proposed change.
Based on the structure of the influence matrix, several strategies can be applied to limit scope,
which will be discussed below. First, limiting scope through a dominant system state will be
discussed. Similar to this approach is the use of dominant or stressing scenarios, as described in
.......... .. .. ...................................................................
Section 4.4.3. Next, scope limits inherent in acceptability criteria rankings are discussed. The
final set of scoping strategies discussed is based on an examination of influence and elimination
of low influence events from the scope of analysis.
Limiting Scope through the Worst Credible System State. Current ATO SMS guidance requires
that the most severe risk associated with a hazard be assessed for the worst credible system state
[11]. The worst credible system state is defined as follows:
Worst - The most unfavorable conditions expected (e.g., extremely high levels of traffic,
extreme weather disruption). Credible - This implies that it is reasonable to expect the
assumed combination of extreme conditions will occur within the operational lifetime of
the change. The assessment should always consider the most critical phase of flight
within which an aircraft could be affected by the failure under consideration. [11]
[emphasis in original]
One result of considering the worst credible system state is to scope out risks by dominance, as
described in Section 4.4.3. By this logic, the worst state conditions associated with a hazard will
result in the highest level of risk resulting from the hazard. Mitigating unacceptable risk levels
under the worst credible conditions will then sufficiently mitigate risk level in all other operating
conditions encountered.
A second result of scoping by worst credible behavior is to eliminate non-credible risks. Those
events that are not reasonably expected to occur during the operation of the system are
considered non-credible. This implicitly assigns a risk level that is within acceptability criteria
to non-credible event sequences, thus making them negligible and scoped out of analysis.
Additionally, scoping by worst credible state can eliminate the effectiveness of mitigations
applied to reduce risk. A hazard is defined for a set of conditions, of which one potential set is
the worst credible conditions of operation of the system, and another set may be a similar hazard
under less stressing conditions. This is illustrated conceptually for two hazards in Figure 5-3.
The hazards have the same structure of initial causes and preceding events and would differ only
in the probabilities assigned to events.
Four elements and two risks associated with the hazard are shown. In the example, Elements 1
and 2 (E-E 2) influence the initial causes of the hazard. As shown in the bow tie model, these
would influence the likelihood of the hazards. Elements 3 and 4 (E3-E4) are mitigating elements,
influencing the likelihood of the branch in the event tree. They reduc
has occurred.
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Figure 5-3: Reduction of Mitigation Effectiveness in Worst Credible System State
The mitigating elements are notionally assumed to be more effective in the less stressing
condition, as shown by their magnitude of influence for Hazard 1 (H1). When conditions are
more stressing (e.g. the worst credible), the Element 4 (E4) no longer has an influence, and the
influence of the Element 3 (E3) is reduced. Under the worst credible state, more stringent
requirements would be placed on Elements 1 & 2 due to the reduced mitigation effectiveness.
Another effect of assuming the worst credible system state can be to strengthen the influence of
one or several elements, because the hazard likelihood is correlated with the condition. This is
shown notionally in Figure 5-4. Elements 2 & 3 (E2-E3) are shown with weak influence under
the less stressing system state. Influence is weak because any change in their behavior has less
of an effect on the risk level. The same elements are shown with strong influences under the
more stressing system state, as changes to their behavior are more likely to increase risk level.
An example of a condition that follows this pattern is the density of traffic. Aircraft are expected
to have more conflicts as traffic density increases. Therefore all system elements that contribute
to the occurrence of a proximity hazard would have a stronger influence under conditions of high
traffic density compared to low traffic density.
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Figure 5-4: Correlation of Influence with Stressing Conditions
This scoping decision can have a significant effect on the validity of the assessed safety
performance. It may be impossible to predict the worst case operating conditions, especially in
the presence of dependent and interacting failures. This is especially for very low risk levels
(e.g. 10-9). The operational lifetime of a system required to ensure no expected events would be
approximately 50 years, at the current rate of commercial airline operations".
Scoping analysis by assuming the worst credible system state may embed conservatism in the
stringency of safety-derived requirements. The proposed change will not always operate in the
worst credible system state. Therefore, on average, the risk level will be lower than assessed.
5.1.3 Detailed Assessment and Modeling/ Mitigation
In the detailed assessment and modeling process, expected risk levels and severity are evaluated
for elements, conditions, and risks that have been identified as within the scope of analysis.
Risks are then ranked by their location in the risk matrix. Unacceptable risks are addressed
through mitigation. The detailed assessment process is typically performed to evaluate initial
risk levels. These are the levels of risk associated with the proposed change without additional
mitigations. This is the approach prescribed by the FAA Air Traffic Organization Safety
Management System [11]. There are several methods used in detailed modeling and assessment.
Two methods are discussed below. First, hazards can be assessed and mitigated independently
of other hazards. Second, hazards can also be assessed as a group, resulting in evaluation of a
subset of the scope of analysis.
" The NTSB reported 19 billion (1.9 x 107) flying hours for Part 121 carriers (airlines) in 2008. For constant
operations, it would take 53 years for the entire airline fleet to reach 1 x 109 operating hours.
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Assessing and Mitigating Hazards Independently. One strategy for assessing hazards is to
decompose the influence matrix by hazard, assess risk, and determine mitigations for each
hazard. This approach is illustrated in Figure 5-5. The scope of assessment is focused on a
single hazard and associated risk in isolation. This is shown notionally for the third hazard/risk
combination. The breadth of scope considers all elements with significant influence, with other
elements scoped out of analysis. As shown, the scope includes only elements 1-4, although
elements 1-6 influence other hazards.
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Figure 5-5: Single Hazard Assessment Decomposition
A potential challenge due to the decomposition by hazard is due to the practice not reassessing
the proposed change after safety requirements have been derived. There is the potential that a
mitigations derived for the system can reduce the risk level of associated with an individual
hazard but increase the risk level of an additional hazard. Because of this potential, mitigations
are commonly either designed to reduce risk levels under all potential conditions (i.e. all other
hazards), or isolated to influence only the hazard under investigation.
The independent assessment of hazards also neglects the evaluation of tradeoffs in mitigations
across hazards. Therefore, there is a risk that the approach can result in non-optimal system
solutions. The system could be overspecified compared to a more holistic approach. The
success of the approach is likely due to the fact that there are typically a small number of new
requirements derived through the safety assessment process that substantially change the overall
behavior of the system, allowing the influences to be isolated. As coupling increases, it may be
more effective to group multiple hazards and risks together in assessment.
Assessing Hazards as a Group. When multiple hazards and system elements result from similar
safety behavior, they can be grouped in analysis. These hazards would exhibit clustering in the
influence matrix. A cluster of hazards is defined as hazards with a common set of system
elements, with little or no influence of elements outside of the cluster. Clustering is typically a
sign that the causal behavior of the hazards due is similar within the cluster. Clustering is
notionally illustrated in Figure 5-6. There is a cluster of influence between Hazard/Risks 1 & 2
(Hi/Ri & H2/R2) and Elements 2-4 (E2-E4). For these hazards, other elements do not exhibit an
influence. For the other hazards shown (H3-H4), all system elements have influence and there is
no readily apparent grouping.
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Figure 5-6: Evaluation of Groupings of Hazards (Clusters)
Grouped hazards in the influence matrix are necessary but not sufficient to define a cluster. In
addition to having influence, the behavior that is exhibited to create the influence must also be
similar. Similar behavior may arise when there are initial causes of hazards that originate form a
subset of system elements, such as a specific set of avionics equipment. They may also be
mitigated in similar forms, such as through training, or through the presence of a safety net (e.g.
TCAS). By analyzing the hazards as a group, mitigation of similar behavior can also be
considered as a group, resulting in a more holistic evaluation of tradeoffs between different
mitigations strategies.
Form of Safety Models. Models used in detailed modeling in assessment can vary in form.
Models can be qualitative or quantitative, and structured or unstructured. Qualitative estimation
techniques classify likelihood in several categories that do not necessarily have a probability
associated with them. In evaluating the expected behavior of the system, expert judgment is
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used to assimilate all dynamics and assign likelihood. Qualitative methods tend to be
unstructured and implicitly held by assessors. For significantly complex behavior, it can be
difficult to rely only on unstructured models. Quantitative methods are typically used within a
logical structure, such as a fault tree or an event tree that delineates potential state transitions
leading to and from the hazard and estimates likelihood for each condition.
Models, particularly quantitative models, can be very complex and detailed. Complexity can
arise from the need to incorporate complex causal behavior of risks or multiple conditions that
are representative of expected operational experience. In many cases, quantitative models
require relevant operational data to model component reliability, traffic characteristics, or to
understand human performance in normal and degraded modes of operation.
The complexity of detailed models is a primary driver of the cost of the safety assessment
process. Significant resources are required to compose complex model structures, obtain
relevant data, and review key assumptions. There is a desire to keep models as simple as
possible, to remain tractable, but sufficiently detailed to capture key safety behavior and remain
credible.
5.2 Target Level of Safety Approach
Application of a Target Level of Safety (TLS) is effectively a subset of the risk matrix approach.
In the approach, a risk level target is defined for a set of conditions (i.e. a hazard) that associated
with a specific risk. The target is usually expressed in the rate of occurrence of events per unit of
exposure (e.g. /hr or /departure). The target is decomposed from an overall risk event to a set of
conditions for which analysis is conducted through a risk budget. The target is a threshold
criterion. If the assessed risk level is below (i.e. less likely than) the target, the change is
acceptable. If it is above (i.e. more likely than) the target, mitigations must be applied to reduce
the risk. This risk budget scopes the hazard for which the proposed change will be assessed and
allocates risk through conditions to the risk target. Thus, due to the nature of deriving a TLS,
hazard/risk identification and scoping processes are inter-related. However, they will be
discussed in separate sections. Following this, the processes of detailed modeling and
assessment and mitigation will be discussed.
5.2.1 Hazard/Risk Identification
Creation of a Risk Budget. In the TLS approach, there is a need to determine how risk levels
will be allocated hazards evaluated for assessment. This process is typically conducted using the
methodology of a risk budget. This is illustrated conceptually in Figure 5-7. For a given risk
associated with the proposed change, there are several hazards (shown as Hazards 1-n) that can
result in the risk. Intermediate sets of conditions can be defined before arriving at hazards, but
are not shown for simplicity.
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Figure 5-7: Risk Budget Decomposition of Hazards
Budgeting is performed to assign a target level of safety to the hazard that will be evaluated in
safety assessment (shown as Hazard 1 above). Other hazards are typically scoped out of
analysis, although it is also possible to use multiple risk budgets for a single system by defining
multiple target levels of safety.
Hazards are defined based on conditions, which can be defined in several ways. One approach is
to separate conditions based on types of exposure to risk. As an example, if the change is limited
to enroute operations, safety can be evaluated separately for the enroute phase of flight
(compared to approach and departure). By this approach, the sets of conditions would
correspond to flight phases, and the condition of interest would be further decomposed to arrive
at the target level of safety. Risk can also be budgeted to different causes of events. An example
of this method is separating target levels of safety for normal performance of a system from that
of failure conditions. When this is the case, a distribution of risk is enforced across multiple
causes.
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Determination of the Risk Goal. One of the issues in applying the TLS approach is determining
the desired target for the top-level risk event, referred to here as the risk goal. This is set to
enforce a goal on the risk level exhibited by the proposed change when it is implemented. There
can be several approaches to setting the design target for the top-level risk event. These
approaches are illustrated in Figure 5-8 and discussed below. These methods serve to enforce
either equivalent levels of safety, or desired safety improvements in the system. From the total
risk goal, the fraction of risk level at each level of decomposition of the risk budget is then
determined.
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Figure 5-8: Methods for Setting Risk Goals
Parity. Using the parity approach, a representative analysis is used to estimate the current rate of
accidents in the system. This analysis either averages accident rates over a time period up to the
time of the change, or uses a point rate from a representative year. No additional improvement is
required for the proposed change. It requires the new system to have an "equivalent level of
safety" to the currently operational system.
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Extrapolation. Recognizing the general trend of declining accident rates, one may expect the
accident rate at a future date to be lower than the current accident rate at the time of
implementing a proposed change. Under the extrapolation approach, the historical accident rate
is extrapolated according to an observed trend line to an expected implementation date.
Risk ratio. The current accident rate may be unknown. If this is the case, a relative performance
gain desired in the proposed change can be defined as a risk ratio. Evaluating a model of both
the baseline system performance, and the system with the proposed change then allows a relative
comparison of risk levels.
Homeostasis. Public perception of accident risk is typically assumed to be correlated with the
annual frequency of accidents and not the accident rate [89]. This dynamic forms a mental
model of regulators and policy-makers of a required static level of accidents per year. By this
logic, increases in flying hours would increase the actual number of accidents per year. To keep
that measure constant, a corresponding reduction in accident rates is required. The homeostasis
approach is common in articulated policy goals for safety improvements [89].
Absolute. Absolute risk level targets set an accident rate threshold regardless of previous
accident experience. This approach can be used to try to maintain consistent investment
decisions across technologies or public harms. The absolute target level of safety includes the
acceptability criteria in the risk matrix, as discussed in the previous section.
Budgeting the Risk Goal to Hazards. There are several potential approaches to budget the risk
goal to hazards. Risk levels can be budgeted equally by hazard, which is typically performed
when hazards are of similar severity. This assigns an equal weighting to the required
performance of each hazard. Risk can also be budgeted by exposure, such that the risk goal is
defined as an average level of risk in the operation of the system. Where available, operational
data can also be used to budget risk levels to be equivalent to a proportion experienced in past
operation.
5.2.2 Scoping
Risk budgeting decomposes risk levels to a design hazard. This has the effect of scoping
analysis to the design hazard, with all other conditions in the risk budget outside of the scope of
analysis. Applying the TLS approach requires influences of the design hazard to be decoupled
from other hazards. This is the benefit of the TLS approach, that it focuses analysis on a set of
decomposed elements and conditions.
This decoupling is illustrated conceptually in Figure 5-9. At the top of the figure, there is a risk
that occurs under conditions 1 & 2. In this aggregate hazard, a given system element (E1) is
shown to have a strong influence on the occurrence of the hazard. However, the element's
influence can be decomposed, such that it has a strong influence under the set of Conditions 1,
but no influence under Conditions 2. For multiple elements in the system, using the TLS
approach decouples their influence from other hazards and eliminates them from the scope of
analysis.
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Figure 5-9: Disaggregation of Influence in Risk Budgeting
In the target level of safety approach, the basic assumption is that risk levels associated with
hazards outside of scope are acceptable by similarity. The logic is that the overall influence of
those elements, as it relates to the level of risk in the system is sufficiently similar to current
operation that they do not need to be evaluated in detail. This also requires the current system to
be acceptably safe. Other risks or conditions as well as other behaviors that could influence
them are judged to be out of scope.
The decomposition of influence by hazard is a significant assumption in the TLS approach.
There can be uncertainty regarding the influence of changes to a system element on the risk level
under other hazards. One example is the navigation paradox, initially identified by Machol [90].
The paradox is that as navigation precision is increased to reduce collision risk of adjacent
aircraft in one dimension, collision risk can increase in other dimensions, which were scoped out
of the analysis.
5.2.3 Detailed Assessment and Modeling/ Mitigation
Due to the quantitative definition of a target level of safety, quantitative models can be applied.
This is in contrast to modeling in the risk matrix approach, which uses both qualitative and
quantitative methods. The emphasis on quantitative modeling typically results in the use of the
TLS approach to set requirements for technical performance measures. The TLS approach can
also be used to evaluate the behavior of multiple interacting components through simulation
methods, such as Monte Carlo analysis.
One method of application of the TLS approach is to separate a risk target for normal
performance from failure conditions. This approach is appropriate in cases where technical
performance of the system under normal operation correlates strongly with risk. An example is
the relationship between navigation accuracy and midair collision risk. When this is the case, the
properties of change elements are typically set to meet acceptable safety targets based on the risk
model used.
With target levels of safety derived for midair and ground collision risks on the order of 10-7 and
10-9 events/hr, high safety performance of change elements can be required. Data underlying
performance at very low likelihood levels is typically not observable at the level of fidelity
required to support assumptions on probability distributions. Instead, causal models are used to
model relevant parameters and fit appropriate probability distributions that extend performance
beyond observed data.
5.3 Performance-Based Approach
For a class of proposed changes where there is similar functionality in a currently operating
system, safety requirements can be derived through the comparison to a reference system. The
performance-based approach has been specifically recognized as acceptable by the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) for approval of systems that influence airborne separation
[8]. The ICAO approach is one example of the more general set of equivalence methods.
Applying the performance-based approach requires the identification of a suitable reference
system that has been judged to be safe either through analysis or through operational use. Given
the selection of a suitable reference system, there are two steps required to derive safety
requirements of a proposed change using the reference system. The first is to select relevant
performance measures that characterize the performance of the reference system. Tradeoffs can
then be evaluated along these performance parameters in deriving safety requirements. The
second process is to evaluate operational differences between the reference system and the
proposed system. These differences must be mitigated such that they do not degrade safety.
5.3.1 Hazard/Risk Identification
In the performance-based approach, hazards and risks are not identified directly. Instead, it is
implicitly assumed that hazards and risks will not change.
5.3.2 Scoping
The scoping process within the performance-based approach is performed to separate two sets of
elements: those characterized by performance measures, and those that represent other
operational changes. These can be illustrated using the influence matrix framework in Figure
5-10. A set of aggregate performance measures is identified to characterize both the reference
system and the proposed change. For the elements that contribute to these performance
measures (E1-E3), changes do not have an influence on risk level. For some operational change
elements, there will be an influence on risks associated with the change. An example could be
new procedures introduced that were not present in the reference system. This is shown by
notionally assigned influences for Elements 4-6 (E4-E6). The reference system approach requires
operational change elements to be specified such that they do not increase risk. There will also
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be other elements in the external system and proposed change that are judged sufficiently similar
that they are scoped out of analysis that are not shown in the figure.
System Elements
elements
characterized by operational change
performance elements
EJ E2 E3 E4  E5  E6
0 10 0 0 0 () R
Key
o-~ StrongC influence
o Weakinfluence
No
0 influence
Figure 5-10: Influence in the Performance-Based Approach
5.3.3 Detailed Modeling and Assessment
The analysis of aggregate performance measures in the performance-based approach is
illustrated in Figure 5-11. Aggregate performance measures are identified that characterize the
safety of the reference system. These serve to judge the performance of the proposed change.
Modeling and assessment may be performed to evaluate tradeoffs between individual
performance parameters that result in the same aggregate level of performance. Once these
performance measures are derived, they are then specified as requirements for the proposed
change.
Reference
System
Aggregate
> Performance
Measures
Acceptable
safety
performance
Figure 5-11: Illustration of the Performance-Based Approach
Some operational elements can differ from the reference system. These are not evaluated to risk
or performance criteria, but are specified as part of the proposed change such that they do not
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increase risk. Based on the goal of maintaining an equivalent level of safety, any increase in
risk level due to operational elements is mitigated for each element.
The performance measures selected for the reference system are commonly technical measures
of performance for which tradeoffs can be measured. These technical parameters include
accuracy of position in different dimensions, integrity (guarantee of position to a given level of
fidelity), latency, and availability. As such, assessment using the reference system method is
appropriate for a limited class of changes where these technical parameters can be used to define
the system. These include surveillance and communication systems.
The performance-based approach is limited to very similar applications to current system
operation and can therefore only deliver the same level of functionality. It cannot be used with
when operational elements have significant influence risk levels that are not similar in causality
to those in the current system. These would include large reductions in separation, changes in
task allocation, or new functions performed by the change.
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6 Application of Influence framework to Safety Assessment of
European Reduced Vertical Separation Minima
To test the influence matrix framework developed in this work, it was applied to the documented
safety assessment of Reduced Vertical Separation Minima (RVSM) in Europe, which was one of
the eight cases analyzed. This chapter documents the application of the influence matrix, the
identification of scope decisions made, and the consistency of scoping decisions with a
subsequent analysis of RVSM performed. The chapter begins with an overview and description
of RVSM. This is followed by a discussion of the safety assessment methods used and
associated documentation. Next, the influence matrix based on the RVSM safety assessment is
presented, along with a discussion of the key scoping decisions that can be identified from the
framework. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications of the scoping strategies
applied for the safety of implemented RVSM.
6.1 Overview and System Description of RVSM
Under conventional separation minima, aircraft are separated vertically by 1,000 ft flight levels
(FL) below FL 290 (29,000 ft) and by 2000 ft. above FL 290. The increase in vertical separation
with altitude has been required due to the sensitivity of altimeters that rely on pressure
measurement. At higher altitudes, the same change in pressure measurement translates to a
greater change in altitude. This is shown in Figure 6-1 for two example points: 1) at 5,000 ft
and 2) at 30,000 ft (FL 300). The slope of the pressure curve is greater for the second point.
Therefore, for a fixed sensitivity in pressure measurement, there is a large altitude error with
increasing altitude.
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Figure 6-1: Variation of Pressure with Altitude
Improvements in altimetry precision made it possible to reduce vertical separations at higher
altitudes. Beginning in 1990, ICAO published draft guidance material [91], on the feasibility of
reducing vertical separation in several regions. Altimetry performance was assured through
certification to Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards (MASPS) on new and retrofit
altimetry systems.
RVSM added six additional flight levels, by reducing vertical separation from 2,000 to 1,000 ft
between FL 290 and FL 410, as shown in Figure 6-2. The increase in available cruising altitudes
enabled more efficient operations and additional capacity.
RVSM Translon Non RVSM
L: 3j( -5-
"I. -3Vb1)
FL.~)'
~:I .320
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;~I. :3~~)
;~I*
;*~I. ~
Figure 6-2: Additional RVSM Flight Levels [92]
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From 1997 to 1998, RVSM was implemented in the ICAO North Atlantic Region [93].
Following this implementation, Eurocontrol performed a safety assessment supporting
implementation in the European region (EUR). This safety assessment was conducted for the
specific EUR operational environment, but built on standards on aircraft performance that were
established earlier by ICAO. The change was approved and implemented in EUR airspace in
2002. RVSM has also been implemented in most other regions , including the United States, but
those implementations are not the focus of this analysis.
To support operational approval in the European Region (EUR), two safety assessments were
performed, both before [94] and after [95] implementation. Each safety case considered
transition areas to RVSM, and "core" RVSM airspace. The focus of this case study is on the
assessment of mature airspace performed in the Pre-Implementation Safety Case (PISC) [94].
As part of the safety case, a Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) was also conducted [92].
The discussion of this case will begin with a description of the safety assessment approaches
used. Analysis of the case is then organized along the general processes of safety assessment:
hazard identification and scoping, detailed analysis and modeling/ mitigation, and operational
approval.
6.2 RVSM Safety Assessment Approach
RVSM provides interesting insight to two methods of analysis. The safety assessment utilized
both the Target Level of Safety (TLS) approach and the risk matrix approach. Both approaches
were combined to support the safety argument using goal structuring notation (GSN). GSN is a
formalism for supporting logical arguments regarding the validity of the safety case. The TLS
was used as a basis for acceptability of collision risk assessments of the effect of operational
errors and altimetry performance on loss of vertical separation. Additionally, a failure hazard
assessment (FHA) was conducted, and risks were mitigated to risk matrix acceptability criteria.
The FHA was performed according to EU guidance [55]. The documentation of the FHA was
sufficient to identify the influences of system elements on associated hazards as identified by the
safety assessors. It documented the rationale for initial risk levels derived, and the effect of
mitigations derived to achieve acceptable levels of risk.
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Brief Discussion of the R VSM TLS and Risk Budget. The ICAO Review of the General Concept
of Separation Panel (RGCSP) established the TLS used for RVSM. The panel set the Target
Level of Safety in vertical separation as 5 x 10~9 accidents per flight hour [96] using a risk
budget, which is illustrated in Figure 6-3. The historical rates of fatal accidents, en-route
accidents, and midair collisions were reviewed, and the overall risk goal for each category was
set to be equivalent to current operation.
From the historical midair collision risk of 1.5 x 10~8 accidents / hr, risk was budgeted equally to
each dimension of flight. Loss of planned separation in the vertical, longitudinal, and lateral
dimensions were treated as separate, independent events, and the overall risk budget for a midair
collision was divided into thirds for each dimension. This resulted in a target of 5 x 10-9
accidents/hr due to loss of planned separation in the vertical dimension. Half of the rate was
budgeted to technical height-keeping performance and the other half to other hazards (such as
operational errors).
1 x 10-7
1.5 x 10-8
5 x 10- Vertical Longituna Lateral
Dimension Dinsion Dimension
equal division
(all other Technical Height-
performance) Keeping Perf
2.5F x61- 2.5 x 10D9
Figure 6-3: TLS Decomposition for RVSM
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6.3 Application of the Influence Framework to the RVSM FHA
The documentation of the FHA [92] performed for RVSM describes the process of hazard
identification, scoping, and risk assessment in sufficient detail to provide a basis for
retrospectively applying the influence matrix framework. An influence matrix was constructed
based on the published FHA. The influence matrix provides additional insight into decisions
made during the hazard assessment. Of particular insight is the analysis of several subdivisions
of scope that involved common mitigations and hazards. The discussion below will highlight
several decisions made in the FHA using the influence matrix, the process for constructing the
influence matrix, and the associated identification of groupings of hazards.
6.3.1 Methodology Applied to Create the RVSM Influence Matrix
The FHA for RVSM was conducted by hazard (as opposed to by risk). Each hazard is a set of
conditions that could result in harm. Thus, identification of hazard identified potentially
dangerous conditions that were of concern. Each set of conditions could result in several risk
events. For each hazard, the worst credible effect occurring after the hazard was used to define
the risk event. The severity and risk level of each risk event are then used to rank each hazard in
the risk matrix.
In the assessment of RVSM hazards, operational experts developed an initial list of hazards
through a structured process of eliciting operational hazards. Hazards were grouped into three
areas: during switchover (i.e. the operational change from conventional to reduced separation
minima), in transition airspace (borders of the region where conventional separation is applied),
and in core airspace. The influence framework application was limited to hazards associated
with core airspace, under the assumption that this would be the mature operating state of the
system. This limits hazard conditions to those related to mature, core airspace.
The hazards identified are arranged in rows of the influence matrix. As shown in Figure 6-4, the
RVSM assessors identified 26 hazards, after the elimination of duplicate hazards. Implicit in the
process is the elimination of uncontrollable hazards, such as meteor strikes, which were not
considered.
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System Elements
Aircraft ATC
No. Hazards Airs ace FU h Crew ui ment ATC Equip Operator TCAS
1.3 System error - altitude deviation 0 o o
1.14 Change of approval status during flight (downgraded) Pilot will 0
not be able to control level
1.15 Air RX/TX unserviceable [radio] 0 O O o o o
1.2 Nuisance TAs and RAs 0 () o 3k
1.8 'Pilot is deviating from clearance OQ O o O
1.6 The pilot will miss the visual perspective of other traffic from
the flight deck and will deviate from cleared levelltrack
1.9 Aircraft unexpectedly encounters turbulence that affects RVSM O O o 0 0 0operation
Ill Sudden deviation from cleared FL and/or route [due to wake] 0 O o 0
'W' in indicated in the flight plan or the pilot claims aircraft for - 51b
RVSM approved despite this is not the case ______ 0 0 0 0
2.4 Flight plan totally missing 0 0 o O O o
2.7 RVSM status of aircraft operating immediately above and
below RVSM airspace not known to ATCO
2.23 STCA not reacting correctly when RVSM is temporarily 0 0 0 O o 02 suspended and increased VSM is introduced'
STCA ltnctionality not able to discriminate between RVSM2.6 approved aircraft and non-RVSM approved aircraft
2.8 Missing IFPS checks of FPLs (flight plan] coming from statesinside RVSM
2.9 The manual insertion of changes or missing RVSM approval 0 0 ) 0
2.1 ATC systems are not able to exchange OLDI messages
containing data about RVSM approval status 0 0 0_ 0_0
2.11 ATC systems are not able to internally distribute data about
RVSM approval status 0 0 0 0 0
2.13 RVSM status has to be transmitted manually to succeeding unit,
if information is missing on flight plans
2.5 Potential loss of separation due to wrong application of
separation standard for OAT and GAT [public a/c] 
2.17 ATCO issued incorrect clearance ) ( O O
2.27 Computer failures
1.16 'Non-RVSM approved aircraft flying above FL410 andperforms emergency descent"
2.12 "Different co-ordination requirements with different MIL
agencies within the ACC"
2.21 "Deinition of vertical dimensions of TRAs may differ from
state to state
2.25 "Ground TX/RX [radio] unserviceable" 0 0 ( 0 0
Aircraft with MTOW < 15.000kg or <30 pax might not be
' carrying ACAS 7.00 o _0___ 0 _
Figure 6-4: RVSM Influence Matrix with Identified Clusters
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The assessors also recognized five categories of system elements: airspace design, flight crew,
aircraft equipment, ATC equipment, and ATC operators. Each element served as a category for
which safety requirements were derived. Thus, these divisions of elements were used to
populate the influence matrix and categorize influence. In addition, risk levels were also
influenced by the interaction of RVSM with existing TCAS equipage. Although not explicitly
identified as a system element, the behavior of TCAS influences risk levels, so the system was
added as a sixth system element.
In the FHA process, participants did not explicitly analyze hazards using the influence
framework. However, the FHA documentation explains the rationale used to assess the risk
levels associated with hazards, and to derive required mitigations. Within this rationale, there is
discussion of the influence of each element on risk, and how that influence is mitigated to
achieve acceptable safety levels. This provides a basis for coding the magnitude of influence
based on the documented rationale.
When a property of a system element contributed directly to the behavior resulting in a hazard's
risk level, it was coded as a strong influence. Direct contributions were consistent with language
stating that the system element directly caused the risk associated with a hazard, through
multiple failure modes or causes related to the behavior of that element. As an example, the
influence of flight crew on the hazard "pilot is deviating from clearance" is coded as strong. The
FHA recognizes multiple flight crew causes that may cause a pilot to deviate from clearance,
such as call sign confusion or errors in programming of flight automation.
When a system element was indirectly related to the risk level of a hazard, it was coded as weak.
This is the case when the additional element interacts with functions performed by other strong
elements, or has small changes in behavior as a result of RVSM. For the same hazard above,
airspace design was coded as a weak influence. The changes due to RVSM change the
likelihood that an error by the flight crew or controller will result in a loss of separation. The
reduced distance between flight levels reduces the amount of time before a conflict can be
recognized and corrected.
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When a system element was not mentioned, and was logically not expected to influence risk, the
influence was rated as none. There are four hazards shown where no elements influence the
hazard. These were recognized by the assessors as hazards that currently exist, for which no
changes to RVSM influence the risk of the outcome. By this assumption, the hazards were
scoped out of detailed analysis.
Continuing the coding process for each hazard, the influence matrix was filled. After this
process, hazards were grouped and reordered for common influence mechanisms, resulting in
clusters. This is discussed in the following section.
6.3.2 Scoping in the RVSM Influence Matrix
Implicit in the FHA process was the exclusion of scope of four hazards present in the RVSM
concept, but were uncontrollable through requirements derived on changes to RVSM system
elements. The first two hazards excluded related to existing airspace coordination issues
(Hazards 2.12 and 2.21). The second is the potential for unequipped TCAS aircraft (Hazard 1.1),
for which equipage rates could not be enforced along with RVSM changes. The third and final
hazard was related to the failure of ground-based ATC communication (Hazard 2.25). All of the
above hazards were deemed to be uncontrollable. It was the judgment in the FHA that no RVSM
system element's behavior could be changed to either increase or decrease the risk of each
hazard in implementation. Related to this premise was that these hazards were already qualified
by similarity. They existed in current system operation and were mitigated. This is reflected
with the absence of influence of any system elements on the hazards.
Although it was recognized that there were strong interactions influencing RVSM hazards,
TCAS was also scoped out of the analysis. The argument was based on similarity, under the
rationale that TCAS was routinely used at lower altitude levels and was acceptably safe, and
behavior could be expected to be similar in the implementation of RVSM. As will be discussed
later, limitations of this assumption were recognized and a monitoring program was used to
identify and correct risks related to TCAS interaction. The influence matrix illustrates the
implications of this scope decision.
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Identification of Clusters. A cluster is a set of system elements and hazards that have similar
influence and safety behavior. It is represented in the influence matrix by a localized grouping
of common influence across hazards and risks. Nine clusters were identified from the RVSM
influence matrix. Clusters were initially identified by rearranging the influence matrix to group
hazards together by the system elements that influenced them. This process resulted in several
groups where a subset of system elements influenced each hazard and the remainder exerted no
influence. From the initial groups, the narrative for each hazard contained in the FHA was
examined to determine if elements contributed to hazards through similar behavior. Where this
was the case, the set of elements and hazards indicated a cluster.
Within a cluster, the hazards, elements, and associated safety behavior were sufficiently similar
that the hazards could be mitigated together through common mitigations. This clustering
approach was not explicitly followed in the FHA process, but represents a potential method for
examining grouped behavior that may have been performed implicitly by the assessors.
The resulting clusters identified are shown in Figure 6-4, indicated by rounded boxes. Each
cluster is numbered and discussed below. Where elements within each cluster are not adjacent,
the labels are divided by letter or by a dashed line to an individual element. The clusters
identified are consistent with a subsequent review of the FHA as discussed in the following
section.
Cluster 1: altitude deviation due to a system error. This cluster is associated with a single
hazard. The "system error" refers to a failure in the aircraft altimetry system that could reduce
separation. This cluster was analyzed through a collision risk assessment conducted to derive
altimetry system performance.
Cluster 2: anomalous aircraft equipment performance. This single hazard is associated with
aircraft equipment failures that can result in loss of RVSM capability. The hazard was addressed
with procedural mitigations.
Cluster 3: nuisance TAs and RAs is heavily influenced by interactions between RVSM and
TCAS. TCAS behavior has a strong influence on pilot deviation from altitude, and on pilot
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reactions to nuisance TAs and RAs. The two hazards were determined to be the most safety-
critical (i.e. the highest ranked associated risks) in the RVSM FHA. They were not adequately
mitigated, and TCAS was scoped out of the analysis. This decision required additional
monitoring processes after implementation to ensure risk was acceptable [97].
Cluster 4: pilot deviation from flight level contains multiple hazards related to potential pilot
errors that result in altitude deviations. The consequences of errors were evaluated by examining
past reports of altitude deviations. Behavior was expected to be sufficiently similar that the
implications of the deviations with reduced flight level separation were expected to be acceptable
using similar mitigating approaches. In addition, several requirements were derived related to
flight crew training.
Cluster 5: A TC system accommodation of R VSMfunctionality represents the consideration of air
traffic control equipment design to introduce functionality required due to implementation of
RVSM, such as different flight plan inputs. Mitigations of the hazards were based on best
practices and judgment to assure the functional operation of the system.
Cluster 6: Incorrect clearance by ATC (between RVSM/ conventional); Cluster 7: computer
failures; Cluster 8: Non-RVSM emergency descent. Clusters 6-8 were not examined in
significant detail in the FHA. Cluster 6 contains hazards related to controller operational errors.
These were mitigated through controller requirements. Cluster 7 was addressed through the
implementation of ground-based system requirements on reliability and software assurance.
Cluster 8 pertains to an emergency scenario, and best practices were used to implement
appropriate procedures.
Cluster 9: existing hazards in reference system. This cluster is noteworthy due to the lack of
influence of any system elements. All hazards within the category were judged either to be out
of scope (not related to RVSM) or sufficiently similar to current operations that no design
changes evaluated would influence the risk. They were therefore scoped out of the analysis.
In the preceding analysis, clusters were identified retrospectively. In future assessments,
identification of clusters can enable the integrated assessment of mitigation strategies. These
mitigations strategies are likely to be more effective at mitigating hazards with common causal
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behavior in comparison to individual mitigation of each hazard, because they enable to analysis
of combined effects of the mitigation.
6.3.3 Subsequent Review of FHA Hazards
After RVSM implementation, Eurocontrol conducted a Post-Implementation Safety (POSC)
[95], updating the initial assessment of RVSM hazards with operational data and results from
monitoring. As part of the POSC, a review of the initial FHA was conducted [98]. The review
was conducted in light of three identified challenges in the initial FHA: 1) the assessment of each
hazard individually neglected aggregate risk levels from all hazards, 2) hazards were closer in
definition to causes, making them "remote" from the risk event, and 3) to risks were found to be
high, contrary to operator expectations [95].
It is interesting to note that the clusters identified above address concerns identified in the
subsequent review. The correspondence between hazards defined in the FHA review and
clusters is discussed below, after an introduction to the hazards identified in the FHA review.
Hazards in the review were based on a functional model of RVSM shown in Figure 6-5, and
there were nine subsystem hazards that contribute to an overall hazard of the aircraft being on the
wrong flight level or route.
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Figure 6-5: RVSM System and Subsystem Hazards [98]
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The subsystem hazards identified were [98]:
1. Non-RVSM approved aircraft is indicated as RVSM approved
2. RVSM approved aircraft cannot indicate loss of RVSM capability to ATC
3. Airspace structure is wrong
4. Aircraft is assigned inappropriate level and/or route
5. No clearances / instructions are given to pilot from ATC
6. Undetectable altimetry system error
7. Loss of, or detectable error in, altimetry information
8. 'Pilot' deviates from cleared level and/or route
9. Aircraft is unable to maintain cleared level
Although a reassessment of combined influence was not possible from the structure of the review
report, the hazards identified in the review are generally consistent with the insights gained from
the identified clusters found using the influence matrix. Differences and similarities found
between the two approaches are shown in Figure 6-6. Clusters identified using the influence
matrix are shown in the first column, and hazards from the subsequent review are shown in the
second. When clusters are related to hazards, they are linked in the figure. Those without links
do not relate. In the discussion that follows, the terms clusters and hazards will be used to
differentiate the two columns.
Clusters Identified from Hazards from FHA Review
Influence Matrix Repo
(6) Undetectable altimetry system error
(1) Altitude deviation due to system
error (7) Loss of, or detectable error in,
altimetry information
(2) Anomalous aircraft equipment
performance (8) 'Pilot' deviates from cleared level
and/or route
(3) Nuisance TAs and RAs (9) Aircraft is unable to maintain cleared
(4) Pilot deviation from flight level
(1) Non-RVSM approved aircraft is
(5) ATC system accommodation of indicated as RVSM approved
RVSM functionality
(2) RVSM approved aircraft cannot
indicate loss of RVSM capability to
(6) Incorrect clearance by ATC (between ATC
[RVSM/ conventional)
(4) Aircraft is assigned inappropriate
(7) Computer failures level and/or route
(8) Non-RVSM emergency descent (3) Airspace structure is wrong
(9) Existing hazards in reference system (5) No clearances / instructions are
given to pilot from ATC
Figure 6-6: Comparison of Influence Matrix Clusters to Review Report Hazards
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As can be seen in the figure, in the first two relationships, multiple clusters correspond to
multiple hazards. In the third relationship, a cluster corresponds to two hazards, and in the fourth
relationship, one cluster corresponds to one hazard. The remaining hazards and clusters do not
relate.
In the first relationship, Clusters 1 and 2, relate to two review hazards (Hazards 6 & 7). These
linked hazards and clusters describe the effects of failures in aircraft equipment that influence
altitude. The clustering analysis separated deviations due to system errors and other aircraft
equipment failures. The hazards separate the same concerns undetectable and detectable errors
in altimetry performance.
Clusters 3 and 4 describe behavior related to altitude deviations, and correspond with Hazards 8
and 9. Corresponding hazards are broken down into whether deviation was intentional or
uncontrollable. These clusters include strong influence of TCAS behavior in corresponding
risks. In the initial assessment, the interaction with TCAS caused the risks to be ranked high,
requiring additional monitoring. The review report recognized operational experience with pilot
deviations TCAS performance to judge that the corresponding hazards were safe.
In the third relationship, Cluster 5 corresponds with two hazards (1 and 2). Cluster 5
incorporates hazards due to a failure of ATC systems to accommodate RVSM. The
corresponding hazards divided this into two separate types of hazard: a) related to non-RVSM
aircraft being approved in RVSM airspace, and b) indication of loss of RVSM to ATC. Other
behavior in the cluster related to flight planning inputs was not recognized in the review report.
The review report was focused on operational hazards, and this cluster was mitigated through
best practices in design.
The final relationship identified was straightforward. Cluster 5 is equivalent to Hazard 4, and
describes an inappropriate clearance for the type of aircraft cleared (e.g. non-RVSM aircraft
cleared on RVSM route).
Several clusters were not included in the hazards of the review report, such as ATC computer
failures (Cluster 7), emergency descent of non-RVSM aircraft (Cluster 8) and the cluster of
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behavior that was scoped out of the initial analysis (Cluster 9). These were either judged to be
low-level causes of other hazards, or were appropriately scoped out (in the case of cluster 9).
Finally, the review report added two hazards. Hazard 3 related to airspace structure, which was
validated by the entire pre-implementation safety case. This was likely inappropriate to identify
as a hazard in the review case, as it would be the cause of other hazards. The influence matrix
captures this through the "airspace design" system element. This indicates hazards where the
structure of the airspace design contributes to the risk level. Hazard 5 was also added, but is
solely related to transition airspace, which was scoped out of this analysis.
6.4 Summary
The influence matrix provided valuable insight when applied to the pre-implementation safety
case arguments. Clustering of hazards identified cases where common behavior contributed to
similar risks. Assessing risk and designing mitigations for each cluster enables a more integrated
approach to determining requirements. These approaches were identified in the subsequent
published review of the FHA.
Several of the identified clusters directly correspond with aggregated hazards identified in the
review report. These indicate hazards that were initially defined in a manner too similar to
causes. Because of this, the structure of influence of potential mitigations in the influence matrix
is common, which indicates that all elements can mitigate the causes in a similar manner. By
clustering these hazards, they are redefined at a more appropriate level that allows mitigations to
be examined in an integrated fashion.
The influence framework also identified significant interactions between TCAS and RVSM
changes that affected risk levels. These were the focus of extensive reassessment in the review
report. The conclusions from the reassessment, however, may not have been available before
implementation, as they relied upon on RVSM operational experience. Therefore, the benefit of
the influence matrix was in characterizing a concern that was identified by assessors and
providing justification for the need for monitoring.
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7 Challenges in Safety Assessment Identified from Case Studies
and Implications for Safety Assessment of Future Systems-
Level Changes
Several trends and challenges in safety assessment were identified through case studies
performed and documented in Appendix D. Cases were selected that implemented operational
changes to the air transportation system with documented safety assessment. Eight cases of
systems-level change were analyzed. Six of the changes have been implemented and two are
pending. A summary of the case studies analyzed is shown in Table 7-1.
Table 7-1: Summary of Case Studies Analyzed
System-Level Change Implemented AssessmentYear Methods
Instrument Landing Systems (ILS) 1961 TLS
North Atlantic Organized Track 1966-1981 TLS
System (NAT OTS)
Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance 1993 TLS (Risk Ratio)
System (TCAS)
Precision Runway Monitor (PRM) 1997 TLS
Automatic Dependent Surveillance, 1999 Risk Matrix
Broadcast (ADS-B) Alaska Capstone
EUR Reduced Vertical Separation 2002 Risk Matrix
Minima (RVSM) TLS
Automatic Dependent Surveillance Risk Matrix
Broadcast (ADS-B) Segments I and (pending) Performace-Based
Risk Matrix
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) (pending) TLS
Performance-Based
The identified trends have implications for safety assessment. Systems-level changes appear to
have increased the scope of analysis. If this trend continues, there will be an increase in the
scope of analysis when evaluating expected future systems-level changes. This chapter will
describe implications of challenges observed in past case studies to the ability to perform safety
assessment and operational approval. One of the key challenges is incorporating increased
breadth of safety behavior in the safety assessment process. Increasing demands on safety
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assessment quality also result from the increased safety expectations in the system. Implications
in assessing fundamentally new operational concepts will also be discussed, as well as
limitations in achievable performance due to legacy systems. Identifying these implications is
expected to provide an opportunity to improve the ability to achieve future changes.
7.1 Increasing Scope of Analysis Required
An increasing scope of analysis was observed in the cases analyzed. Scope is the number of
system elements and hazards/risks evaluated in safety assessment. This trend is illustrated in
Figure 7-1. Generally, the trend is for proposed changes to incorporate more system elements
and exhibit an increase in interactions with other aircraft and existing systems. The two pending
changes reviewed, ADS-B and UAS exhibit large scope compared to previous changes. Trends
observed in the scope of analysis are discussed below.
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Figure 7-1: Increasing Scope of Reviewed Changes
Distributed functionality is a key property observed in systems-level changes. Multiple
components of a system, such as avionics, infrastructure, and procedures interact in performing
an operational capability. This is evident in the ADS-B case, where several applications require
ground infrastructure, airborne equipage, and procedures. This is also evident for UAS, where
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functions are distributed between the unmanned vehicle, ground station, and command and
control infrastructure.
Other cases are also large in scale, meaning that there are a large number of elements that
compose the change. When this is the case, each element can have multiple failure modes or
interactions with other elements. Evaluating the safety performance for a given risk across the
multiple system elements that support a function can require a more sophisticated examination of
interactions and tradeoffs between system elements. This is one mechanism by which scale
increases breadth of scope along the dimension of system elements.
An increase in scale can also be expected to result from the planned implementation of multiple
applications reliant upon common infrastructure. With long equipage cycles and time scales of
current programs, it will be attractive to support multiple applications associated with changes.
Each application has separate risks associated with it and can change the behavior of system
elements. Thus, increasing applications expands the scope of risks evaluated. Some
consequences in terms of setting required functionality will be discussed in Section 7.5.
One final factor increasing scale is the physical extent of changes to the system. Infrastructure
changes can be expected to be deployed across the entire air transportation system. This can
create large variation in operating environments, interfaces with automation systems, and
interactions with other air traffic of varying levels of capabilities. This increases scope in both
the conditions under which the change must be assessed, and interacting with external systems.
7.1.1 Challenges in Managing Complexity of Increased Scope
In past changes, complexity has been managed by decomposing the safety behavior considered
by hazard. When a target level of safety method was used, risk was analyzed to a single hazard,
and other hazards were scoped out of analysis. This approach relied on a decomposition of
influence in the change to define a focused hazard for assessment. Using a risk matrix approach,
causal behavior was assessed to individual hazards, and in some cases to groups of hazards. The
strategy of decomposition is likely to be less appropriate for future changes due to coupling in
behavior and potential adverse consequences due to decomposition.
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In the risk matrix approach, risk levels are assessed by decomposing the analysis by hazard.
There is also a chance that the decomposition strategy to individual hazards can increase the
overall risk levels outside of the scope of analysis if defined mitigations interact to adversely
influence the level of other risks. The common strategy to manage this is to implement
mitigations that are isolated to the individual risk and not expected to interact, or to introduce
mitigations that are expected to enhance safety across a broad set of hazards. This strategy can
result in sub-optimal design of mitigations by not evaluating tradeoffs in the performance of
mitigation measures across hazards. Thus, assessing each hazard individually can lead to
overspecification of requirements in the system, such that multiple mitigations address multiple
hazards.
7.1.2 Use of the Influence Matrix to Structure Scope Decisions
The scoping decision is an important process in safety assessment. The process has a strong
effect in defining the comprehensiveness of analysis by determining what influences can be
expected to contribute significantly to risks, and what influences can be scoped out of the safety
assessment. There is currently a lack of structured processes used for defining the scope of
safety assessment.
The influence matrix can be used to explicitly address scope decisions made in safety assessment
at a systems-level. Population of the influence of system elements on hazards and risks can
clearly communicate and document assumptions made about the safety behavior of a system
before detailed modeling and analysis are performed.
The influence matrix can also identify potential approaches to decomposing the assessment of
safety behavior. This can be achieved by identifying clusters of common influence groupings on
risks, which can be used to structure the detailed modeling and analysis processes around groups
of risks with common mitigation strategies. This provides the potential to decompose safety
assessment tasks while maintaining an increased scope. It also highlights what elements with
high influence are considered outside the scope of analysis, and highlights assumptions made
about behavior external to analysis.
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7.2 Increasing Demands on the Quality of Safety Assessment
The trend of decreasing accident rates can be expected to lead to an increase in required safety
performance of changes. This is supported by trends that have been observed in case studies of
reductions in the Target Level of Safety. There has also been an observed increase in the
sophistication of safety models. With the desire to continue safety improvements recognized by
the FAA, increasing demands on the quality of safety assessment can be expected in the future.
7.2.1 Increasing Safety Expectations
As accident rates have decreased, the requirement to maintain safety in proposed changes has
resulted in increased safety expectations. This is evident in the trend of decreasing Target Levels
of Safety in the cases reviewed, as illustrated in Figure 7-2. Although there are differences in the
type of accident, the TLS for PRM performance is two orders of magnitude higher than the TLS
for RVSM, and intermediate cases support a generally decreasing trend.
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Figure 7-2: Target Levels of Safety from Cases Reviewed
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7.2.2 Increasing Accuracy Expected in Safety Assessment
In early application of quantitative risk models, results were used to augment judgment by
operational experts and validate assumptions. Over the course of time, as more operational data
has become available, and sophistication of modeling and computational tools have increased,
safety models have become more representative of operational data. This is evidence of an
increase in the expected accuracy of safety assessment.
More sophisticated models often require an increase in representative operational data
extrapolated to low probability events, especially in the analysis of midair collision risk. This
will present a challenge for future systems-level changes, especially when experience from past
operations may not directly transfer to a new capability, as will be discussed in Section 7.3.
Judgment by assessors remains a key factor in assigning probabilities to human failure modes.
In the case where human performance results in observable operational errors or incidents, it
may be possible to observe historical probabilities to use in safety assessment. However, under
new operating conditions, significant operational expertise is required to accurately represent
how human elements will interact with the operation of the system under varying conditions and
in the presence of potential failure modes.
7.2.3 Increasing Scope Required to Accurately Represent Behavior
Expansion of Hazards Considered. The need to accurately predict expected levels of risk can
also be expected to result in an increase in the required scope of safety assessment. As
discussed in Section 4.4.3, negligible risks are commonly eliminated from scope when dominant
conditions are present. In the risk matrix approach, hazards with low risk levels may be scoped
out of the design if they are not expected to substantially affect the overall level of risk of the
change. In the TLS approach, this scoping is performed implicitly, assuming that there is not
significant influence on other hazards that have been decomposed in the risk budget.
The system typically becomes safer by mitigating dominant risk levels associated with hazards.
Hazards with a higher level of risk are more likely to occur in operation, making them more
likely to be identified and corrected. This represents a paradox in ultra-reliable systems, as
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articulated by Amalberti [99]. The increased safety performance results in less ability to address
risks based on accidents.
The need for an expanded scope of analysis can be illustrated by an example using the influence
framework, as shown in Figure 7-3. Two hazards influencing a risk are shown. The first hazard
has been assigned set of notionally strong influences across several system elements, with a few
weak or negligible elements. The level of risk associated with the second hazard is only
influenced weakly by changes in one element. This is typically correlated with a very low
change in risk level. Under the assumption that other hazards dominate, the second hazard
would be scoped out of the analysis. When the scope of analysis expands, addressing an
influence, although it is weak, is required to reduce overall risk levels by a significant magnitude.
Example: Risk 1 Dominates
System Elements
expected ability to Ri dominates &
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Figure 7-3: Expansion of Scope of Analysis
A reduction in dominant hazards can lead to a significant increase in the number of hazards
evaluated. This is illustrated conceptually in Figure 7-4. In the figure, there are multiple hazards
shown, each with an associated risk level. The first two hazards have assessed risk levels
significantly above the notional acceptability threshold, while the others are near the threshold.
For the first two hazards, it is clear that risk needs to be mitigated. For the other hazards, it is
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less apparent that risk should be mitigated, or what the most effective mitigation strategies may
be. With a reduction in dominant hazards, it will become more difficult to determine effective
mitigations.
(less safe)
acceptability threshold
(more safe)
Hazards
Figure 7-4: Illustration of Consequences of Dominant Hazards
For hazards with risk levels close to acceptability criteria, mitigation strategies can be
ambiguous. Without a dominant hazard, there can be a large number of hazards near the
acceptability threshold. Mitigating any individual hazard would not substantially reduce risk
levels, which are already very low.
It can become more difficult to rationally determine which hazards to mitigate. Each hazard has
a cost associated with mitigation to an acceptable level, and with an increase in hazards it can be
difficult to determine how to allocate mitigation resources. It may also become more difficult to
identify mitigations that do not interact to increase the risk level for other hazards. To address
this challenge, there may be a need to develop analysis of mitigations at a meta-level that can
affect multiple hazards.
There is also the possibility that if the increased number of hazards cannot be mitigated,
acceptable scope may be limited to achieve tractability of analysis. This would limit the types of
changes to the system that can be approved.
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Dynamic & Emergent Behavior. One result of the expansion of scope can be to further identify
more subtle system behavior. Hazards can exhibit complex causal behavior that is difficult to
identify in early assessment of systems. The presence of emergent behavior manifest as systems
accidents motivates the need to expand the scope of analysis to additional system elements.
System accidents typically occur due to the complex interaction of multiple elements [25] and
are especially challenging to detect when there is no clear causal failure leading to the accident.
Due to increasing system complexity, scope is likely to expand both in addressing interactions
with additional external elements and their resultant risks. The goal is to address potential
emergent behavior early in the process to prevent that behavior from resulting in an accident.
7.2.4 Use of Operational Monitoring as a Mitigation
Operational monitoring measures can be considered as an approach to mitigation risks in the
safety assessment process. While this has been performed for limited examples, it is not part of
current safety assessment or operational approval guidance. Including monitoring as a
mitigation can be a strategy to approve changes where procedural or technical mitigations were
not sufficient to achieve acceptable risk levels at the time. Monitoring can also expand the scope
of authority to correct safety deficiencies to external elements.
Appropriate measures must be taken to ensure that monitoring can reduce risk by addressing
precursors to accidents before an accident occurs. Monitoring mitigations should not reduce the
level of safety of the system.
7.3 Assessment Challenges from Fundamentally New Types of Operations
Many expected systems-level changes exhibit fundamentally new types of operation in the air
transportation system. Due to the nature of new types of operation, there is a reduced ability to
apply past experience and judgment, operational data, and similarity strategies to evaluation of
expected safety behavior.
Lack of Ability to Apply Similarity. The approach of limiting scope by similarity is challenging
fundamentally new types of operation, and is likely to not be appropriate. When an operation is
significantly different, an analogous operation in the current system does not exist. The scope of
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assessment is therefore likely to increase, as additional safety behavior must be evaluated. By a
similar argument, the performance-based approach is not appropriate to simplify the assessment
of fundamentally new capabilities.
In the case where multiple risks are evaluated and multiple system elements influence the risk,
this increase in scope is likely to increase uncertainty in the resultant level of risk of the system.
Following the discussion of uncertainty, another cause of increased scope is discussed.
Operations may be implicitly accepted today that would not meet current safety assessment
criteria. Even in performing similar functionality to the system, they cannot be accepted by
similarity due to the unacceptable performance of a reference system.
There is the risk that lack of similarity will fundamentally limit the types of operational
capabilities that can be approved. If sufficient uncertainty exists such that the level of risk
associated with a new capability cannot be evaluated, the safety case may fail to close and the
change could be rejected. It is also possible that performance requirements may be made
sufficiently stringent that they are not realizable by the current state of technology.
Need to Obtain Operational Data in Early System Deployments. The representativeness of
operational data presents a paradox in safety assessment. Operational data must reflect the
expected operational environment, but that environment is unknown unless a reasonably similar
system exists in operation. When a proposed change significantly alters the behavior underlying
past data, it is difficult to judge the applicability of past experience to the assessment of the
proposed change.
It should be recognized that human judgment remains a key factor in extrapolating trends in
operational data beyond the likelihood available from samples. This judgment should also be
recognized as having an ability to adapt past data to conditions of interest for the current change
evaluated. An example of this approach is evident in the case of collision risk assessment of
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). The data limitation is being overcome by modifying past
operational data to reflect expected changes in interaction with future UAS systems. Parameters
of the encounter model used to evaluate TCAS have been altered to reflect potential conflicts
with UAS, which can have different performance from current commercial aircraft [100].
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It is a challenge when the operation of a new system is sufficiently different from current
operation such that past experience does not apply. In this case, data from early operational
implementations can be especially useful. It will therefore be essential to structure programs to
identify relevant safety data required in operational trials that can inform the safety assessment
for future refinements of the system.
7.4 Limitations in Achievable Performance due to Interaction with Legacy
Systems
Proposed changes often interact with elements in the existing system. In some cases, the current
structure of operational approval of limits the ability to change the behavior of existing systems.
This inability to change the behavior of existing legacy systems can constrain the achievable
performance of proposed changes. This has been observed in RVSM and ADS-B.
7.4.1 Performance Limitations of Legacy Systems
In classes of changes that interact significantly with TCAS, achievable separation distances can
be limited if these interactions are not mitigated through additional safety requirements in the
change. There is also the risk that mitigations may not acceptably reduce risk, and therefore
achievable separation will be limited.
The effectiveness of TCAS at mitigating midair collision risk levels may also constrain
achievable operational concepts. Where other aircraft are not equipped with transponders, the
effect of mitigation is reduced, and midair collision risk may be unacceptable. This class of
interactions can therefore limit the physical extent of allowable changes to airspace where
equipage is ensured.
A separate challenge due to legacy system performance is illustrated by the requirements on
ADS-B navigation quality indicators for mixed environments compared to non-radar
environments. Paradoxically, with two available position sensors (ADS-B and radar), higher
navigation precision is required for the mixed environment than when relying on only one
position source (ADS-B).
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7.4.2 High Performance Requirements Set by Lower Performance System Elements
Where there is significant variation in equipage of other aircraft, the lowest performance
equipment class can set the performance requirements for an overall application. This is
especially relevant for cases where the risk is a midair collision. By its nature, midair collision
risk couples behavior between systems through common interaction in airspace.
This challenge is emerging for the case of unmanned aircraft systems. Interaction with non-
transponder equipped aircraft creates a significant challenge for the design of Detect Sense and
Avoid Systems (DSA). Current approaches to DSA require active rather than passive sensors to
detect aircraft that do not emit transponder signals [100]. These sensors replace the active pilot
ability to detect, sense, and avoid other objects.
This challenge can arise from not considering airspace design as within the scope of most
significant changes. Due to the current mix of operations in certain classes of airspace, it is
expected to become increasingly difficult to achieve advanced capabilities without enforcing
equipage requirements on other users, or specifying proposed systems to higher levels of
performance.
7.5 Balancing Required Performance In Long Time Scales of Change
In several cases, underlying infrastructure is used for a common set of applications. For
example, ADS-B supports multiple applications in the current plans for deployment [101]. It is
expected to enable additional applications in the future. One challenge present with multiple
applications is balancing current and future demands for functionality. This will be discussed in
the first section. In the second section, the challenge of requirements stability based on
continued revision of definitions of required performance will be addressed.
7.5.1 Future vs. Current Demands for Functionality
Initial applications of a new technology may be implemented at lower criticality [102], meaning
that failure modes are generally of less severe consequence. This can occur due to the
uncertainty in safety performance of the capability. Failures of functions that are not flight
critical can be more readily mitigated through existing controls in the system. Lower criticality
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of function also implies a lower level of required software design assurance, and other factors
that are more likely to speed initial development.
Lower levels of requirements, even if not directly related to the flight criticality, also reduce the
cost of equipage. Requirements on navigation precision that are less demanding tend to be met
by existing aircraft infrastructure, while there is the concern that methods such as WAAS or
LAAS that provide higher levels of precision are either not fully deployed, or too expensive
[103].
With long implementation and equipage times, there will be a challenge in operational approval
in the tradeoff between establishing initially low requirements based on expected initial use
compared to requiring increased performance for anticipated future applications. This tradeoff is
illustrated notionally in Figure 7-5. If the former approach is taken, there is a risk that the system
will be specified at point A, and will be underspecified for the higher level of requirements at B.
This can potentially require a second equipage cycle, or limit the ability to achieve future
functionality. If the latter approach is taken, there is a risk that a system will be overspecified
and less attractive to operators for immediate benefits.
Level of
Requirements
B -.. -.. - - - - - - - - - - -
overspecification for underspecificationfor
currentfunctionality future functionality
A
' Functionality
current future
functionality functionality
Figure 7-5: Current vs. Future Functionality and Levels of Requirements
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7.5.2 Requirements Stability
Long lead times have implications for the stability of underlying requirements [104]. Because
standards are developed before operational approval of systems, there is significant uncertainty
in potential costs of recertification or reequipage if the avionics installed by early adopters are
not adequate to perform desired functions.
Uncertainty in standards can create a disincentive for operators to equip with a technology that
meets the current standards if their avionics may not be usable in the future or if revised
standards provide a higher level of benefits.
7.6 Summary
Systems-level changes have increased in the scope of analysis. If this trend continues, there will
be an increase in the scope of behavior assessed when evaluating expected safety performance
and implementing required mitigations. There will also be increasing demands for safety
performance as accident rates have decreased and as regulators seek to further decrease the level
of risks in the system. This is expected to increase demands on the quality of safety assessment
to accurately predict adverse behavior.
In addition, future changes are expected to introduce fundamentally new operational capabilities,
changing the way that the air transportation system operates. These new capabilities make it less
appropriate to apply previous operational experience or build on similarity to past behavior. This
can increase demands on safety performance and implicitly introduce additional uncertainty on
its results.
In combination, the trends highlighted from pending ADS-B and UAS changes indicate
increasing challenges in conducting safety assessment for future systems-level changes. There is
a risk that the safety assessment may become intractable, resulting in an inability to realize
significant operational improvements in the future.
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8 Conclusions and Recommendations for Future Work
Significant challenges can be expected in the safety assessment of the scale of changes
envisioned in future modernization initiatives. Along with increasing scale of expected changes,
there will also be increasing demands for safety performance resulting in an expanded scope of
analysis required. Several other key trends will also present challenges. These include the
assessment of fundamentally new types of operation, limitations due to the interface with legacy
systems, long time scales of change.
The influence matrix framework presented in this work has been applied to show that the key
effect of the identified trends for future safety assessment will be an expansion in the required
scope of analysis. There are limits to the achievable scope in safety assessment. Limits can arise
from cognitive limits of the assessors in the ability to identify all potential influences of system
elements on risk, especially when the interactions of a system are complex. Complex
interactions can lead to multiple weak influences, especially through the interaction with external
systems and identification of those weak influences can be a limitation for assessors. There can
also be resource limitations to the scope of safety assessment in terms of time and effort
available to perform the assessment.
If limitations to scope cannot be managed, the system may be constrained to changes for which
scope can be managed. This is the foundation for methods of utilizing equivalent functionality.
Similar reliance on limited functional changes as a means of reducing the required scope of
assessment can limit changes to functionally similar operations.
To accommodate new operational capabilities, limits to scope will need to be overcome. Several
approaches may be available to overcome current scoping challenges. To more efficiently
perform analysis, it may be possible to develop automated tools to analyze sets of hazards with
structured forms of influence. These tools could free assessor resources to focus effort on
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hazards where behavior is not understood well enough to be captured in a structured form, thus
reducing the scope of assessment performed by human assessors. It should also be possible to
reuse results from previous safety assessments where the functions performed by systems are
similar. Those hazards that can be reused would also limit the scope of new analysis performed.
Cognitive limitations of assessors can also be overcome through several strategies.
Decomposing analysis within areas of expertise is commonly applied, but may only be
appropriate for limited hazards where the influence is grouped around common domains, such as
aircraft systems, or ATC systems. Automation tools may also be applied to safety assessment to
structure the analysis of hazards and influences, to allow for more efficient and common mental
models of safety behavior.
There are several challenges in determining the appropriate scope of analysis. If analysis is
underscoped, there is an influence of system elements, or additional hazards that can increase
cause implemented risk levels to be higher than acceptable. If analysis is overscoped, the
additional mitigations imposed upon the system, or additional resources spent on safety
assessment are an inefficient. The resources associated with the tasks could better be applied to
addressing other areas of safety.
Underscoping can have a strong effect on the validity of assessed safety if influences scoped out
of analysis significantly increase the level of risk above acceptable values. For this reason,
particular attention must be paid to influences on hazards with risk levels near acceptability
thresholds. Techniques can be applied that consider potential interactions with additional system
elements that may contribute to risk levels for these hazards.
Overscoping can result from current approaches that assess and mitigate risk levels by hazard. If
mitigations reduce expected risk significantly below acceptability levels, an excess amount of
resources have been expended in the system to implement the mitigations. This results in an
increase in the time, cost, and complexity of implementing systems. A potential approach to
improve the design of mitigations would be to reassess proposed changes with all mitigations
identified to eliminate unnecessary mitigations.
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The ability to achieve the appropriate scope of analysis will be key to realizing future changes in
the air transportation system. Methods should be developed to enhance the ability to manage
increased scope in safety assessment and to achieve the appropriate balance between
underscoping and overscoping.
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Appendix A
Acronyms & Abbreviations
Acronym Definition
1090ES 1090 Mhz Extended Squitter
AC Advisory Circular
ACAS Airborne Collision Avoidance System
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance, Broadcast
AFS FAA Flight Standards
AIR FAA Aircraft Certification Service
AMS Acquisition Management System
ANSP Air Navigation Service Provider
AOP Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association
ARC Aviation Rulemaking Committee
ASIAS Aviation Safety Information Analysis an Sharing System
ASRS Aviation Safety Reporting System
ATC Air Traffic Control
ATM Air Traffic Management
ATO FAA Air Traffic Organization
ATO-S FAA ATO Safety Service
ATOS Air Transportation Oversight System
ATS Air Traffic Services
COA Certificate of Authorization
CCB Configuration Control Board
CM Configuration Management
CNSRM Casefile/NCP Safety Risk Management
CRA Collision Risk Assessment
CRM Collision Risk Modeling
DAL Design Assurance Level
DER Designated Engineering Representative
DSA Detect, Sense, and Avoid
EUR [ICAO-designated] European Region
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FAR Federal Aviation Regulation
FHA Fault (or Failure) Hazard Analysis
FIS-B Flight Information Services - Broadcast
FL Flight level
GA General Aviation
GPS Global Positioning System
GSN Goal Structuring Notation
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IFR Instrument Flight Rules
ILS Instrument Landing System
IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions
JRC Joint Resources Council
LAAS Local Area Augmentation System
LPV Lateral Precision, Vertical Guidance
MASPS Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards
MNPS Minimum Navigation Performance Specification
MOPS Minimum Operational Performance Standards
NAC Navigation Accuracy Category
NAS National Airspace System
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NAT [ICAO-designated] North Atlantic Region
NCP NAS Change Proposal
NIC Navigation Uncertainty Category
NMAC Near Midair Collision
NPRM Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board
NTZ No Transgression Zone
OTS Organized Track System (in Oceanic Control)
PMA Part Manufacturer Approval
PRM Precision Runway Monitor
RCGSP [ICAO] Review of the General Concept of Separation Panel
RNP Required Navigation Performance
RVSM Reduced Vertical Separation Minima
SA Selective Availability
SARP Standard and Recommended Practice
SICASP [ICAO] SSR Improvements and Collision Avoidance Systems Panel
SIL Surveillance Integrity Level
SMS Safety Management System
SPR Safety and Performance Requirements [Standard]
SRM Safety Risk Management
SRMD Safety Risk Management Document
SRMDM Safety Risk Management Decision Memo
STC Supplemental Type Certificate
TIS-B Traffic Information Services - Broadcast
UAS Unmanned Aircraft System
UAT Universal Access Transceiver
TCAS Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System
TERPS United States Standard for Terminal Instrument Procedures
TSO Technical Standard Order
VDRP Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program
VFR Visual Flight Rules
VMC Visual Meteorological Conditions
WAAS Wide Area Augmentation System
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Appendix B
Documentation of Current Safety Regulatory Processes Reviewed
Agency Type Number Title
DoD Standard MIL-STD-882D Standard Practice for System Safety
Eurocontrol Regulatory ESARR 4 Risk Assessment and Mitigation in ATM
Requirement.
Explanatory Material on ESARR 4Eurocontrol Guidance EAM 4/ GUI 1 Requirements
FAA Advisory 25.1309-1A System Design and Analysis
_________Circular ________
FAA Advisory 23.1309-1C Equipment, Systems, and Installations 
in Part 23
Circular Airplanes
The FAA and Industry Guide to Product
FAA Guidance Certification (2nd ed)
FAST - The Federal Aviation Administration
FAA Guidance Acquisition System Toolset
FAA Handbook FAA System Safety Handbook
Federal Aviation Administration Safety
FAA Manual Version 1.2 Management System Manual
FAA Order 1100.161 Chg 1 Air Traffic Oversight
FAA Order N JO 1800.2 NAS Change Proposal (NCP) Process Support
of the Safety Management System
FAA Order 1800.66 Configuration Management Policy
FAA Order 3400.3H1 Airway Facilities Maintenance 
Personnel
Certification Program
AOV Credentialing and Control Tower Operator
FAA Order 8000.9 Certification Programs
FAA Order 8110.4C Chg 1 Type Certification
FAA Order 8130.2F7 Airworthiness Certification of 
Aircraft and
Related Products
FAA Order 8000.368 Flight Standards Service Oversight
FAA rde 800.90AOV Credentialing and Control Tower OperatorFAA Order 8000.90 Certification Programs
FAA Order 80404.4 Safety Risk Management
FAA rde 810.5AAircraft Certification Service - Mission,FAA Order 81 00.5A Responsibilities, Relationships, Programs
FAA Order 8130.2 Chg3 Airworthiness Certification of 
Aircraft and
Related Products
FAA Order 8110.42C Parts Manufacturer Approval Procedures
Production Approval and Certificate
FAA Order 8120.2F Management Procedures
FAA Order 8150.1B Technical Standard Order Program
FAA Order 8260.19C Flight Procedures & Airspace
United States Standard for Terminal Instrument
FAA Order 8260.3B Procedures (TERPS)
FAA Order 8900.1 Flight Standards Information Management
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System (FSIMS)
FAA System Spec SRIOOO NAS System Specification
ICAO Manual Doc 9859, Safety Management Manual (SMM)
________ _________AN/460
ICAO Guidance Doc 9689, Manual on Airspace Planning Methodology for
AN/953 the Determination of Separation Minima
Mineta Policy National Civil Aviation Review Commission
Commision
RTCA, Inc Process RTCA/DO-254 Design Assurance Guidance for AirborneElectronic Hardware,
Guidelines for the Approval of the Provision and
RTCA, Inc Process RTCA/DO-264 Use of Air Traffic Services Supported by Data
Communications
RTCA, Inc Process RTCA/DO-178B Software Considerations in Airborne Systems
and Equipment Certification
Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the
SAE Process ARP 4761 Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne
Systems and Equipment
Appendix C
Interviews Conducted
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Name Title & Organization Date (s)Interviewed
James Brady Aerospace Engineer, FAA Small Airplane 4/17/2007
Directorate, Standards Office
Mike Castle ADS-B Separation Standards Analysis Group, 4/25/2007
Johns Hopkins University
Bruce DeCleene Aerospace Engineer, Avionics Systems, FAA 5/10/2007Aircraft Certification Service
Luke Cropsey Manager, DoD Joint Integrated Product Team for 7/20/2007UAS Airspace Access
Lowell Foster Flight Test Engineer, FAA Small Airplane 4/20/2007Directorate
Vince Galotti Manager, Air Traffic Management, International 5/14/2007Civil Aviation Organization
5/11/2007
Steve Thompson Staff Member, MIT Lincoln Laboratory 7/16/2007
Steve Van Trees Manager, Avionics Systems, FAA Aircraft 5/10/2007Certification Service
Steve Vail Senior Manager, Air Traffic Operations, Fedex 4/17/2007
Aviation

Appendix D
Case Studies
The framework introduced in Chapters 6 and 7 is used to analyze case studies of implemented
and pending system changes. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the relevant safety
assessment and operational approval activities for each case and discuss identified implications
trends and implications for future changes. The case studies and assessment methods is shown in
Table D-1. Each of the three safety assessment approaches from the previous chapter was used
in at least two cases. As the reader may also note, some cases used multiple safety assessment
approaches.
Table D-1: Assessment Methods Used in Case Studies
Implemented Assessment
No System-Level Change Year Methods
1 Instrument Landing Systems 1961 TLS(ILS)
2 North Atlantic Organized Track 1966-1981 TLS
System (NAT OTS)
3 Traffic Alert and Collision 1993 TLS 
(Risk
Avoidance System (TCAS) Ratio)
4 Precision Runway Monitor 1997 TLS(PRM)
Automatic Dependent
5 Surveillance, Broadcast (ADS- 1999 Risk Matrix
B) Alaska Capstone
6 EUR Reduced Vertical 2002 Risk Matrix
Separation Minima (RVSM) TLS
Risk Matrix
Automatic Dependent tS
7 Surveillance, Broadcast (ADS- (pending) Performance-
B) Segments I and II Based
Risk Matrix
8 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (pending) TLS(UAS) Performance-
Based
The discussion of each case will begin with an overview and description of the proposed change.
Following this, the safety assessment approach used will be discussed along with key details
regarding the approach framed using the safety assessment model and influence framework.
Finally, key trends identified in the case and implications for future changes will be discussed.
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D.1 Initial Instrument Landing Systems (ILS)
D. 1.1 Overview and System Description
In the early 1960s, the British Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) implemented one of the first
widely used quantitative targets as the basis for evaluation of a combination of airborne and
procedural capability. Quantitative targets were used to evaluate the performance of Instrument
Landing Systems (ILS) [105] [106] installations on aircraft. Instrument landing systems rely on
a ground-based radio signal that defines the approach path to a runway in poor visibility.
Avionics onboard the aircraft receive the ILS signal and provide guidance to the pilot, or are
directly coupled to an autopilot system.
D. 1.2 Safety Assessment Approach and Details
Development of ILS was one of the first cases of the use of a Target Level of Safety (TLS). A
single risk level was derived as a safety target for the rate of accidents on approach. From this
target, multiple additional targets were decomposed for subsets of system performance.
Derivation of the Target Level of Safety. The risk budget used to define the TLS is shown in
Figure D-1 and has been adapted from [106]. At the time of implementation, the observed
accident rate on approach was on the order of 0.6 accidents in every 106 landings. Judging the
time exposed to ILS risk, a target for both performance and failures of the system was arrived at
of 1 x 10~7 accidents / hr [105], which is the top-level event of the risk budget. The overall
accident rate was allocated to performance and failure conditions equally, resulting in a
performance target of 0.5 x 10-7 accidents / hr used to design the properties of the system. The
performance target is further expanded in the figure. Within this target, risk was further
decomposed to dimensions of performance (longitudinal and lateral), and then parameters of the
system (longitudinal position, vertical velocity, etc). Each of these divisions served as targets for
analysis of the decomposed modes of operation of the system.
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Average Risk of
Fatal Accident
Due to the 1x1-
System
Performance 0.5 X 10-7 0.5 x 10-? Pero
Longitudina Vertical Missed Bank Lateral Missed
Position Velocity Approach Angle Displacement Approach
I1l0-1 1 X10-8  5 X10-9  1 X10-8  1 X10-8  5 x10-1
Figure D-1: Risk Budget for Automatic Landing Systems (modified from [105])
Associated Scope and Detailed Modeling and Assessment. Detailed simulations were used to
simulate approaches and design parameters of the autoland system. Fault tree analysis was used
to design failure modes to meet the target. The scope of assessment was focused heavily on
technical performance of the system. Both technical and human failures were evaluated as part
of the fault tree model [105]. Scope was further limited to risks of ground impact during
approach. Other modes of flight and other risk events were not evaluated.
D.1.3 Discussion
The risk budget used in ILS was the basis for establishing risk matrices as acceptability criteria.
As the basis for risk matrix criteria, it was pessimistically assumed that there were 100 safety-
critical systems in an aircraft that could result in an accident (n = 100). The overall goal on
accident rates was 10-7 accidents / hr, an improvement in the current level of experienced safety.
By this reasoning, the likelihood of any individual failure leading to an accident was prescribed
as 10-9 failures /hr.
From the catastrophic severity target of 10-9, additional targets were established for lower
severity risks, decreasing by an order of magnitude for each target. This approach was
incorporated into early British Civil Airworthiness Requirements (BCAR) and became the basis
for the Joint Airworthiness Requirements 25.1309 [106] and similar FAA requirements [58] for
aircraft system installations.
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D.2 North Atlantic Organized Track System (NAT OTS)
D.2.1 Overview and System Description
The ICAO North Atlantic region (NAT) is an oceanic control region with high traffic density
between Europe and North America. To facilitate procedural separation of traffic, routes (known
as "tracks") are created at regular intervals based on forecasted winds. These tracks are known
as the Organized Track System (OTS). Because of the lack of radar coverage over the ocean,
traffic is surveilled through self-reported position. This makes collision risk highly dependent
upon the navigation performance of individual aircraft.
Over several years, lateral, longitudinal, and vertical separation standards of the OTS have been
reduced to accommodate increases in traffic and enable more efficient routing. Based on the use
of collision risk assessment, NAT OTS spacing was changed three times from 1964 to 1981-
twice in the lateral dimension and once in the longitudinal dimension. The analysis of NAT OTS
separations will be limited to the evaluation of the two lateral separation changes, implemented
in 1971 and 1981.
In the discussion, the TLS analysis approach is described first. After this, a background on each
change to separation and key factors describing the change is provided. This serves as a basis for
discussion of trends in the TLS method as applied to the NAT OTS.
D.2.2 Safety Assessment Approach and Details
North Atlantic Track spacing was evaluated using a Target Level of Safety (TLS) approach
based on a risk budget used to decompose the target risk event as a loss of vertical separation.
The TLS approach was used because safety behavior could be decomposed into an independent
set of hazards contributing to a midair collision. Specifically, midair collision risk models
decomposed a loss of planned separation by three dimensions of operation: lateral, longitudinal,
and vertical. The independent decomposition allows evaluation of a loss of separation from the
nominal case in a given dimension. For example, a loss of vertical separation occurs when
aircraft were expected to be separated vertically and occupy the same position lateral and
longitudinal to each other. An example condition is two aircraft separated by altitude, but
following identical routes at the same speed and position.
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A summary of NAT separation changes reviewed is shown in Table D-2 along with the overall
risk goal and target levels of safety used. The initial evaluation of NAT spacing is noteworthy as
the first reference to a TLS as the acceptability criterion and the first application of a quantitative
midair collision risk model.
Table D-2: Summary of NAT Lateral Separation Cases Reviewed
Year Separation Risk Goal Target Level of
[lateral (nm)/ (accidents / hr) Safety
long min)]
1964 120/15 (n/a) (n/a)
1968 90/15 4.5 x 10~8 to 1.2 x 10-7 [107] 1.5to4x10~ [107]
1971 120-60 (composite) / 15 4.5 x 10~' to 1.2 x 10~ [107] 1.5 to 4 x 10- [107]
1981 60/15 6 x 10-'[107] 3 x 10-' [93]
Risk Budget and Scope. The risk budget used to derive the NAT TLS decomposed a midair
collision event to enroute midair collision, and then to an equal division of risk level by
dimension of exposure (lateral, longitudinal, and vertical). This division is illustrated in
Figure D-2. In addition, two primary factors were evaluated that influence risk in the lateral
dimension: navigation performance (of aircraft) and gross navigation errors, caused by airborne
or ATC-based operational errors.
Collision Risk Lateral
Model Dimension
Navigation
Performance
Gross Navigation
Errors
Figure D-2: Risk Budget Decomposition of NAT Collision Risk
The risk budget decomposition inherently limits scope to the risk event for which the target level
of safety is defined. This eliminated consideration of other risks, such as loss of control or
ground impact as well as system elements that contribute to the risk. The limit in scope was
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consistent with the change being evaluated, namely to lateral navigation performance and
airspace design in the lateral dimension.
Detailed Modeling Approach Used. To resolve deficiencies in the data and stakeholder disputes
surrounding it, a quantitative midair collision risk model was created. The model was initially
developed by Marks [108], and later refined and published by Reich [109]. The model is known
generally as the Reich or Reich-Marks model [110]. Details of the collision risk model were
refined over the course of evaluating several separation changes, but the basic structure of the
model remained the same
The Reich-Marks model represents an aircraft by its gross dimensions of width, length, and
height, and determines the probability of overlap of two aircraft based on the position uncertainty
distribution. The model considers probability of errors in lateral, longitudinal, and vertical
dimensions to be independently distributed. By this formulation, the probability of collision is
the combination of probability of overlap in each dimension [90]. The model considers
navigation error distributions, and neglects ATC-related operational errors [107].
Initial Models Used to Evaluate Collision Risk
In the early 1960s, NAT separation standards were 120 nm laterally and 20 min. longitudinally.
Operational experts based these separations on judgments of navigation error distributions. The
judgment that navigation errors followed a Gaussian distribution with mean zero. Safe lateral
separation was assumed to be around two or three standard deviations from the mean, and the
standard deviation was estimated largely based on expert judgment [107]. Observations proved
that this was a poor estimate of actual collision risk [107]. It was noted by the planning group
that collision risk was heavily dependent upon the tails of navigation error distributions, and a
Gaussian model did not accurately account for the predominance of errors with significant
deviation from the mean [111]. These deficiencies led to the development of the Reich-Marks
Model.
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Application of the Collision Risk Model to 1971 Separation Reduction
In the early 1960s, airlines made a request to ICAO to reduce lateral separation to 90 nm. To
analyze this reduction, radars were installed by the FAA bordering the NAT region and on ships
and data were collected from 1962-1963. The resulting analysis concluded that aircraft did not
spend a substantial amount of time deviating beyond 45 nm (half of the separation), and it was
expected that the reduction would be safe [90]. When ICAO moved to implement separation, the
pilot organization refused to accept the safety argument, believing the data were not consistent
with their observations. A resulting hearing in 1966 held by the FAA resulted in the removal of
initial approval of separation, based on challenges to the observed data [90].
Additional data were taken on aircraft navigation distributions to represent sufficient accuracy to
characterize distributions [107]. A target level of safety was used evaluate collision risk in
reduced separation based on the application of the collision risk model and navigation
distributions. The initial risk goal was set 10 times below the observed midair collision rate for
all aircraft (not just NAT traffic). This was to place a buffer for expected future growth in
operations. Agreement was not achieved around a set number, but a resultant range of 4.5 x 10-
accidents/hr to 1.2 x 10~7 accidents/hr [90] was reached. After decomposition, the resulting
target level of safety was 1.5 to 4 x 10~7 accidents/hr [107].
Based upon the analysis of the model, the proposed 90 nm separation was deemed to be less safe
than the required target. Participants recognized that this analysis only augmented judgment, and
based on the assumptions made, the change may actually be safe in practice [90]. However, 90
nm separation was rejected due to the potential for operational errors in misunderstanding of
cleared position. It was desirable to have tracks spaced in increments of 60 nm or 1 degree of
latitude. This decision used judgment to evaluate a risk that was out of the scope of the
mathematical analysis.
With this consideration, the analysts considered staggered separation [90]. This separation has
aircraft pairs at the same altitude separated by 120 nm, but pairs 1,000 ft above separated 60 nm
from those below. Staggered separation was implemented in 1971.
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Establishment of Minimum Navigation Performance and Further Separation Reduction
After the introduction of composite separation, airlines requested a further reduction in lateral
separation to 60 nm. In analyzing lateral performance data of aircraft in composite separation,
several gross navigation errors were found well outside normal performance bounds that were
not reflected by the assumed distributions [112]. This also resulted in a small proportion of
traffic introducing a significant portion of collision risk.
In response to the pilot request, the NAT SPG re-evaluated the lateral target level of safety and
further reduced it to 2 x 10-8 [107]. In addition, the original Reich-Marks model was refined to
increase the sophistication by accounting for, among other factors: diverging aircraft at the exit
of tracks and temporal variations in the distribution of errors due to inertial navigation.
In 1975, it was proposed by the planning group to implement to Minimum Navigation
Performance System (MNPS) airspace, for which aircraft navigation systems were certified to
specific performance boundaries. At the same time, the military planned to eliminate long-range
navigation aids, necessitating a change in aircraft navigation system equipage [90]. Certification
of navigation performance was expected to eliminate large variations in technical performance
due to equipment errors. Without these changes, 60 nm separation was not deemed safe.
NAT MNPS was implemented by ICAO in 1978 and a monitoring program was instantiated to
collect operational data [112]. As part of the monitoring program, it was found that aircraft
complied with assumed performance, but that errors due to misunderstanding of ATC commands
were creating deviations well outside of the assumed boundaries [107]. The errors were
predominately due to misunderstanding of ATC command and therefore called "ATC loop errors
[107]." These primarily resulted in mis-assignment to tracks. These causes were addressed
through operational training, and not directly incorporated into the collision risk model. As
operational error causes were addressed and MNPS equipment was implemented, 60 mi.
separation was deemed acceptable and implemented in 1981 [112].
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D.2.3 Discussion
The purpose of creation of the Reich-Marks midair collision risk model was to provide structure
to the analysis of the safety implications of a change. This structure resulted in a common basis
for a decision accepted by multiple stakeholders involved. As such, the stakeholders also
realized that the initial quantitative analysis was a guide, discounting results due to assumptions
and uncertainties. As time progressed, the Reich-Marks model's sophistication was increased,
and more representative operational data were applied. This transformed approval decisions
made on the model as more reflective of the operational environment, and gradually reduced the
level of judgment applied to model results. Thus, the trend in use of the model was initially to
advise judgment, and then became the key determinant of acceptability.
The initial assumptions on the independence of navigation errors by dimension persisted
throughout the analysis. As will be seen in the RVSM case, the budgeted breakdown to
independent dimensions continued to be used. Therefore, initial framings of a problem through
quantitative models can persist for long periods of time and analysis of multiple systems.
With both increasing demands in safety performance and demands for reduced separation,
derived requirements on navigation system precision increased. Initially, the baseline navigation
system performance was used to determine required procedural separation. Later, the approach
was inverted. Requirements were derived on equipment performance to meet procedural
demands.
One of the most important insights from the NAT case study is that the scope of analysis
expanded. In two cases, operational data forced the revision of assumptions as the basis for a
prior approval. This indicated that aircraft navigation performance was no longer the dominant
cause of midair collision risk. Errors were not normally distributed as initially assumed,
prompting increased sophistication in data collection to support the 1971 reduction. Following
that reduction, monitoring revealed gross navigation errors far outside of normal performance,
and these errors were addressed.
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In this case, the scope of causal factors increased, beyond baseline navigation performance, to
include air traffic control interaction with aircraft. In addition, as dominant causes of risks were
mitigated, other the magnitude of the influence of other causes became more significant,
prompting the causes to be addressed.
D.3 Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)
D.3.1 Overview and System Description
The Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) is installed on aircraft to prevent
midair collisions. The system is alternately referred to as the Airborne Collision Avoidance
System (ACAS) by ICAO and Eurocontrol. TCAS determines the position of transponder-
equipped aircraft through measurement of relative bearing and range computed from
interrogation of other aircraft transponders. Altitude is encoded in the response for a class of
transponders. Coupled with a set of collision avoidance logic, TCAS can also provide Traffic
Alerts (TAs) to the position of other aircraft, and resolution advisories (RAs) to prevent midair
collisions through commanded vertical maneuvers. Surrounding traffic, as well as TA and RA
information is displayed to the pilot. TCAS I provides TAs only. TCAS II provides both TAs
and RAs.
TCAS equipage was mandated by Congress following the collision between a DC-9 and general
aviation aircraft near Cerritos, CA in 1986. It is the result of a concept originally envisioned and
developed beginning in the 1950s [113]. TCAS II was mandated in the U.S. for turbine air
carrier aircraft with greater than 30 seats in December 1993. Aircraft with 10 to 30 seats are
required to be equipped with TCAS I [57], which only provides traffic alerts. Since 2005, TCAS
II has been mandated worldwide on all aircraft with takeoff weight greater than 5700 kg or with
19 or more seats with exceptions granted for state aircraft.
D.3.2 Safety Assessment Approach and Details
Initial development of TCAS algorithms and evaluation of safety performance was conducted by
the MITRE corporation with involvement of MIT Lincoln Laboratory, and documented in a
system safety study [114]. Several follow-on activities were undertaken to further refine safety
findings by MITRE and to update the TCAS logic [115]. Additionally, from initial certification
and development, TCAS software has been refined to address issues that have been identified
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through operational use [115]. The analysis of this case will focus on details of the initial system
design decisions and safety assessment conducted by MITRE [114] and will then include some
of the emergent issues and analysis associated with major updates to the system.
Analysis of TCAS followed the TLS approach. The criterion used was not an expression of level
of risk, but a relative measure of risk in the form of a risk ratio. The ratio was defined as the risk
level of a near midair collision (NMAC) with TCAS compared to the risk level without TCAS.
An NMAC was defined as aircraft that approach as close as 100 ft vertically and 500 ft.
horizontally [114]. No formal requirement was placed on the risk ratio. It was clearly desirable
that the risk ratio be less than 1, indicating that implementing TCAS would reduce the risk level
of midair collisions.
An NMAC was chosen as the target event instead of a midair collision because the occurrence of
a midair collision depends on several factors related to relative geometry of collision and size of
aircraft. These are difficult to quantify analytically. Instead, a near-midair collision of very
small separation is reasonably close to the event of concern and does not need to account for
detailed aircraft geometry.
D.3.3 Initial System Safety Study
The initial assessment of TCAS safety performance was conducted by a team led by MITRE
[114]. The core of the safety study was an extensive fault tree with detailed conditions evaluated
leading to a potential NMAC. The initial construction of the fault tree represented a scoping
decision regarding the key elements and conditions leading to the NMAC risk. It was also used
to evaluate complex causal relationships in the detailed assessment and mitigation process. The
fault tree was quantitatively analyzed to determine the expected risk ratio under nominal
conditions, and parameters were also varied to assess sensitivities to assumptions and the effect
of potential failure modes.
Several other activities were used to derive parameters for evaluation through the fault tree.
Modeling fault tree parameters was based on judgments by the MITRE team and operational
experts and data from early operational trials with developmental versions of TCAS. Data were
obtained from airline-recorded data on trials with Piedmont Airlines, flight trials around Atlantic
City with an FAA aircraft, radar observations from NASA Wallops, and incident reports on
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NMACs collected by the FAA. Combined, this data represented a small set of experience
compared to what would be accumulated with future significant TCAS equipage. The data set
was limited by the ability to process large amounts of radar data, and the sensitivity of attaining
airline operational data from commercial carriers [115].
Scope of Analysis Due to TLS Approach
Events other than an NMAC were not considered analytically. The exclusion of ground impact
in the analysis was subject of considerable debate during the course of analysis [115]. The initial
assessment was performed under the assumption that a resolution advisory could only influence
the risk of a ground impact under cases of rapidly changing terrain, and it was expected that
these would be rarely encountered in operational service. Thus, the overall influence of the
design parameters on ground impact risk was judged to be weak, and the result level of risk
affected was scoped out as negligible. Terrain avoidance alerts and maneuvers were also given
higher priority than TCAS.
Using a risk ratio approach also scopes the analysis to events that occur after a potential conflict
already exists. Events and associated system elements that result in a loss of procedural
separation or failures are therefore eliminated from scope. By not quantifying to an absolute
level of midair collision risk, the rates of occurrence of initiating events were not modeled.
Similarity was also inherently applied using the risk ratio approach. Evaluating both the baseline
system and the system with TCAS measures a relative effectiveness, rather than an absolute level
of risk. This assumes that the systems after implementation and before behave in similar ways,
scoping out any potential behavioral differences and embedding them into the detailed risk
model.
Because TCAS resolution advisories are issued in the vertical dimension, horizontal encounter
characteristics between aircraft were evaluated only as they related to the likelihood of proximity
for collision in the vertical dimension, and horizontal miss distances were assumed to be
uncorrelated to vertical miss distances. This scoped out the evaluation of any horizontal
dynamics influenced by TCAS.
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Scope of System Elements Considered in the Design
The initial TCAS safety study identified several system elements to include. These included the
change elements of: TCAS equipment and collision avoidance logic. There were also several
elements considered with which TCAS interacts, with the associated behavior included in the
fault tree. The elements considered in the initial assessment are discussed below. It is important
to note that many of the assumed properties of the elements were later re-evaluated in subsequent
assessments of TCAS effectiveness. These issues will be discussed separately in the following
section.
The TCAS avoidance logic is a critical change factor influencing its performance. Several
parameters were used to vary designed logic, and compute resolutions that would maximize
separation and be robust to disturbances.
TCAS was designed to be effective in encounters with other TCAS-equipped aircraft, as well as
aircraft equipped with the Mode A and C transponders of the time. Mode A transponders do not
encode altitude, therefore information based on signals received provided only relative bearing to
aircraft, and only traffic alerts are provided. Mode C transponders encode altitude, and signals
from Mode C equipped traffic are used to provide resolution advisories. Encounters with each
element were considered separately as strong influences in their contribution to the effectiveness
of TCAS. The transponder equipage fraction of other aircraft was an important factor and was
also considered as a property of each system element.
TCAS relies on the pilot to interpret and execute responses to traffic alerts and resolution
advisories. This includes pilot ability to visually detect aircraft when conditions permit. Thus,
the pilot was a system element with a strong influence on the effectiveness of TCAS. In
evaluating nominal performance, the safety study assumed complete compliance in pilot
responses to RAs in calculating a risk ratio. However, sensitivity analyses were performed to
evaluate the effect of assumed rates of pilot non-compliance with RAs [115]. The visual
acquisition function of the pilot was also modeled, in having an effect in mitigating the risk of
encounters with altitude unknown targets and in augmenting RA behavior. Pilot behavior was
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also qualified by a degree of similarity to current operations. TCAS was expected to function
similar to controller traffic and resolution advisories.
Several potential failure conditions in interaction with other aircraft were included. Examples
include bit errors in encoded altitude and inaccurate altitude reporting. In addition, the flight
behavior of other aircraft was considered, including sudden "deceptive maneuvers" which could
lead to an induced collision or a reduction in effectiveness of TCAS interactions.
Failures within the TCAS surveillance system, such as loss of surveillance tracks were also
included in the analysis, as well as TCAS system reliability based on an assumed mean time
between failures. Failures were scoped to those that were judged to related directly to the rate of
NMACs, and did not include any failures that could degrade situation awareness.
As TCAS is considered to operate independently from ATC, ATC functions and interaction with
ATC commands were scoped out of analysis. This was under the rationale that TCAS alerts
would have priority over ATC commands, and pilots would inform ATC of resolution actions
after being clear of conflict. Although scoped out of analysis, a branch was maintained in the
fault tree to later account for controller instructions and response to controller conflict advisories.
However, this branch was not evaluated, and does not include the potential for conflicting
instructions between TCAS and controllers. The exclusion of ATC had a noteworthy effect on
the validity of analysis, as interactions were later found to be significant, as will be discussed in
the following section.
Detailed Assessment and Mitigation
Estimates of key parameters were used to characterize the performance of the system elements
described above. Examples include estimates on environmental conditions (i.e. IMC/VMC),
equipage fraction of aircraft with transponders, distributions of intruder aircraft by altitude, and
errors in transponder-reported altitude. In addition, observed responses to traffic and resolution
advisories by the trial flight crews were used to validate assumptions on the pilot-commanded
climb rates, altitude deviations, and subsequent level-off maneuvers [115].
Where uncertainties existed in model parameters, sensitivity analysis was conducted for each
parameter independently to ensure that it did not significantly alter the risk ratio. Parameters
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were also weighted to represent an average flight condition. With this weighted average, the risk
ratio expected in service was calculated as as 42%, meaning the implementation of TCAS would
result in a risk level of midair collisions that was 42% of the rate without implementing TCAS.
The model also provided insight into training implications for flight crews, which were deemed
necessary. These included compliance with RAs and maintaining vigilance in visual acquisition
to avoid complacency. These represented safety-derived requirements necessary to mitigate a
reduction in TCAS effectiveness.
Operational Approval
The development of standards for TCAS was performed within an ICAO working group, the
SSR Improvements and Collision Avoidance Systems Panel (SICASP) [115]. The group was used to
vet assumptions and system studies analyzing the effectiveness of TCAS, and ultimately made
recommendations to ICAO regarding the incorporation of TCAS into ICAO Standards and
Recommended Practices (SARPs). The SICASP held multiple sessions throughout the development
and refinement of TCAS to address issues in logic and plan early implementation and final standards.
A detailed summary of these decisions has been prepared by Carpenter [115].
The SICASP analysis was conducted in parallel, and was related to, FAA decision-making to
mandate the implementation of TCAS [116]. However, details on FAA and other countries'
operational approval decisions were not readily available.
D.3.4 Further TCAS System Refinement and Studies
After the initial system safety conducted by MITRE, the data gathered in operational trials and in
operational experience was found to conflict with some initial assumptions. The original MITRE
study was reassessed and several design changes to the TCAS algorithm resulted. The
identification of issues after the initial study does not detract from the validity of the initial study
in the context of limitations in available data. However, understanding the decisions made
regarding these issues provides insight into limitations in safety analysis, including underlying
data used in modeling and initial scoping decisions. A subset of issues identified are discussed
below, organized by the major revisions to TCAS software that resulted or are expected to be
implemented after addressing the challenges.
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Refinement of Initial TCAS Logic to Version 6.04. Simulations of TCAS logic based on radar
observation of operational trials of TCAS in 1987-1989 challenged some assumptions made as
part of the initial MITRE studies [115]. In particular, assumptions made regarding the
independence of horizontal and vertical properties of encounters were found to be too simplistic
and not representative of the behavior of aircraft under ATC control.
Re-evaluation by panel experts judged the existing logic to be safe, even under modified
conditions. During the course of the re-evaluation, several changes were made to CAS logic to
improve the performance in encounters between two TCAS-equipped aircraft, and reduce the
number of nuisance advisories in ATC [117]. Additional correction of a specific encounter
scenario, known as the "Seattle encounter" also resulted in modifications to CAS logic to reduce
risk in encounters identified in interaction with Air Traffic Control commands [117]. The
resulting version, 6.04A was mandated by the FAA in 1994 [118].
Development of TCAS II, Version 7.0. Additional operational data and increases in
computational power allowed a more sophisticated analysis of potential encounter scenarios to
serve as a basis for a major improvement in TCAS performance to Version 7.0.
Throughout the operation of TCAS, radar data had been collected that was used to statistically
characterize aircraft dynamics before a close encounter. These served as a basis for development
of an FAA technical center simulation analyzed by MIT Lincoln Laboratory (MIT LL). TCAS
performance was characterized under conditions more representative than the parametric MITRE
study. The model used Monte Carlo simulation techniques based on conflict parameters to
evaluate TCAS logic versions 6.04 [117] and 7.0 [118].
Several changes were implemented in Version 7.0. Sense reversals, or a change in direction of
resolution advisories were modified to increase separation under conditions when other aircraft
did not comply with TCAS alerts. Horizontal filtering was added to reduce false alerts when
aircraft had sufficient horizontal separation. Also, logic regarding multiple aircraft encounters
was redesigned.
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D.3.5 Emergent Issues in Current TCAS Implementation, Version 7
Additional issues have emerged in concern with the currently implemented Version 7.0,
prompting efforts that have resulted in the modification of TCAS to Version 7.1. Two emergent
issues are discussed below.
Sense Reversals for Non-Compliant Intruders. In some conditions, conflicting commands
between air traffic control and TCAS resolution compliance can result in the situation illustrated
in Figure D-3. Illustrated in this scenario, TCAS issues a resolution advisory to the first aircraft
to descend. A second aircraft receives ATC instruction to descend at approximately the same
time. Shortly thereafter, a climb RA would be issued by TCAS to resolve the potential collision,
with which the pilot does not comply. In Version 7.0, no reversal is issued to the first aircraft,
potentially creating an induced collision. In version 7.1, the modified collision logic can detect
the non-compliance of the second aircraft and issue a sense reversal, which is more likely to
resolve the collision. This situation was identified as a contributor to a midair collision near
Uberlingen, Germany [119]. The resulting change proposal, CP 112E has been analyzed and is in
the process of receiving operational approval [120].
TCAAWAS 
or non-equipped
Figure D-3: Illustration of TCAS Rate Reversal Logic Change [1211
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The lack of a downlink of TCAS behavior to Air Traffic Control is one contributor of the
increased risk level of an induced collision. The presence of this risk level has prompted an
analysis of the feasibility of downlinked TCAS resolution information to ATC [122].
Aural Alerting Phraseology. Another issue that has emerged is pilot reaction to the resolution
command to adjust vertical speed, which is typically used to cue the pilot to reverse a rate of
ascent or descent. However, the aural alert is confusing, and proposals are in place to replace it
with a level-off command. [121].
D.3.6 Discussion
Use of Data and Assumptions. Parameters estimated in the initial system safety study were
based on the engineering judgment of the assessors. Limited operational experience served to
validate assumptions, but a significant lack of data and computational capability did not allow
them to be incorporated accurately into the detailed models of the system. Instead, sensitivity
analysis was conducted to examine the effect of key assumptions, and they were not found to
significantly reduce the overall safety of the system.
Increased representativeness of operational data and sophistication of models has enabled logic
changes and improved performance through software revisions. Although this operational data
challenged assumptions made as the initial basis for TCAS approval, the architecture of the
system has remained relatively constant over time, indicating that the initial design of the system
was robust.
Role of Similarity. TCAS represented a fundamentally new operational capability. In TCAS,
collision avoidance functionality was incorporated in an automation system onboard the aircraft
under different conditions than previously used by pilots or air traffic controllers. It shifted a
task of awareness of traffic from the ground and provided the capability to pilots. It also
implemented resolution advisories in a shorter time to collision than available via air traffic
control surveillance.
Although the capability was fundamentally new, in some aspects, the functionality was similar to
current system operations. Resolution advisories were designed to mimic those given by
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controllers under similar situations, but the shift in allocation was significant enough to require
complete evaluation of the system.
Elimination of Air Traffic Controlfrom Scope. One deficiency in the early architecture was the
lack of broadcast information on TCAS resolutions to air traffic control. This represents a failure
in the scope of initial analysis. While the analysis framework allowed ATC behavior to be
incorporated as external to TCAS functionality, it did not provide a sufficient basis to merit an
architectural design decision to provide TCAS information to ATC.
The counter-argument is that the architecture of TCAS as independent from ATC allowed
changes to be incorporated without requiring substantial changes to other aircraft equipment,
ATC, or ground infrastructure. This has allowed improvements to the system to be incorporated
without requiring the creation of a new system.
Flexibility in Reconfiguration of System. Strong continued monitoring and development after
operational implementation enabled the ability to further improve the effectiveness of TCAS.
Changes to avoidance logic were and continue to be motivated by observed incidents [120]. This
represents a valuable use of operational data to address precursors to accidents. Unfortunately,
the Oberlingen accident prevents an example where an accident highlighted and accelerated
demands for change. The implementation of collision avoidance logic in software allowed
flexibility in adapting to identified issues.
Embedded Judgment on Induced Collisions. It was recognized during initial development that
the use of TCAS could induce some midair collisions. In the assessment of the system the
tradeoff between induced and prevented collisions was incorporated into the model of the
assessment, and not imposed externally through acceptability criteria. Early attempts to create
separate risk ratios were proposed but failed [115].
TCAS As a Mitigation for Future Operations. TCAS performance can is often used support the
safety assessment of other changes to the system, providing mitigation against the risk of a loss
of separation. Consider the three lines of defense commonly asserted as preventing a midair
collision illustrated on the left-hand side of Figure D-4. A level of risk is present due to the
density of traffic. Procedural separation further reduces risk by separating aircraft along
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common routes. Additionally, air traffic control is responsible for separation of aircraft when
observable and under their control. TCAS, where equipped, provides a second layer of collision
avoidance protection. The final defense against a midair collision is pilot ability to see & avoid.
A midair collision results in a failure of all defenses, either through lack of identification, or
failure to resolve. The equivalent event tree, of the sequence is shown on the right side of Figure
D-4:.
I AC TCAS Avotid
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Figure D-4: Collision Avoidance Prevention Mitigations and Event Tree
An example of the effectiveness of TCAS is shown in Figure D-5 from Andrews, et al. [123].
The authors evaluated an advanced ground-based separation and alerting system, where faults
introduced could result in a failure of conflict-free trajectories. TCAS was an element in the
system model that reduced the expected rate of midair collisions under conflict scenarios. This
effect is shown in the orange region, and is generally an order of magnitude reduction in the rate
of collisions.
Without TCAS, increased performance would be required in other system elements to reach the
same level of midair collisions. This unavailability of TCAS could be present due to a lack of
equipage of other aircraft.
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Figure D-5: Andrews, et al. Analysis Results of Advanced Separation Concept [1231
D.4 Precision Runway Monitor (PRM)
D.4.1 Overview and System Description
The Precision Runway Monitor (PRM) was designed to allow reduced lateral separation on
approach to closely-spaced parallel runways. PRM increases capacity at some airports where
runways are spaced too closely to permit safe separation using conventional terminal radar,
between 3400 and 4300 ft (3000 ft with an offset ILS). The PRM system consists of high update
rate radar and air traffic control display monitored by a dedicated controller. The controller uses
the PRM display in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) to monitor aircraft deviations
from their assigned approach paths. If a deviation is detected, the controller issues a breakout
command to one or both aircraft on approach to avert a potential collision. The first PRM
system was installed in Minneapolis and commissioned in 1997.
D.4.2 Safety Assessment Approach and Details
The TLS approach was used to evaluate and specify key system elements of the PRM system:
the update rate and azimuthal resolution of the radar; distance between parallel runways; and
dimensions of the no transgression zone (NTZ) [124]. The functionality of the system was
judged to be sufficiently independent from other conditions that it was possible to scope the
analysis to a single hazard: the potential for midair collision due to unresolved blunders.
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The safety analysis supporting PRM design parameters was conducted by MITRE and published
by the FAA in support of the acquisition of the system [124]. This case is based on the FAA
report, and other references to PRM in literature [96, 107, 125].
Target Level of Safety and Risk Budget. PRM was designed to an equivalent level of risk to
current operations, assuming the current level of accident approach risk was acceptable. To
determine this target, NTSB accident data were reviewed for a six-year period. Divided by the
assumed operating hours in IMC, this yielded the acceptable final approach accident rate of
1 accident per 2.5 million approaches [in IMC] or 4 x 10~7 accidents per IMC approach [124].
The risk budget breakdown for PRM is shown in Figure D-6.
all TLS in accidents / Approach 4.2 x 10-7
approach Accident
---------------------------------- +/60.to each category
PRM Other
& 4.2 x 10 Category Categories
4.2 x 10-8
Unresolved
Blunders
PRM
Conditions
Figure D-6: PRM Risk Budget
From the overall final approach IMC accident rate, nine categories of final approach accidents
were decomposed of which failure of the PRM system was expected to add a tenth cause. Only
three causes are listed in the documented analysis (engine failure, collision with an obstacle, and
aircraft deviation from the approved flight path) [124]. With this factor, the design goal for the
PRM system is 1 accident per 25 million IMC approaches or 4 x 10-8 accidents per IMC
approach. The nine causes of approach accidents were not directly observed. Only two
accidents occurred during the period used to review safety [124]. Based on this, the 1/10th factor
represents a judgment of the fraction of risk that the PRM should assume as an equivalent
contribution to other systems.
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Detailed Modeling and Assessment. Documentation of the design process that resulted in the
initial configuration of the PRM system was not available. Safety available studies document
safety decision-making based on early operational trials of deployed PRM systems, as well as
simulation and quantitative analysis. The quantitative assessment is the only aspect of analysis
that related system performance to the risk target. However, the quantitative assessment was
performed along with analysis of other aspects of the system. Therefore it is important to discuss
both below.
Several system elements interact in PRM. Air traffic controllers utilize dedicated displays to
monitor aircraft approaches and issue breakout commands. Pilots perform approaches, using
autopilot and ILS equipment. In addition, TCAS provides awareness of other traffic, and can
potentially issue traffic alerts or resolution advisories. Properties of the PRM procedures were
also evaluated, including update rate and separation between runways.
One aspect of the safety study was to investigate the magnitude of flight technical error on ILS
approaches for different aircraft types. This informed the boundary that aircraft were expected to
deviate on an ILS approach, and set a minimum allowable separation distance between runways
based on current ILS performance.
Simulations also informed judgments about pilot and controller response to blunders. Pilots
were found to respond less aggressively than desired when issued breakout instructions, so
requirements were placed to train pilots on breakout procedures. Controller behavior focused on
assessing the influence proposed properties of the PRM system on performance in blunder
identification and response time [125]. These studies also quantified parameters used in a Monte
Carlo simulation of blunders.
In the trial and simulation results, the perceptions of controllers of the utility of the system were
also probed through structured surveys. Both pilots and controllers were generally accepting of
the midair collision protection afforded by the system [124, 125] and DOT. This approach
elicited an implicit acceptability judgment by users, which supported operational approval.
TCAS was installed for test flights at two locations, and the interaction of TCAS and the PRM
system was observed. It was found that TCAS RAs occurred frequently while aircraft were
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maneuvering and acquiring the threshold. It was also found that TCAS augmented PRM
breakout instructions in the case of a blundering aircraft, and it was judged that the operation of
both systems in parallel did not significantly influence safety. Modifications were recommended
to operate TCAS separately on parallel approaches, but they were not implemented [124].
The likelihood of midair collisions given a blunder was evaluated using a Monte Carlo
simulation. This estimated that there was one midair collision, out of every 250 worst-case
blunders. The risk analysis performed did not follow the conventional approach of modeling
parameters and comparing results to a target level of safety. Instead, the target level of safety
was set for performance of the system, and the acceptable rate of blunders was calculated. It was
assumed that there was a 1% probability of a worst -ase blunder, given a that a blunder occurred.
This resulted in an acceptable frequency of 1 blunder every 1,000 approaches. This was
validated through anecdotal evidence on the rate of blunders at other facilities.
D.4.3 Discussion
While the scope of hazard to midair collision on final approach appears to have been made
appropriately, it is not clear that worst-case condition of a blunder appropriately represents the
worst-case system state for analysis. The blunder condition assessed was an aircraft changed
heading 30 degrees into the path of the other aircraft executing an approach. As an initiating
event, it was dismissed an extremely rare event. Because of the low frequency, the PRM system
was only required to add marginal mitigations designed based on a single case. It is not clear
that more likely, but less severe events should not have been considered that would lead to
midair collision risks [126]. Other failure modes using the system, such as misidentification by a
controller, equipment failures, or even other blunder modes were not explored.
Instead of a direct reliance on the quantified risk of midair collision due to blunders, the
simulations and flight trials performed likely created sufficient confidence in system capabilities
to achieve operational approval.
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D.5 Reduced Vertical Separation Minima (RVSM) in Europe (EUR)
The influence matrix was applied to the FHA of RVSM in Chapter 6. A system description and
analysis of the risk matrix approach was included as part of the chapter. In this appendix, other
key issues in the safety assessment of RVSM are discussed. The system description is repeated
for convenience.
D.5.1 System Description
Under conventional separation minima, aircraft are separated vertically by 1,000 ft flight levels
(FL) below FL 290 (29,000 ft) and by 2000 ft. above FL 290. This variation in vertical
separation with altitude was due to the dependence of height-keeping on barometric altimeters.
At higher altitudes, the same pressure accuracy of the altimeter translated to a larger altimetry
system error due to the more shallow gradient of pressure with altitude.
Beginning in 1990, ICAO published draft guidance material [91], on the feasibility of reducing
vertical separation in several regions. The operational reduction in vertical separation required
increased altimetry precision, which was assured through certification to Minimum Aviation
System Performance Standards (MASPS) on new and retrofitted altimetry systems.
From 1997 to 1998, RVSM was implemented in the ICAO North Atlantic Region [93].
Following this implementation, Eurocontrol performed a safety assessment supporting
implementation in the European region (EUR). This safety assessment was conducted for the
specific EUR operational environment, but built on standards on aircraft performance that were
established earlier by ICAO. The change was approved and implemented in EUR airspace in
2002. RVSM has also been implemented in most other world regions, including the United
States, but those implementations are not the focus of this analysis.
To support operational approval in the European Region (EUR), two safety assessments were
performed, both before [94] and after [95] implementation. Each safety case considered
transition areas to RVSM, and "core" RVSM airspace. The focus of this case study is on the
assessment of mature airspace performed in the Pre-Implementation Safety Case (PISC) [94].
As part of the safety case, a Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) was also conducted [92].
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The discussion of this case will begin with a description of the safety assessment approaches
used. Analysis of the case is then organized along the general processes of safety assessment:
hazard identification and scoping, detailed analysis and modeling/ mitigation, and operational
approval.
D.5.2 Collision Risk Modeling to TLS
Collision risk modeling was used to evaluate required altimetry system performance to the
associated target level of safety. Risk was modeled using the ICAO close approach proximity
model [127]. This model is an extension of the Reich-Marks model described in the NAT OTS
case. The model relies on estimating a horizontal overlap rate based on traffic characteristics,
and associated probability of vertical overlap due to height-keeping performance. ICAO
established a Minimum Aviation System Performance Standard (MASPS) [128] for altimetry
systems. The MASPS specified altimetry system performance in terms of three parameters:
mean (80 ft), 3 standard deviations (245 ft), and integrity (probability of failure of 1 x 10-5).
In early operational monitoring, the height-keeping performance of aircraft already equipped to
the MASPS was monitored. The data were to statistically characterize altimetry performance of
aircraft operating in the airspace. When correlated with ATC clearance data, the HMU results
gave distributions both for altimetry system performance error, and "flight technical error" which
was indicated vertical position errors due to deviations from clearance. Data also provided an
estimated rate of horizontal overlaps [95].
The horizontal overlap and vertical error data were combined in a mathematical model to
evaluate determine the expected collision risk due to vertical overlap. It was found that with
current aircraft performance, expected level of risk was 0.5 x 10-9. Data from operational errors
were also included, finding an overall expected level of safety of 0.5 x 10-9. Each value
exceeded the corresponding TLS of 2.5 x 10-9 [95].
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Elimination of TCAS from Scone
As discussed above, TCAS behavior was not directly assessed as part of the FHA performed.
Instead, it was assumed that TCAS was qualified by similarity to lower altitude levels with
conventional separation. Two hazards associated with interaction with TCAS were deemed
unacceptable, and required additional monitoring activities.
The hazard "nuisance TAs and RAs" was not considered to meet the required safety objectives.
Excessive climb and descent rates were judged to potentially initiate TAs or RAs. There were no
RVSM-specific mitigation means determined by the assessors that could address the risk.
Instead, a follow-on study was conducted by Eurocontrol and found the level of alerts to be
acceptable [97].
The second hazard assessed as safety-critical (i.e. high risk) was "pilot is deviating from
clearance." This situation is commonly referred to as an altitude burst, which indicates that a
pilot either deviates from the assigned altitude, or continues to climb or descend through an
assigned altitude.
The level of risk associated with the hazard is dependent upon TCAS interactions, as well as
potential operational errors by pilots or controllers. No mitigation measures were identified that
could address the risk of deviation, although it is clear that RVSM system elements relate to it.
Instead, it was argued that the risk exits and is tolerated in the current system, and the only effect
of RVSM would be increased absolute frequency.
Although no mitigations were prescribed in the safety case, training programs were initiated by
Eurocontrol to mitigate the risk associated with deviations. The follow-on Post-Implementation
Safety Case [95], reassessed the risk and found it to be tolerable.
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D.5.3 Discussion
The two methods used to determine safety-derived requirements in RVSM illustrate divisions in
the applicability of the methods. The assessment to a risk matrix was performed using
qualitative estimates of likelihood. It was also used as a means to derive requirements, which
were best practices in addressing identified hazards: training, equipment design, and airspace
design.
Where it was necessary to assess technical performance, a sophisticated midair collision risk
model was required. This model relied on an accurate representation of operational data and
related it directly to the level of midair collision risk. It was also used to assess the implications
of observed operational errors.
TCAS was identified as a significant interacting element. TCAS had a strong influence on the
identified safety critical hazards. These hazards were not mitigated through RVSM elements.
Instead, their occurrence was monitored through follow-on activities. The monitoring program
found behavior to be acceptable [97].
D.6 Overview of Automatic Dependent Surveillance, Broadcast (ADS-B) Cases
ADS-B is an integrated set of airborne and ground components that are used to transmit GPS-
derived position and other information to the ground and other aircraft. This capability is known
as ADS-B out. The presence of a datalink also enables the receipt of information from other
aircraft and the ground, known as ADS-B-in. ADS-B has two corresponding services broadcast
from the ground. Traffic Information Services, Broadcast or TIS-B contains information from
surveilled traffic through ADS-B or rebroadcast from ground radars. Flight Information Service,
Broadcast or FIS-B contains airspace information, and meteorological information, including
graphical weather.
ADS-B uses two types of transponders to relay information. A transponder similar to a Mode S
transponder with extended information is the 1090ES (extended squitter). 1090ES is expected to
be adopted by large commercial aircraft. The Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) operates on
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978 MHz and has higher bandwidth for receipt of graphical information, such as weather, and is
expected to be attractive for equipage by General Aviation aircraft [129].
ADS-B was initially conceived as a replacement to radar-based surveillance, to enable the
retirement of existing secondary surveillance radars. Since its initial development, the use of
ADS-B has expanded to support multiple applications.
The analysis of ADS-B is divided into two cases. The first case focuses on the initial
deployment of ADS-B as part of the Capstone program in Alaska, beginning in 1999. The
Capstone program was an early demonstration of ADS-B functionality using UAT. The FAA
subsidized installation on several aircraft of an ADS-B system that broadcast GPS-derived
position to air traffic control, and provided a display to pilots of surrounding air traffic and
terrain. The focus of this discussion is the hazard analysis supporting the implementation of
radar-like services using ADS-B as a surveillance source [130]. A hazard analysis was also
performed for other applications of ADS-B, but is not the subject of the Capstone case analysis
[131].
The second case focuses performance requirements for system-wide deployment of ADS-B in
the United States. As part of this deployment, there are plans to support multiple future
applications relying on ADS-B. These plans are based on development of requirements for
ADS-B performance for multiple applications that is currently in process in the US and
internationally [132]. The FAA has published a notice of proposed rulemaking mandating
equipage and performance requirements for ADS-B-out. Requirements for additional ADS-B
applications have also derived through several safety studies. These assessments of required
performance have been conducted by RTCA [133, 134] and by the ADS-B separation standards
working group, as documented in open literature [135]. The case study will focus on a
comparison between requirements for different applications.
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D.7 Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) Alaska Capstone
Program
D.7.1 Safety Assessment Approach and Details
A scenario-based preliminary hazard analysis was performed to evaluated expected safety
performance to a risk matrix. The scenario-based assessment defines hazards as a set of
operational conditions, grouped together into a scenario. Initial risk was categorized based on
existing controls, and mitigations were evaluated qualitatively to reduce high risks to acceptable
levels [130]. This processes is discussed in the first section.
Additionally, during the course of the Capstone operational evaluation, concerns were raised
regarding the dual use of ADS-B and radar targets for separation. This resulted in a disapproval
of ADS-B information and required a reassessment of the safety assessment before returning the
capability. This is discussed in the following section.
ADS-B-Out Hazard Analysis
The risk matrix used in the evaluation is shown below in Figure D-7. The structure of the risk
matrix is noteworthy in two respects. First, with the exception of the catastrophic category, the
severity categories and criteria differ from those typically used by the FAA. This is evident in
contrasting Figure D-7 with the ATO SMS risk matrix shown in Figure 5-1. Second, the
assessors recognize that the nature of Alaska operations allow risks that are typically ranked as
high risk (i.e. in the region of catastrophic and extremely remote) to be accepted. This
acceptance acknowledges the need to further evaluate the risks in operational practice, and it also
acknowledges that scenarios with risk in the region have been improved by the introduction of
Capstone equipment, and would not have initially been in the acceptable region.
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Figure D-7: ADS-B Capstone Radar-Like Services Risk Matrix 11301.
While the function performed for ADS-B is as a surveillance source to air traffic control, the
scope of hazards was not limited to this function. Examples include hazard with associated risks
of ground impact, loss of pilot situation awareness, and inappropriate use of ADS-B displays for
cockpit-based separation [130].
The safety assessment process used was to decompose the evaluation of risk and required
mitigations by hazard. This is illustrated in an example scenario shown in Table D-3. The
scenario involves collision of an aircraft using ADS-B with terrain or a fixed object. The
scenario was selected because it is one of eight scenarios with the highest risk measure. There
were no scenarios with a risk ranking of R1, and no air traffic-control related scenarios with a
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risk ranking of R2. Thus, the scenario illustrates both a high risk, and a risk outside of the scope
of radar services.
Table D-3: Example Hazard Assessment for Capstone ADS-B-Based Separation [130]
Scenario Scenario Possible Effect Risk R# Recomimendations for Precautions,
# Description Controls, and Nlitigation
Two ADS-B
aircraft on
approach IFR.
Inadvertent
loss of voice
communication
occurs to single
aircraft due to
environmental
effects.
Loss of voice
communication
single aircraft
Slight increase in
controller
workload.
IIIE 8. ADS-B radar-like separation standard (e.g.,
5 nmi, MEAs) is defined to allow intervention
time for ATC and pilot to respond safely in
case of system failure or other contingencies.
9. MFD could enhance pilot situational
awareness in the event of a ground system
and/or avionics failure.
17. Avionics certification, installation, and
approval process in place for Capstone, in
conformance with standard certification
procedures (e.g., TSO-1 29C, DO- 1 78B
(software) and AC-23.1309-lC (hardware)).
STC will be amended for ADS-B radarlike
services.
25b. Pilot ability to see-and-avoid in VMC.
27. Standard pilot and controller procedures
(e.g., AIM and 7110.65) for lost voice
communications will be applied when using
ADS-B as a surveillance source, the same as
when using radar beacon system as a
surveillance source.
29 Air-to-air ADS-B traffic depiction can
provide an additional means of detection of
ADS-B aircraft
30. The avionics have been tested, per
procedures defined in RTCA/DO- 1 60D, to
environmental categories as listed in the
various Capstone avionics installation
manuals.
In the assessment of the hazard, system elements judged to influence the risk and their associated
numbers above were: airspace procedures: separation standards (8) and ATC/pilot common
procedures (27); avionics: multi-function display MFD functionality (9), certification (17),
testing (30) and traffic information (29); pilot see & avoid procedures (25b). Thus, the system
elements are distributed across a range of airborne and ground systems. Some safety-derived
requirements already exist in the system, such as defined safety separation standards, while
others are required to be performed before system implementation, such as avionics certification
and testing.
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The actual measures of influence assessed are unknown, as further rationale is not provided on
the effectiveness of controls in mitigations in each area, but it can be inferred that all components
had some degree of influence. Based on this influence, a qualitative mental model was used to
judge the associated risk level.
Reassessment of ADS-B to Radar Separation
The implementation of ADS-B based separation in Capstone included displays to controllers for
separation both between ADS-B returns, and ADS-B and radar returns. In February 2007, the
office of Air Traffic Oversight (AOV) expressed concerns that the Safety Risk Management
Document used as the basis for this implementation did not adequately address potential risks of
ADS-B/radar separation. For this reason, approval for the practice was removed and re-
assessment was required [136]. AOV had specific concerns about the lack of scope of hazards
related to boundaries of radar coverage, and the influence of terrain.
As a result, the application for ADS-B to radar separation was resubmitted after reassessing
ADS-B to radar risks. The assessment addressed the scope concerns addressed by AOV, and
separation procedures of ADS-B to radar traffic were reinstated [137].
D.7.2 Discussion
The initial hazard assessment for ADS-B radar services was heavily focused on aircraft-based
hazards. This is likely the cause of the failure to include sufficient conditions within the scope of
analysis for approval of ADS-B to radar separation. However, the justification for initial
implementation of ADS-B to radar separation was unavailable in the review of the case. The
process of disapproval, and re-approval of this procedure indicates the challenges associated with
adequately scoping analysis.
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D.8 U.S. Deployment of Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B)
D.8.1 Overview of ADS-B Performance Parameters
ADS-B can utilize different sources for navigation information with different levels of accuracy.
To account for this, standards developed for ADS-B define key parameters used to encode the
position accuracy and integrity. Three of these parameters will be discussed here. The
Navigation Integrity Category (NIC) indicates the position uncertainty boundary to a given level
of probability (typically 10-7 events/hr). The probability is defined in the Surveillance Integrity
Level (SIL). Accuracy of position is defined to a 95% confidence level, and is encoded in the
Navigation Accuracy Category for position (NACp). It should be noted that previous versions of
ADS-B combine integrity and accuracy into a single parameter, the Navigation Uncertainty
Category (NUC), but the focus of this discussion is on later versions that separate integrity and
accuracy.
There are specific mappings of each parameter to boundaries on position or probabilities.
Accuracy and Integrity values are shown in Table D-4 for reference. Surveillance Integrity
Levels are shown in Table D-5.
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Table D-4: Relationship of NIC/NAC Codes to Position Uncertainty (adapted from [1251)
unknown
20 nm
8 nm
4 nm
2 nm
1 nm
0.6 nim (1111 m)
0.5 nim (926 m)
0.2 nm (370 m)
0.1 nim (185 m)
75 m. VPL- 112 m
25 m, VPL - 37.5 m
7.5 m -VPL- 11 m
>10 nm
< 10 nm
4 rm
2 nm
1 nm
0.5 nm (926 m)
0.3 rnm (557 m)
0.1 nm (185 m)
0.05 nim (92.6 m)
30 m
10 m
3 m
RNP-10
RNP-4
RNP-2
RNP-1
RNP-0.5
RNP-0.3
RNP-0.1
GPS (SA on)
45m GPS (SA off)
Ism WAAS
4 m LAAS
Table D-5: Definition of SIL Codes (adapted from [1251)
Sureilanc Probability of Exceeding R, without
ingit detectionL e v e l (S UL ) -- 1- 
--------------------
0 unknown
1 1 x 10- per flight hour or per operation
2 1 x 104 per flight hour or per operation
3 1 x 10-7 per flight hour or per operation
D.8.2 Comparison of ADS-B Application Performance Requirements
As part of the program approval requirements for Segment 1 of ADS-B deployment in the U.S.
National Airspace System, a Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) was conducted [131]. The
PHA uses a risk matrix approach. The details of the Segment 1 PHA will not be covered in this
discussion. It is useful to note that as part of the mitigation of midair collision risks in the PHA,
a requirement was derived to conduct a probabilistic analysis to identify the required
performance for mixed ADS-B/radar separation.
Interviews conducted indicated that this analysis uses two approaches [102]. The first approach
is assessment to a target level of safety. The second approach is in comparison of equivalent
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performance to a reference system. Thus, the overall safety case for ADS-B relies on the
utilization of all three approaches discussed in this work.
In addition to safety assessments conducted for the U.S. program, several other studies have been
conducted to determine required performance for potential future applications. Potential future
applications assessed by RTCA [134] along with requirements in U.S. and EU [138] policy are
shown in Table D-6Table D-6:. The six applications assessed by RTCA are: ASSA, FAROA,
EVAcq, ACM, ASIA, and ICSPA. Detailed descriptions of each application are included in the
reference and are consistent with their titles [134].
In general, the requirements for each application were derived from the combination of safety
assessments and operational performance analysis conducted independently for each application.
Integrity requirements are derived through a safety assessment using fault tree or failure modes
and effects analysis. Accuracy requirements are based on a structured assessment of the required
performance within the operational environment.
Table D-6: Accuracy and Integrity Parameters Required for Selected Applications
Minimum Navigation Parameter
Required
Application NACp NIC SIL Reference
Airport Surface Situation 9 9 1 (10-3) [134]Awareness (ASSA)
Final Approach Runway
Occupancy Awareness 9 9 1 [134]
(FAROA)
Enhanced Visual Approach 7 8 1 [134](EVApp)
Airborne Conflict N/A 7 2 [134]Management (ACM)
Approach Spacing for
Instrument Approaches 8 9 2 [134]
(ASIA)
Independent Closely-Spaced 9 9 2 [134]Parallel Approaches (ICSPA)
ATC Surveillance in Non- 5 4 2 [139]
Radar Areas (NRA)
ADS-B Out for Air Traffic
Control 2 9 7 2 [140]
12 The NPRM does not relate specified requirements to individual applications.
application.
Strictly speaking, this is not an
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As can be noted, the requirements for airport awareness applications are higher than those for
airborne surveillance. This is due to the increased accuracy required to discriminate position
relative to fixed objects and other vehicles on the airport surface. As airborne separations are
generally higher, there is a lower level of required accuracy and integrity.
In addition, performance requirements in radar airspace are generally higher than non-radar
applications. This is due to the latency associated with radar sweeps compared to ADS-B
position reports. When two aircraft are in close proximity, radar illuminates each aircraft at
nearly the same time, reducing the position error associated with the travel of the aircraft
between position reports. In some operational scenarios, the probability of reception of an ADS-
B message results in substantial latency between radar sweeps and the ADS-B report. Thus, the
baseline required position uncertainty of the ADS-B system is required to be higher to
compensate for the travel latency [141]. In non-radar environments, this latency does not exist.
Although there is still potential for latency between ADS-B reports, it is typically lower than a
full radar sweep.
D.8.3 Interaction of ADS-B with TCAS
TCAS is certified to issue advisories and alerts under a complex set of conditions based on the
computation of a time to closest point of approach. These conditions result in an envelope of
protection for which the TCAS system has been certified as safe. If a proposed change involves
operating within the TCAS envelope, TCAS will be a significant interacting element, as pilot
reactions to traffic alerts and resolution advisories will influence the occurrence of proximity-
related risks in the proposed change. In addition, within the envelope, the interaction of the
proposed change and TCAS can result in an increase in false alerts to the pilot. This can reduce
trust in TCAS alerts, reduce TCAS effectiveness in other operational conditions, and interfere
with the desired operation.
Several ADS-B applications will potentially conflict with TCAS due to reductions in planned
separation. Studies are currently underway to consider the potential next step in the evolution of
TCAS, which may include higher fidelity surveillance and the incorporation of trajectory
information from other aircraft. These changes should continue to enable flexibility in collision
avoidance logic, to allow for the incorporation of new operations.
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D.8.4 Discussion
The wide variation in performance requirements by application creates a tension in setting
required performance. The requirements from the NPRM have been placed based on expected
future application requirements for high accuracy and integrity [140], although it can be noted
that the integrity requirement is not sufficient to meet the required performance for some ground-
based applications. The EU has placed lower requirements on initial installations for non-radar
areas [138]. This illustrates a fundamental tension in balancing requirements for expected versus
current applications.
An additional challenge in ADS-B is due to the long time scale of development of standards.
Underlying standards for equipment have gone through several revisions. An example is the
minimum Operational Performance Standard (MOPS) for 1090 Mhz Extended Squitter (1090ES)
[142]. Early avionics based on the DO-260 standard allowed for the use of either of two
potential measures of position uncertainty. During later revisions, only one of these measures
was determined to be acceptable for use in air traffic control (ATC) separation. As a result, the
installation of ADS-B avionics in individual aircraft must be modified to use the approved
method of broadcasting position uncertainty. As an example, Airservices Australia currently has
to certify each individual airframe before the aircraft could utilize ADS-B for ATC separation
[143]. The DO-260 specification has been changed once, the current DO-260 Change 1. The
second version of the 1090 ES MOPS, DO-260A, has been changed three times, with the current
version published as DO-260A Change 3.
The uncertainty in required standards can create a disincentive for operators to equip, and can
discourage early adoption.
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D.9 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
D.9.1 Overview and System Description
An Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) is composed of single or multiple unmanned aerial
vehicles, a ground station, and command and control infrastructure. Unmanned aircraft are
usually equipped with sensors, such as electro-optical and infrared cameras, which typically
provide information relayed to the ground station or other customers. There are several other
potential applications for UAS, as the aircraft exist along a broad spectrum of capabilities in
terms of size, payload, endurance, and ceiling [144].
Unmanned aircraft have been historically operated by the military. Recently, there has been an
increased need for access to civil airspace, for border surveillance missions, military training
flights, and manufacturer testing of aircraft. There is also a desire to utilize UAS for civilian,
academic, and law enforcement applications.
Current aviation regulations did not anticipate operation without a pilot onboard, and several
aspects of UAS challenge the basis for current approval processes and flight rules. This has led
to several global efforts to accommodate UAS in civil airspace, a current review is provided in
[145]. In the United States, FAA Unmanned Aircraft Systems Program Office [146] was formed
to develop interim guidance and approval processes for limited introductions of UAS [146].
RTCA is also developing standards for UAS equipment.
A key limitation is a lack of inherent ability of an onboard pilot to detect and avoid potential
conflicts with other aircraft operating in airspace. Current regulations require that "vigilance
shall be maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other aircraft
[147]." Translating this requirement to unmanned aircraft has led to the need to evaluate traffic
detection technologies or procedures that replace this functionality of an onboard pilot. For
UAS, this capability is known as Detect, Sense and Avoid (DSA).
The following discussion of the UAS case will be organized slightly differently due to the nature
of the pending change. The first two sections of this case will focus on determination of required
performance of DSA systems to meet safety acceptability criteria. This discussion will begin
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with the early establishment of criteria and interim standards for the DSA function. Following
this, current efforts are underway to perform a structured safety assessment of UAS DSA will be
described.
UAS also present other significant challenges in operational approval due to the fundamentally
new type of operation they represent. UAS operations present changes in pilot roles, changes in
task allocation between pilots and automation, and changes in potential risks and associated
severity of risks. These challenges in evaluating fundamentally new operations will be discussed
in the third section.
D.9.2 Detect Sense and Avoid Functionality
Early standards developed by ASTM. ASTM developed one of the first standards for UAS sense
and avoid sensor performance in 2004 [148]. The standard describes performance-based
requirements for a DSA sensor in terms of field of regard, range, and resolution. In the process
of developing the ASTM standard, two safety assessment approaches were used. The first was
an equivalent performance approach, which based sensor performance on the equivalent field of
regard and detection capabilities of the human eye. Through analysis of several midair collision
scenarios, it was found that human detection performance was insufficient to resolve a
significant number of potential collisions, and direct performance comparison was therefore not
used as a basis for deriving UAS sensor performance [149].
Instead of equivalent performance, a TLS approach was then used to design system performance.
Near midair collision (NMAC) rates for general aviation were estimated based on an estimated
ratio of NMACs given midair collisions, and an analysis of midair collision rates reported by the
FAA. This yielded an average NMAC rate of 8.6 x 10-6 / hr. The target rate was used to derive
sensor range, field of regard, and resolution requirements using a Department of Defense
modeling tool [149].
To date, the ASTM standard has not been accepted by the FAA as an acceptable means of
compliance with DSA requirements. It is likely due to the implicit rejection of pilot see and
avoid performance as an acceptable reference system, both in terms of a safety target, and in
visual acquisition performance. Additionally, the target is nearly two orders of magnitude less
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safe than 1 x 10-7 requirement in the ATO SMS for a hazardous severity of risk for which an
NMAC would be ranked.
Interim Equivalence Approaches to DSA. Current U.S. operations of UAS are approved by the
FAA Unmanned Aircraft Systems Program Office (UAS PO). The program office combines
multiple areas of expertise in air traffic procedures, and airworthiness certification. The UAS PO
has published interim guidance on operational approval of UAS operations. There are two
mechanisms by which UAS operations can be approved: experimental aircraft certification, or
through a Certificate of Authorization (COA). Both require examination of individual
operations, site visits, and significant operational restrictions [146].
As interim policy, the standards are not required to go through the full safety assessment and
rulemaking process as other regulations. For this reason, a combination of expert judgment and
best practices were used to derive the guidance. A basis was still necessary to determine
requirements to see and avoid other aircraft, as the risk severity is potentially catastrophic. For
this reason, an equivalence approach was used.
One equivalence approach is to segregate UAS operations to restricted airspace, which
eliminates the DSA function. This is similar to current restricted airspace practices used to
protect non-military aircraft from encounters potentially more dangerous military aircraft or
missile operations.
Two interim approaches to performing DSA also utilize equivalence. These are the use of a
chase aircraft, and the use of ground observers. A chase aircraft that flies in formation with the
UAS and acts as a surrogate in communication with air traffic control. The pilot of the chase
aircraft is responsible for detection and avoidance of other aircraft. This directly replaces the
function an onboard pilot would perform, and seeks to remove any variation that would change
levels of risk associated with the see and avoid task, as well as the task of communicating with
air traffic control.
A second approach recognized as acceptable by the FAA is to utilize ground observers. Ground
observers are generally required to be spaced no more than 1nm laterally and 3,000 ft vertically
from the UAV [146]. The aircraft can only operate within visual contact with the ground
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observers at all times. The lateral distance is the same VFR weather minimums for low visibility
conditions, set at 1 nm, indicating an assumed limit on pilot/observer detection capability.
By the ground observer approach, the task that an onboard pilot would perform in visual
conditions has been directly transferred to ground-based personnel. This introduces other
variations in performance that were not explicitly considered. Ground observers have difference
reference frames than an onboard pilot would, which can influence the ability to identify
resolution maneuvers. Ground observers must also communicate with the UAS remotely,
introducing a potential failure path in execution. Regardless of these differences, the approaches
are attractive because they are equivalent in function to current methods of performing the task.
The basis for using equivalence for current UAS DSA standards seems to conflict with the
rejection of equivalence in the ASTM standard. While the details are not directly documented,
differences in the approach can be identified that explain the apparent conflict.
The ASTM standard proposed set functional performance as a standard for technology. It is
likely that this process bears increased scrutiny than internal FAA policy judgments. The
performance of general aviation aircraft sense and avoid, as a reference system for deriving a
technical standard, was not acceptable. However, the same functional role in a human, in the
specific cases evaluated by the UAS PO was judged to be acceptable. This judgment could
indicate that UAS observers would perform better than average pilots of the reference system. It
could also indicate implicitly higher process standards for the derivation of technical
requirements.
RTCA DSA MOPS development. The ASTM standards development approach has been de-
emphasized by the FAA. Instead, the FAA has tasked RTCA Special Committee 203 (SC-203)
with developing Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for detect, sense, and
avoid and command and control systems [150]. RTCA has traditionally developed system
requirements in an advisory role to the FAA, as noted in the ADS-B case study above.
Although the results are not complete, RTCA is using a risk matrix approach to assess and
mitigate hazards related to the use of each system [151]. The practice in development of MOPS
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is to use safety assessment as the basis for deriving some aspects of system performance, with
others driven by other requirements.
D.9.3 Challenges Due to Fundamentally New Operational Capability
UAS DSA as a Fundamentally New Capability. The significant change in task allocation for
performance of traffic avoidance represents a fundamentally new operational capability. The
sense and avoid task has been performed by onboard pilots, and assured through training and
pilot certification. In UAS, the task is transferred to onboard equipment, potentially with a pilot
in the loop. The transfer of functionality from a pilot to equipment fundamentally changes the
approval path for DSA equipment. Instead of being assured through pilot certification, approval
must be obtained for DSA avionics and software, and new operational procedures approved for
flight crews operating the system.
Deriving equipment standards requires examination of several additional system elements that
influence associated risks. These can include the characteristics of surrounding traffic, DSA
sensor performance, collision avoidance or alerting logic, and resolution actions. Potential
hazards associated with each function must also be assessed within the scope of analysis.
In changing task allocation, it becomes less possible to qualify performance by similarity. A
suitable technical system does not exist to use as a reference system or to qualify by similarity.
System behavior also becomes more difficult to decompose in the same way similarity can be
used to determine required radar performance. The entire control process is coupled, such that
tradeoffs are evaluated between, for example, sensor performance and conflict identification.
There is also the ability to improve upon current human-based sense and avoid practices.
The performance requirements derived from the safety assessment are expected to be
demanding. By the judgment of the FAA associated administrator for aviation safety, feasible
technology to perform detect, sense, and avoid to an acceptable level of safety is currently not
available and not likely to be available in the near future [152]. There is a risk that technical
performance requirements could be demanding such that suitable technology cannot be
developed to meet the performance requirements.
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Changes to Severity Classifications. As described in Section 3.3, severity rankings associated
with a potential risk are defined based example descriptions of harm associated with the risk.
Implicit in severity definitions is a presumed shared fate between the flight crew and occupants
on an aircraft, and the general public on the ground. In addition, embedded in the current
definitions of severity are indicators of increased risk, as discussed in Section 5.1.2.
UAS operations change the events used to define associated severity levels. Instead of
potentially harmful effects to occupants and crew of the aircraft, there is the addition of potential
harms to third parties on the ground. One study [153] has addressed harms to the public by
incorporating fatal injuries to third parties into severity definitions. The study also addressed
unique failure modes as indicators of increased risk, such as loss of communication and
associated control of the vehicle as a catastrophic event, regardless of the harm it may pose
directly to individuals [153].
Elimination of Shared Fate between Flight Crew and UAS. By removing the flight crew and
occupants from the UAS, there is removal of "shared fate" between the operators of the UAS
and the UAS itself. There is a perception that this may adversely influence the safety decision-
making priorities of operators. Under hazardous conditions, operators may be less likely to take
extraordinary measures to prevent harms if direct harm to operators is not a consequence. If this
is the case, current operational procedures and flight crew certification may be judged to be less
effective at mitigating risks. Thus, the new operational nature challenges assumptions under
current approaches and may require re-evaluation or special consideration before operational
approval.
Removal of Flight Crew from Direct Control of Aircraft. While in most modem aircraft flight
crew commands are processes through a fly-by-wire system, remote operation of UAS removes
flight crew even further from direct control. This can remove sensory inputs regarding vibration,
smell, and sound that could indicate hazardous conditions [154]. This reduces the ability to
compare similar tasks between traditional flight crews and UAS operators.
In addition, the introduction of a communications link can pose additional risks. Latencies and
failure conditions introduced by the link require a new approach to mitigating risks than in a
traditional aircraft. The potential for loss of control also results in the incorporation of some
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autonomous behavior in most UAS. The onboard autonomy often functions to execute aircraft
control in the advent of a loss of communication with the ground either to re-establish link, or
safely terminate the flight of the UAS. Onboard autonomy and the presence of a
communications link can expand the necessary scope of safety assessment to additional risks,
and the additional associated elements.
D.9.4 Discussion
The fundamentally new nature of UAS operations has had implications for several safety
assessment and operational approval decisions. Because of the lack of regulatory guidance
directly applicable to UAS and the lack of a full safety assessment, interim standards have been
based on judgment, and a substitution to equivalent performance. This approach has enabled
limited operations, but it is not comprehensive or rigorous enough to support routine operations.
Recognizing two driving equipment requirements for command and control and detect sense and
avoid, efforts through RTCA have begun to develop equipment standards to be used as the basis
for certification. These have limited scope by decomposing two functions that are of concern in
UAS operation. Even with the decomposition, there is still a significant scope of analysis
required to derive required performance for acceptable safety. Additionally, there is a risk that
the performance required in DSA and command and control systems may be specified to a level
that is unachievable with available technology, or prove costly to implement by the majority of
desired operators.
Beyond command and control and detect, sense and avoid, there will be a substantial set of
analyses required to determine the safety acceptability of UAS operations. Changes in pilot
tasks, levels of autonomy, and severity of risks are a few areas that drive a large scope of
analysis required.
It should be noted that the current approaches to evaluating UAS safety do not include airspace
design within the scope of analysis. The burden of mitigation lies within elements of the UAS
system. With the exception of limited use of restricted airspace to segregate UAS operations, the
requirement to change airspace structure has not been evaluated. In this way, the current
requirements of airspace limit achievable performance of unmanned aircraft.
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